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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this study was to explore whether operation police officials are adequately trained 
to make use of lethal force decisions in accordance with the legal requirements, particularly 
after the amendment to s49 (in 2003) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. To 
answer this question, the researcher set about to firstly, review the Basic Training Learning 
Programme (July 2004 to June 2006) of the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
specifically those aspects that dealt with the use of lethal force training in the SAPS and 
secondly, to review some decided case laws on the view held by the courts, on the use of 
lethal force.  
 
During the research, it was discovered that the amendment to s49 and the inadequate (in some 
cases lack of) training is a real cause for concern for operational police officials, both 
personally and professionally. This was prevalent amongst the seasoned police officials, i.e. 
those who served in the SAPS for more than 12 years. The research highlights some of the 
concerns in Chapter 6.  
 
There were many training related questions that arose. Recommendations are put forward in 
Chapter 7. In summary, what is being put forward in terms of use of force training in the 
SAPS is, in brief, the following:  
• an alignment of SAPS training on the use of lethal force to the amended legislative 
requirements (amended s49 and Constitution); and  
 
• a seamless framework in the training and education of police officials between those 
that served in the SAPS prior to the arrival of the new Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) 
and those that have enrolled after the changes made to the legislation (amended s49 
and Constitution).  
 
It is postulated that if the above suggestions are considered and/or implemented, it would 
give impetus to creating a new breed of police officials who are needed to meet the new 
challenges facing a fairly new democratic country.  
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Chapter 1 
MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Modern-day policing involves the practice of protecting and preserving human rights and lives. 
The acceptance of the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) sparked a new era in the 
field of policing in the Republic of South Africa. One of the founding provisions of the 
Constitution is that it is the supreme law of the Republic and therefore any law or conduct that is 
contrary to the Constitution, is invalid (Constitution 1996, Act 108 of 1996). Within the 
framework of the Constitution lies the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) which affords and reinforces 
basic human rights to all citizens of the Republic irrespective of race, creed, sex or age. This 
concept was never before included in the history of policing in South Africa.  
 
Prior to 1996, before the Constitution came into effect, the police were familiar and accustomed 
to using lethal power to take lives even if there was no imminent life-threatening danger to 
themselves or others. This situation was provided for by the old Section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977) which dealt with the use of lethal force when undertaking an 
arrest of a suspect. This piece of legislation clashed with the ideals and provisions of the new 
Constitution of South Africa.  
 
Over the last five years this situation has changed. Naturally, in the midst of these changes, the 
embattled Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereafter referred to as s49) and 
the police conduct touching on its provisions have come under close scrutiny. 
 
Section 49 (2) of The Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977), which dealt with the use of 
lethal force has had to be amended to satisfy the new democracy on which the foundation of the 
Constitution rests. Due to these changes, the South African Police Service (SAPS) is faced with 
the challenges of keeping abreast and in line with the constantly changing legal environment.  
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The police official is expected to protect the lives of all citizens of the country and themselves 
from life threatening danger. Furthermore, he or she must not act ultra vires, i.e. outside the 
scope of the law, specifically constitutional law. In the case of the use of lethal force this would 
entail that a police official is well trained in the proper handling of a firearm (skill) and is 
familiar with the legal requirements (theory) of using his/her firearm. Accordingly, the aim of 
this study is firstly, to review specifically the use of lethal force training in the South African 
Police Service’s Basic Training Learning Program to establish its appropriateness. Secondly, a 
comparison of the use of lethal force in the Basic Training Learning Program will be made 
against the data obtained from the fieldwork research (survey questionnaire and interviews) 
administered to a selected sample of current operational police officials. The disparity or 
synonymity between the Basic Training Learning Program and the use of lethal force and the 
actual use of lethal force by operational police officials will also be explored. The foregoing 
discussion serves to describe the present state of affairs. 
 
1.2 Rationale for research 
In 1998, two years after the birth of the Constitution, Parliament called for the amendment to 
section 49 (Maepa, 2002:12). This amendment, in fact, only came into effect on 18 July 2003 – 
nearly five years later. At the time, it had become necessary to amend s49, since it was contrary 
to the principles enshrined in the new Constitution. The main reason for such revision being that, 
whilst section 11 of the Constitution protected the fundamental right to life, in contrast, section 
49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act allowed for a fleeing person who was suspected of 
committing a Schedule 1 offence (refer to Annexure C for a detailed list of offences) to be shot at 
in order to secure the arrest (apprehension) of such a person whether he was fleeing or resisting 
arrest. At that time the use of lethal force in the SAPS was largely directed by s49 in the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). Human Rights principles did not form a 
significant part of this legislation whereas the Bill of Rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution, forms 
part of the very framework of the Constitution. Correspondingly, the Constitution advocated a 
democratic community orientated form of policing – again this was a completely new concept in 
policing in the Republic of South Africa. 
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Prior to the introduction of the new Constitution, if the suspect was fatally shot by police as 
he/she attempted to flee from a Schedule 1 offence, no criminal charges were brought against the 
police official if the incident complied with the requirements of ‘justifiable homicide’ (see old 
version of s49 below). The conduct of the police official was rarely scrutinised. The mere 
allegation on the part of the police official that the suspect was fleeing from a Schedule 1 offence 
appeared to have been an adequate justification and defence of the resulting action. Joubert 
(2001:244) confirms this and provides that s49 (2) (old version), “….in certain limited 
circumstances… justifies the killing of a suspect who resists an arrest or who flees”.  
 
However, section 13(3)(b) of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995), 
provides that police officials may use minimum force when on official duty, as authorised by law 
and that such force is to be ‘minimum and reasonable’ under the specific circumstances of the 
incident (Joubert, 2001:17).  
 
This research study will examine whether the police official understands the scope of their 
authority and the consequences of their actions when lethal force is to be used. A starting point 
then to be: just what is the status presently on the understanding of the use of lethal force as 
experienced by operational police officials? Furthermore, have police officials received adequate 
training, if any, after s49 was amended? If yes, are they in a position to make reasonable, 
informed use of lethal force decisions in order to protect themselves and the citizens of the 
country? This research accordingly sets out to explore aspects of these questions. 
 
1.3 An overview 
It must be borne in mind that this research is limited strictly to the use of lethal force only and 
not the use of force in general. In other words, the primary focus was on the use of firearms in 
policing and not the use of minimum force during policing or the use of such aids (equipment) as 
pepper spray, tonfa baton, handcuffs, etc.  
 
In order to determine the extent of practical and knowledge based training and exposure of police 
officials to the requirements for use of lethal force, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with operational police officials in two provinces, namely: Gauteng (Vaal Rand area) and the 
4 
 
Free State (Sasolburg area). The use of semi-structured interviews as a means to gather data was 
adopted. See discussion on page 19 at section 2.4 further on.  
 
It would have been insufficient to merely compare the laws of s49 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) and the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), 
without the inputs from the grassroots level of ordinary police officials on the street. Their views 
and perceptions on the use of lethal force play a vital role in understanding how they protect and 
serve the country, as well as how they interpret and act (policing) within the parameters of s49.  
 
The researcher interviewed 19 operational police officials in the Free State and 10 in the Gauteng 
province respectively. A total of 29 interviews were conducted. A great deal of information and 
insight was obtained from these interviews. At the time of the interviews, all of the respondents 
were operational police officials from three different units, namely: Flying Squad (10), Crime 
Prevention (9) and Community Service Centre (10).  
 
In addition, the researcher has extensive experience in the field of policing having performed 
duties as an operational police official in the Durban Flying Squad from 1991 to 2002. She was a 
Commissioned Officer who was also later a trainer in the SAPS and was responsible for 
overseeing the co-ordination of Basic Training nationally, as well as managing the Firearm 
Training Section at Protection and Security Services, SAPS National Head Office. Hence the 
choice of topic was in line with her field of interest. 
 
1.4 Problem statement  
The key question that was focused upon in the study was the following: 
 
Are operational police officials presently adequately trained to make use of lethal 
force decisions and act in line with legal requirements? 
 
Whilst the Constitution came into effect in 1996, the amended section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act only came into effect on 18 July 2003 after the case of Govender (SALR, 
2001:286) and Walters (SALR, 2002:615) challenged the constitutionality of the old s49(2). 
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Consequently, the Constitutional Court ruled that the old s49 was contrary to the Constitution 
and it therefore needed to be amended.  
 
Four years down the line, the researcher undertook this research in order to see how the police 
have rolled out these legislated changes to grassroots level, i.e. to operational police officials 
who are engaged more frequently in situations where they are exposed to the likelihood of using 
their firearms.  
 
The authority to shoot at another person is powerful if not potent. One would expect that the 
person with this authority is indeed a professional who has been trained in line with the relevant 
knowledge, skills and attributes. Their decisions then would be fair, reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society. 
 
For these reasons, there is a dire need for this type of research. As far as the researcher is aware, 
besides the Mistry, Minnaar, Redpath and Dhlamini (2001)1 study on use of force in Gauteng – 
which was completed before the changes to s49 were implemented – studies of this nature have 
not been done in South Africa before.  
 
Moreover, for members of the SAPS, uncertainty and indecision around the use of force, is 
indeed a worrisome situation. Whilst the Department of Justice welcomed the new legislation on 
the use of force, the Ministry of Safety and Security were particularly wary of it, in fact quite 
non-supportive and to a certain extent obstructive. This view is supported by Bruce (2002:4d), 
where he submitted that the amendment was “resisted, most notably by the SAPS and Minister of 
Safety and Security”.  
 
The confusion was perpetuated by the delay in the Presidency in ratifying the new legislation as 
a result of the concerns raised by both the Departments of Justice and Safety & Security. 
However, in terms of our new democracy, if the Constitutional Court decides that a “bill is 
constitutional, the president must sign it” (Motala, 2002:180). 
                                                
1
 Full report can be viewed at www.crimeinstitute.ac.za and is also available on the Independent Complaints 
Directorate’s website at www.icd.gov.za. .  
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The delay (five years) was as a result of concerns from the Ministry of Safety and Security and 
the National Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi. National Commissioner Selebi indicated in 
2002 that the SAPS was “not ready” for the amendment (Maepa, 2002:12).  
 
On the other hand, the amendment brought along confusion and misconception as police officials 
believed their policing powers had now been limited. The reason for the confusion was that 
firstly, whereas previously (before the implementation of the new Constitution in 1996), the 
police could shoot at a suspect who was fleeing from a Schedule 1 offence. Secondly, in 1998 
Parliament debated the issue and called for an amendment, whilst simultaneously the legality of 
Section 49 as opposed to the Constitution was being tested in court (Govender v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) and Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC)).  
 
Bruce (2000:2) indicates that in South Africa, there is “… high levels of violent crime and large 
numbers of attacks on and murders of police members”2. Whilst Masuku (2002:5-6) points out 
that violent crime levels increased throughout the country, especially crimes like vehicle hi-
jacking, robberies, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and attempted murder. Such a 
situation put police officials on the ground under tremendous pressure to respond to criminals 
likewise by using lethal use of force as an almost immediate reaction. However, with the 
uncertainty about its use in the minds of operational police officials the issue became even 
further complicated. 
 
Statistics reveal that crime stabilised at unacceptably high levels during the period 1991 to 2001.3 
It is suggested therefore that the debacle around the use of force during this period contributed to 
the high crime levels as police officials were uncertain as to the circumstances during which they 
may or may not use their firearms in the performance of their day-to-day duties.  
 
                                                
2
 Minnaar (2003) maintains that per 100 000 of the population South Africa has one of the highest if not highest in 
the world rates of the killing of police officials.  
3
 For detailed analysis of the South African crime statistics and rate per 100 000 of the population see 
www.saps.org.za.  
7 
 
However, amidst this changing landscape, the right to shoot remained if a suspect threatened the 
life of the police official or any other person. This situation was not initially realized by 
operational police officials and contributed to the confusion around the amendment to Section 
49.  
 
This view is supported by a research report of case studies from seven policing areas in Gauteng 
which was undertaken in 2001 by the Institute for Human Rights & Criminal Justice Studies at 
the Technikon SA at the request of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) (Mistry, 
Minnaar, Redpath & Dhlamini, 2001). 
 
In this research report it was revealed that some police officials felt powerless because the 
circumstances during which force may be applied were restricted whilst suspects get away 
(literally) ‘with murder’ when it comes to the use of force. Some police officials interviewed for 
this report believed that suspects have more rights than they (police officials) do (Mistry et al., 
2001:47). The new Section 49 came into effect on 18 July 2003, and although the research for 
the Mistry et al. report was conducted in 2001, the research for this study will show that there are 
still operational police officials who have received no formal training on the legal application on 
the use of lethal force when effecting an arrest. Research conducted in this study, apart from 
other findings, demonstrates that similar beliefs and perceptions (as revealed in the Mistry et al. 
report), still exist. (See Chapter 6 for more detail). 
 
According to Bruce (1999), ordinary members of the public, as well as the police official, have 
the right to use lethal, deadly force when their lives or property are threatened – even the highest 
court in this land does not possess the authority to impose such a harsh sanction.4  
 
In a new democracy with a supreme Constitution that espoused basic human rights such as 
dignity, respect and more importantly the right to life, there was no question that s49 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act had to be amended so that it fell in line with the changing needs of the 
country. 
 
                                                
4
 In 1995, in a landmark judgement, the South African Constitutional Court struck down the death penalty. 
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1.5. Aims of research 
The purpose of this research will serve: 
• to examine the training curriculum on the use of lethal force in basic police training (July 
2004 to June 2006) and comment on the content of the use of lethal force (Chapter 3); 
• to align that part of the training curriculum focusing on the use of lethal force with the 
decided case laws which played a key role in shaping the new s49 (Chapter 4); 
• to highlight and or explore ‘grey areas’ in the new Section 49 on the use of lethal force 
and identify shortcomings (Chapter 5) and; 
• to compare the above with the results of the data obtained from the sample group of 
operational police officials (Chapter 6) 
 
It is believed that this research shall contribute to encouraging a culture of making responsible 
lethal force decisions in line with legal Constitutional requirements. 
 
With a view to gaining insight and a better understanding of this dynamic field of policing, a 
recommendation shall be tendered which may contribute to effective and professional service 
delivery.  
 
The research shall strive to highlight the problems, fears and concerns faced by operational 
police officials in the transition on the use of lethal force in policing thus far, as well as suggest 
solutions to these concerns. The following terms are defined in order to provide clarity on issues 
to be discussed. 
 
1.6.  Definition of concepts  
The key concepts used in the study are as follows:   
 
1.6.1 Lethal Force 
For the purpose of this study, lethal force (also commonly referred to as deadly force), shall 
mean the use of a firearm by a police official in the execution of his duties for the purposes of, 
but not limited to, the effecting of an arrest. Hall & Whitaker (1999:393) describe deadly force 
as that …. “which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm…”.  
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1.6.2 Police official 
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act defines “peace officer” as including any “magistrate, 
justice of the peace, police official, any member of the Department of Correctional Services and 
a peace officer appointed in terms of section 334 of the Criminal Procedure Act” (Joubert, 
2001:21).  
 
More appropriately, the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, Section 5(a) provides that 
the “Service shall consist of all persons who immediately before the commencement of this Act 
were members” (Butterworths, 2000:129).  
 
A police official for the purpose of this study shall mean a person appointed in terms of any of 
the above provisions to serve in the South African Police Service (after or while undergoing the 
requisite training in policing). 
 
1.6.3 Criminal Procedure 
The understanding of criminal procedure may be aptly explained as follows. Our law has two 
major divisions namely; public and private law. Public law relates to the “relationship between 
the state and the subject of the state,” whilst private law refers to the “relationship between 
individual and individual” (Introduction to the Theory of Law, Study Guide, Unisa 2002:25). 
This explanation is in concurrence with Kleyn and Viljoen’s (1996:102) submission which 
provides that Criminal Procedure “prescribes” the way in which a person suspected of having 
committed an offence should be prosecuted. Whilst Joubert (2001:7-8) explains that Criminal 
Procedure falls under formal law (adjective law) and refers to codified statutory law. Therefore, 
we shall interpret criminal procedure as a part of public law that regulates and prescribes the 
procedure to be followed when criminal law has been violated. This procedure is contained in the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. This research will deal specifically with the use of 
lethal force issue as contained in Section 49 of the abovementioned Act – an Act that authorises 
police officials to use lethal force in limited circumstances in order to carry out their duties. 
Importantly, Joubert (2003:3), justifiably points out that these criminal procedural rules are 
“subject to the supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996”, 
and are therefore jointly married with common law and constitutional rights. 
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1.6.4 Reasonable force 
Reasonable “suggests a rational basis for police action which can be tested objectively” (Pike, 
1985:115). In my opinion, this definition is too vague. Branford (1994:36), provides that it 
means “having sound judgement .ready to listen to reason”. On the other hand, according to the 
English Dictionary force means “power, strength, .military strength” (Branford, 1994:361). For 
the purposes of this research study, reasonable force shall mean the degree of power and strength 
needed to effect an arrest after arriving at a sensible, logical and sound decision based on a set of 
given facts and acting in accordance with this insight. 
 
1.6.5 Case law 
According to Joubert (1999:7), case laws are “court decisions which interpret both common law 
and statutory provisions and adjust those provisions to fit the realities of the day”.  
 
A review of appropriate and/or relevant case laws allows for courts to change old laws to suit the 
needs of present day society, (e.g. section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act had to be amended 
to remove power of persons to use lethal force against fleeing suspects who do not pose a danger 
to anyone). Case law forms an invaluable source of law because, firstly it allows us to understand 
and interpret the law properly. Secondly, so that the law may be justifiably and effectively 
enforced. 
 
1.6.6 Schedule 1 offences  
The Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) has seven schedules. These schedules consist 
of a “combination of offences”. These offences are grouped together into schedules. The reason 
for this is that these groups of offences are relevant to certain sectors in the Criminal Procedure 
Act – this prevents repetition of offences when sections are being discussed.  
 
Schedule 1 offences are grouped specifically for sections 40, 42 and 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Schedule 1 offences are treason, sedition, public violence, murder, culpable 
homicide, rape, indecent assault, bestiality, robbery, kidnapping, childstealing, assault when a 
dangerous wound is inflicted, arson, malicious injury to property, etc. (see attached list as per 
Annexure C) (Joubert, 2001:408). 
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1.6.7 Training 
Training according to Erasmus & Van Dyk (1999:2) “….can be regarded as a systematic and 
planned process to change the knowledge, skills and behaviour of employees in such a way that 
organisational objectives are achieved”. 
 
1.6.8 Unit Standards 
According to the Firearm Competency Assessment and Training Centre website (accessed on 15 
January 2009), a “unit standard requires a learner to demonstrate competency / skills in specific 
outcomes”. Both formative and summative assessment methods are used to assess the 
competency and skills against specific outcomes 
(http://www.fcatc.co.za/standards/standards.htm). For the purposes of this research, reference to 
a unit standard shall mean a registered statement that contains the required education, specific 
outcomes and assessment criteria, as well as other administrative needs, that are to be completed 
in order to be deemed competent and qualified in a particular learning field. 
 
1.7 Value of the research 
The necessity of this type of research cannot be over-emphasized. The research provides 
recommendations and suggestions on future training needs on the use of lethal force for 
operational police officials. These proposed solutions, if implemented by the SAPS, may inter 
alia: 
− serve to eliminate uncertainty experienced by operational police officials by providing an 
interpretation on the new section 49; 
 
− contribute towards implementing a learning programme for operational police officials on 
the use of lethal force; 
 
− identify gaps at this moment in time on use of lethal force training in SAPS and assist in 
determining the way forward; and 
 
− promote/encourage professional service delivery in the SAPS. 
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The following synopsis will explain the chapters that follow. 
 
1.8  Layout of dissertation 
Chapter 2 explains and outlines the research methodology employed, as well as the sampling 
techniques used for research data collection. Problems encountered during the research are also 
detailed. Chapter 3 explores the present state of affairs with reference to the training in the Basic 
Training Learning Program on the use of lethal force, and also reviews the use of lethal force 
training provided to new recruits of the SAPS. In conclusion, a brief overview of the regulation 
of the use of lethal force training by the Safety & Security Sector Education & Training 
Authority (SASSETA) is provided. Insights into the legal framework on the use of lethal force 
are introduced in Chapter 4. These touch on the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act, 
decided case laws and the SAPS Act. 
 
An exploration of differing opinions on the interpretation of the new s49 is contained in Chapter 
5, whilst Chapter 6 serves to summarise the research findings of twenty-nine (29) respondents 
who were interviewed between March and April 2006. A statistical analysis of the data that was 
collected follows. Chapter 7 concludes with recommendations on future training on the use of 
lethal force in policing, which focus on overcoming current concerns.  
 
1.9 Summary 
It is firmly felt by the researcher that a study of this nature will benefit the government, citizens 
of the Republic of South Africa, the SAPS and police officials in general. The responsibility of 
protecting human rights is the responsibility of every inhabitant of our country. Therefore, 
organisations such as the SAPS, South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), Business Against Crime (BAC), personnel at the 
Ministry of Police, learning centres such as UNISA and the people of our country, will be 
enlightened and sensitised to the need for more comprehensive and detailed police training on 
the use of lethal force. A study of this nature will add value and benefit all these role players. It 
may create awareness on shortcomings presently experienced and instil confidence in both the 
police and the public.  
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Chapter 2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, SAMPLING OF TARGET POPULATION 
AND DATA COLLECTION 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The method used to obtain information in this research study was through qualitative 
methodology by means of semi-structured, one-on-one interviews. A literature review was 
undertaken. In addition, a review of the training material5 used at the Police Training College 
(Pretoria West) was incorporated as part of the overall research thrust. Most of the information 
that the researcher will introduce during this study has been gleaned from the in-depth one-on-
one interviews held with operational police officials in the Vaal Rand Flying Squad and the 
Sasolburg policing area. In some cases these interviews went on for over an hour since the 
research was of an exploratory nature.  
 
2.1.1 A note on the station and areas selected  
Gauteng has a total of 130 police stations6 under its jurisdiction. These police stations are 
grouped into eight areas, of which the Vaal Rand is one area. Further, the Vaal Rand area7 in turn 
comprises of 13 (of the 130) police stations under its area of jurisdiction. They are Boipatong, De 
Deur, Ennerdale, Evaton, Kliprivier, Lenasia South, Meyerton, Orange Farms, Sebokeng, 
Sharpeville, The Barrage, Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging.8 Nine respondents in the sample 
population of this study, are responsible for operational policing duties in these areas.  
 
The Free State Province has a total of 109 police stations under its jurisdiction.9 SAPS 
Sasolburg10 is one of the police stations in the Free State Province (www.saps.org.za). Nineteen 
                                                
5
 Refer to Chapter 3 for detail on SAPS Basic Training Learning Programme and the Reference list of sources 
consulted. 
6
 Refer to http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2008/_provinces/gauteng/gauteng.htmurce 
for more detail.  
7
 See map of Vaal Rand area as per Annexure A. 
8
 See http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2008/_provinces/gauteng/gauteng.htm.  
9
 See http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2008/_provinces/freestate/free_state.htm for detail. 
10
 See map of Sasolburg as per Annexure B. 
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respondents in this study, were drawn from the Community Service Centre and Crime Prevention 
units of SAPS Sasolburg. 
 
2.2 Research design 
The researcher used qualitative research methods since, unlike quantitative methods, evaluation 
of the current SAPS Basic Training Learning Programme occurred in “natural settings” 
(Mouton, 2001:161). In this way, the researcher gained the confidence and trust of participants. 
This empirical research was conducted in the form of exploratory questions. An empirical 
question, like the topic of this research, addresses a real life problem. Quantitatively, in order to 
improve the validity and objectivity of the research, an analysis of data took the form of a 
thematic coding system in which statistical data could be drawn. It is believed that this allowed 
for a more holistic approach to the study.  
 
2.3 Sampling of target population 
In this qualitative study, police officials engaged in operational duties at station level were 
approached for the purposes of conducting semi-structured interviews. A probability sample in 
the form of simple random sampling was used. In such a probability sampling, any member of 
the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample (Welman & Kruger, 
2000:52). The plan entailed the use of three groups of participants. They were as follows: 
• operational police officials at the Community Service Centre (CSC) 
• operational police officials at the Crime Prevention unit (CP) 
• operational police officials at the Vaal Rand Police Emergency Services (PES) hereafter 
referred to as the Flying Squad. 
 
A letter requesting permission to undertake the research was drafted and sent to Assistant 
Commissioner G. E. Moorcroft, The Head: Strategic Management, SAPS (see Annexure J). On 
receipt of approval a presentation was made to the SAPS Sasolburg Management team (research 
site area). The Area office at Vaal Rand was contacted and a meeting with the commander of the 
Emergency Response Services (Flying Squad) was held.  
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The questionnaire and entire process was explained. Copies of the letter of approval for the 
training etcetera were provided to those attending the meeting. In addition input and suggestions 
from the team were invited and encouraged. A date was set down to indicate the start of 
interviews pending their inputs/feedback/problems from the SAPS team. Shift rosters for the 
Community Service Centre (CSC), Crime Prevention and Flying squad were obtained. A random 
sample (every fourth person and so on) was drawn off the prepared lists. There were 
approximately 10 persons drawn per unit. These lists were communicated to the respective 
commanders at Sasolburg and Emergency Response Services (Flying Squad).  
 
The interviews were arranged and co-ordinated according to the shift roster – where the members 
were off sick or on vacation leave or unavailable, the researcher adopted the name that was one 
up or one down on the list (whoever was available at that time). The interviews were conducted 
at SAPS Sasolburg, the offices of the researcher in Sasolburg and at the offices of the Flying 
Squad. The duration of each interview was between one to one-and-half hours. The interviews 
were audio-tape recorded and supplemented by handwritten field notes.  
 
The whole interview and transcribing process in fact proved to be a very lengthy and difficult 
process for the following reasons: 
• language barriers; 
• inaudibility of tapes (outside interference/noises); 
• poor understanding of certain questions by the respondents; 
• the unavailability of shift workers or police officials always working outside of their 
offices (operational); 
• service delivery could have been compromised if patrol vehicle drivers or 
Community Service Centre workers were taken off their duties; 
 
With that in mind, the researcher set about to interview 29 respondents (operational police 
officials) by means of in-depth one-on-one interviews. The respondents were drawn by a random 
sampling technique and each respondent had an equal chance of being selected. The research 
population was from the Sasolburg, Free State province (accounting for 19 of the respondents) 
whilst the other respondents were from the Vaal Rand Police Emergency Services (the remaining 
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10) which is situated in the Gauteng province. These semi-structured interviews were recorded 
on audio tape. The audio cassette was transcribed verbatim and categorised thematically. A total 
of 34 questions were posed to each respondent. The analysis of the information proved to be 
challenging since 21 of the questions were a simple arithmetic (numerical) exercise of counting 
up the numbers and/or responses. However, the remaining 13 questions had to be thematically 
coded by the researcher manually. The procedure of analysis took the form of a manual system 
for both the statistical and thematic coding of responses. The responses of each interview were 
cross checked and anomalies were identified. A pattern was thus identified, categorised and 
coded. In addition the interviewer compiled field-notes during the interview. The notes were 
consulted to cross check and verify information. The information was then coded and analysed 
accordingly. 
 
This involved reading the response of each respondent for each question many times over to 
identify common themes. These themes were then listed and the interviews were then re-read 
and the responses grouped according to the respective themes. Many of the respondents got off 
the topic and this caused variations to be added and its relevance considered. As a result, after 
analysis in some cases, a re-analysis had to be done to revisit the themes themselves and group 
them as well. 
 
Essentially, the semi-structured interviews were then analysed in two ways: 
• Firstly, statistically by coding responses e.g. Yes =1, No = 2 etc., and; 
• Secondly, patterns and trends in open-ended questions were thematically coded.  
 
The researcher managed to complete (and record) twenty-nine interviews, hereafter the 
researcher proceeded to transcribe and analyse all 29 interviews (ten from the Gauteng Province 
(Vaal Rand area) and nineteen of the Free State Province (Sasolburg)).  
 
There were a total of 34 questions in the interview schedule of which 21 were numerically coded 
and 13 were thematically (categories) analysed and then coded. The latter questions were read 
and re-read so that common themes could be identified and grouped. This thematic coding 
process was long and fraught with language problems, poor understanding, poor speech, etcetera, 
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emanating from the respondents answers/responses. To overcome this challenge the tape extracts 
had to be repeatedly listened to and cross-checked with the handwritten field notes to improve 
the integrity and accuracy of the information collected.  
 
Upon analysis of the information collected, the researcher drew certain conclusions on the 
research hypothesis and interpretation.  
 
2.4 Data collection and data capture 
As indicated earlier, data was collected by means of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
the three identified groups namely the community Service Centre, the Crime Prevention Unit and 
the Flying Squad. Welman & Kruger (2000:166), provide that semi-structured interviews are a 
versatile way of collecting data. The reasons for this method of data collection are that subjects 
of different levels and backgrounds may be accommodated. This method was appropriate 
because vague responses could be probed for elaboration or clarification (Welman & Kruger 
2000:167).  
 
From the outset it was evident the sample population would involve police officials of different 
age groups with varying degrees of experience in policing. Consequently, in order to cull 
information from the diverse population, the in-depth one-on-one interview was decided upon to 
draw on individual experience of each interviewee. 
 
Whereas in structured interviews, the interviewer is restricted to a schedule of questions, in semi-
structured interviews, an interview guide was compiled. This interview guide focused on various 
aspects of training in the correct use of lethal force such as individual responses by police 
officials, perceptions, understanding, etc.  
By using this method the researcher interacted with the individual and experienced their life 
world without suggesting responses or influencing answers (Welman & Kruger, 2000:196). In 
this way first-hand experience of the participant on the use of force was focused upon. A mini 
tape recorder was used in the interview with the audio recording being transcribed at a later 
stage. Transcripts of all interviews are discussed in the analysis section of this study and are 
available upon request. 
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The interview guide also comprised of aspects related to theoretical training on the use of lethal 
force. All the respondents were asked the same question (Welman & Kruger, 2000:167). In some 
instances the interviewer adapted the question to suit the background of the respondent.  
 
According to Welman (2000:167), semi-structured interviews offer versatility, which is the very 
reason why the researcher chose this method for data collection. Only those police officials 
working operational at the time or period the researcher conducted the interviews, were 
interviewed. This was convenient for all parties and cost effective. The units of analyses (sample 
of the population) were readily available for research purposes in terms of geographic location. 
In addition, it was convenient and economical for the researcher, who is a resident in the Free 
State area. 
 
The interviewer (researcher) took special care not to influence the responses of the respondents 
in any manner. This entailed that no leading questions were asked, and body language, tone of 
voice, facial expressions etc. of both interviewee and interviewer, were taken into consideration. 
Every effort was made to create a conducive environment in order to conduct the interview.  
 
When the first interviews were carried out, the interference of external stimuli, e.g. police sirens, 
radio playing and office movements impacted negatively on the interviews. The sounds were 
picked up by the tape recorder and transcribing of these recordings became difficult and 
challenging because of the background noise. Therefore after the first four interviews, 
permission was obtained to move the interviews away from the Sasolburg Police Station and 
conduct them at the researcher’s office.  
 
Saturation levels (repetition of responses) in terms of information collected were reached after 
approximately 15 interviews had been conducted. 
 
In this study, the semi-structured interviews were recorded on tape. The audio cassette was 
transcribed verbatim and clustered into categories (same theme). During the interviews, detailed 
handwritten field-notes were taken. During the transcription process the interview was typed out 
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based on the audio tape recordings. The handwritten notes were used to cross check and confirm 
in order to minimise error. 
 
In terms of the legal framework, data on current legislative requirements on the use of force in 
respect of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) and the Judicial Matters Second 
Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No 122 of 1998) were consulted. This included relevant decided 
case laws from 1995 to 2003 that pertain to the use of lethal force. The aim was to provide a 
possible interpretation of the amended Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 
of 1977). 
 
So too, the curriculum of the Basic Training Learning Programme of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) from July 2004 to June 2006 was obtained and specifically those aspects dealing 
with the use of lethal force training were reviewed. Crime statistics for the years 2001 to 2007 
are reviewed and presented.  
 
2.5 Data analysis 
Data analysis began after the 29 interviews had been concluded. In the analysis phase, an 
“appropriate statistical procedure” was chosen to analyse the data (Welman and Kruger, 
2000:201).  
 
The procedure of analysis took the form of a manual approach. Statistics were compiled after the 
answers received from the respondents were thematically coded. Twenty-one questions out of 
thirty-four in the interview schedule were coded numerically and placed on an excel sheet (e.g. 
Yes =1, No = 2, not applicable = 3, etc.) Simple arithmetic was used to total the numbers per 
response.  
 
These totals were then divided into the number of respondents and the percentage was calculated 
(e.g. if 10 answered yes, 10/29 respondents x 100% = 34%.) Therefore 34% of the sample 
population answered in the affirmative. 
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However, the remaining thirteen questions were dealt with differently. A thematic coding system 
was employed. The individual responses of the 29 respondents for each of the questions were 
read and re-read. Common patterns and themes were identified, categorised and coded. The 
coded themes were listed, the 29 responses for that question was read again and coded 
accordingly. Again to minimise error in the findings, uncertainties were cross checked against 
the field notes and audio tape. After this thematic coding system was applied, the thirteen 
questions were then analysed in the same method as the numerically coded questions where 
percentages were worked out based on responses received. Some results are explained with the 
aid of tables, graphs and figures. This system of analysis allowed for findings and data to be 
properly interpreted. The main findings could be highlighted, both negative and positive. 
 
2.5.1 Some shortcomings experienced 
The process used in the analysis was very challenging and a long process. It was also time 
consuming.  
 
Language barriers and dialect interfered with communication. The mini-tape recorder used was 
not functioning optimally during the last three interviews. As a result the researcher relied 
heavily on the handwritten notes for these interviews.  
 
2.6 Validity and reliability of data collection 
In the interests of trustworthiness and authenticity, the transcripts of the interviews were cross-
checked against the handwritten notes. The anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. An 
interview guide was used in the one-on-one semi-structured interviews. Again, to ensure validity 
and reliability, the researcher did not use leading questions, ambiguous or double-barrelled 
questions. The same questions were put to all participants, adapting the approach to match the 
participants’ background and education level (Welman & Kruger, 2000:167). The researcher 
took care not to influence respondents by way of body language, tone of voice and expression. 
The researcher conducted the interviews in a relaxed environment and explored the opinions of 
police officials interviewed. 
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Only operational police officials were interviewed, i.e. those police officials who are attending to 
complaints and are more frequently called upon to use force in the execution of their duties. 
Police officials involved in management, administration and investigation were excluded from 
the study. For the purposes of the study, only those operational police officials attached to rapid 
response units were interviewed. The data that was collected from the interviews were analysed 
and compared with SAPS statistics and annual reports.  
 
A study of (8) South African case laws and one case law of the United States, on the use of lethal 
force, from the period 1978 to July 2002 were examined (see Chapter 4 ). These methods were 
employed to ensure validity and reliability of the proposed study. 
 
2.7 Ethical considerations  
The researcher adhered to the ethical code of conduct regarding research as prescribed by the 
University of South Africa (Unisa). Further, the ethical Code of Conduct, as mentioned in 
articles 70 and 71 of the SAPS Act, Act 95 of 1998 were adhered to as well as the requirements 
of the South African Police Services National Instruction 1/2006 with respect to conducting 
research in the police service.  
 
As is recommended by Welman, (2000:164) the researcher dressed discreetly so as not to detract 
or impact on the respondents responses. All role-players were informed that their participation 
was not obligatory but voluntary. Their consent to participate was requested and obtained before 
the interview progressed. The identity of the respondents used in the sampling was protected by 
anonymity and information received was handled confidentially. Victims of police shootings 
were not interviewed. 
 
2.8 Research problems  
2.8.1 Legal challenges 
There has been no decided case law on the present amended version of s49 so that it can be 
interpreted. A decided case law decision on the amended version (new s49) may provide better 
insight in recommending the implementation of an appropriate training programme for SAPS 
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officials. In order to overcome this, the researcher reviewed decided cases on the use of lethal 
force since 1994, although it was difficult to draw the ideal interpretation on the new s49. 
 
The reasoning in these decided case laws was interpreted. One of the questions pondered upon 
was: how does the police official determine “substantial risk” as mentioned in the new section 
49? Each situation is unique and different people respond differently to certain situations. To 
overcome this, the researcher highlighted the precedents as set by the courts in the various cases 
dealing with this matter. In other words each case is judged on its own merits before reaching a 
decision. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on these). 
 
2.8.2 Availability of candidates 
The nature of this study – an examination of the use of lethal force – required that operational 
police officials who are more frequently exposed to life threatening situations be interviewed. In 
all cases they were the first to respond to incidents of crime. The selected sample of respondents 
was therefore not always available. Although interviews were authorised and scheduled well in 
advance, the candidates were not always available to attend.  
 
The shortage of manpower at the Community Service Centre was a challenge in that dates had to 
be re-arranged on several occasions. In some instances, e.g. the Community Service Centre 
(CSC), there was only one patrol vehicle available to attend to crime incidents. The researcher 
could not conduct the interview as this would mean that the only patrol vehicle would not be 
available to attend to complaints that could possibly have been of a life threatening nature, and 
the community at large would have suffered the consequences.  
 
The initial interviews at Sasolburg SAPS were conducted on the first floor at the police station. 
At daily temperatures in the Free State reaching 38 degrees celsius, there was no air-conditioning 
or fan so the windows had to be kept opened during the interviews. Consequently, sirens, police 
vehicles hooting, shouting, talking, screaming across the parking lot, the sound of police vehicles 
entering and leaving the police premises, etcetera had a major impact on the process of 
transcribing the first five interviews. This interviewing environment was extremely 
uncomfortable and not conducive for that purpose. 
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Further, all candidates interviewed worked shifts. In the Sasolburg area in the Free State 
Province where the majority of the interviews were held (19), some of the respondents worked 
‘seven-to-seven’ shifts (12 hours a day) whilst others worked eight-hour shifts.  
 
It was, therefore, a challenge to co-ordinate arrangements and in most instances the researcher 
turned up only to be asked to re-schedule because the respondent was on leave. Therefore many 
of the interviews had to be conducted after hours or off peak periods. In one instance on 4 
February 2006, a Saturday afternoon, the researcher turned up to conduct interviews at the SAPS 
Sasolburg but was turned away as a result of the shortage of manpower, alternate arrangements 
had to be made for the second time. The researcher had to be very patient and understanding 
because the research population was engaged in duties and the needs of the public had to be put 
first. 
 
2.8.3 Geographical difficulties 
The initial research proposal indicated that the sample would be drawn from the Pretoria area. 
However, during the course of the study the researcher took up a new job (left the SAPS) and re-
located to the Sasolburg, Free State area before the field research could be undertaken. 
Consequently the sample of respondents was drawn from this area to which the researcher had 
relocated. In order to gauge police perceptions in both areas and widen the exploratory research, 
the researcher also drew a sample from the Gauteng area, across the Vaal River in 
Vanderbijlpark, the home of the Vaal Rand Police Emergency Services (Flying Squad). The 
researcher had to travel about 50 kilometres return to conduct these interviews. 
 
2.8.4 Getting off the topic 
On many occasions the respondents would evade the question and relate incidents that did not 
directly address the question asked.  
 
This was especially prevalent for questions they did not appear to have an answer for because 
there were long pauses before making a response (if at all). The researcher encouraged them by 
saying that there was no right or wrong answer and that they should explain how they perceived 
the situation (the specific issue/situation the question was addressing).  
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An example of this would be for Question 29: Were you ever trained regarding the correlation 
and/or differences between the use of lethal force during arrest and acting in private defence? In 
these situations the respondents were gently prompted and the question was rephrased for a 
response. It is possible that the questions were not phrased in simple enough English. This 
problem was addressed by rephrasing the question so that the respondent could understand its 
main thrust. 
 
2.8.5 Language usage 
Language barriers posed a major challenge. The popular ethnic language spoken by the majority 
of the respondents in the Sasolburg area was Xhosa whilst the rest of the candidates 
communicated in Afrikaans, which is their first language. The researcher’s first language is 
English but she is literate in Afrikaans although she had seldom (infrequently) used Afrikaans 
(coming from KwaZulu-Natal) over the past 15 years. After the first interview the researcher 
went over the interview schedule and edited it in Afrikaans so that it could be correctly 
communicated to the Afrikaans-speaking respondents.  
 
Some of the questions in the interview schedule were too difficult for the respondents to 
understand so it had to be explained in simpler terms. The interview questions were not asked in 
simple English and this sometimes posed a problem. Fortunately, the use of semi-structured 
interviews allowed for the researcher to break down the questions in simpler terms, one-on-one 
with the respondent. 
 
2.8.6 Miscommunication with SAPS hierarchy 
After receiving permission to conduct the research from SAPS Head Office the researcher 
requested and received permission from the Area commissioner to address a management 
meeting at SAPS Sasolburg. At this meeting the research proposal was presented to those police 
officials present. Questions, feedback and suggestions from the management team were invited. 
The researcher requested to start interviews on 2 February 2006 and was told that there would be 
no problems. At 15h15 on 1 February 2006 (day before the interviews were scheduled to start), 
the Station Commissioner’s secretary informed the researcher that the Commissioner had a 
“problem” and the interviews could not go ahead as scheduled. No communication in respect of 
25 
 
the same was received before this date. The Commissioner then impolitely referred the 
researcher to the SAPS Provincial Commissioner in Welkom. The Sasolburg Station 
Commissioner, further stated that only if the Provincial Commissioner grants his/her permission 
will the researcher be allowed to undertake the interviews to continue.  
 
The Station Commissioner informed the researcher that she just needed to “cover” herself. After 
numerous calls to SAPS National Head Office: Strategic Management and to the Provincial 
Commissioner, the researcher managed to get the go ahead. The Provincial Commissioner was 
extremely helpful and requested documentation (inter alia Head Office permission letter) 
submitted previously to the Sasolburg Commissioner’s office. He perused the same and at about 
17h00 on the 1 February granted and approved the conducting of interviews for the next day.  
 
2.8.7 Transcription challenges 
Towards the end of the interviews, i.e. from interview 25 onwards, the mini tape recorder was 
not functioning properly. At certain times it did not tape the respondent’s complete responses to 
the questions. The researcher had to then rely heavily on the detailed notes made in order to 
transcribe the information accurately for these interviews. In some instances the respondents 
spoke too softly and/or inaudibly. 
 
2.8.8 Selection criteria for candidates 
Only operational police officials were interviewed. Operational police officials from two 
provinces were chosen to draw a sample from, namely: Free State (SAPS Sasolburg) and 
Gauteng Province (SAPS Vaal Rand: Police Emergency Services).  
 
Respondents from three divisions were drawn, namely: 
• Community Service Centre 
• Crime Prevention 
• Police Emergency Services (Flying Squad) 
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Again the shortage of manpower and responding to complaints (calls of duty) were naturally a 
priority for this particular group of respondents. (See availability of candidates as mentioned 
above.) 
 
2.9  Summary 
Language barriers posed some problems and respondents may have had difficulty in 
understanding the questions. The gap in this research would be that this study focussed primarily 
on the use of lethal force (largely the use of firearms in situations where responding to 
complaints or crime incidents) as opposed to the use of minimum force in general, i.e. restraining 
techniques, take down holds, practical officer survival techniques, self defence and hand-to-hand 
combat. Accordingly the aspects of the use of minimum force and its associated tactics and 
techniques could be further explored in a later study.  
 
The methodology used to conduct research into this field from start to finish provided valuable 
insight for the researcher. The setbacks/delays and limitations were eventually overcome. For 
example the poor co-operation received from some officials, to working after hours and off peak 
periods to keep appointments and interview times. To improve reliability and validity of the 
research information during the transcribing, cross-checking between audio tape and handwritten 
notes was done throughout the process. The researcher adopted a versatile approach, from 
dressing down to working after hours, to trying to create a comfortable (interview conducive) 
environment and ensure that those selected were actually interviewed. The data collected from 
the interviews were supplemented by the in-depth review of the Basic Training Learning 
Programme on the use of lethal force used by the SAPS. Further, the findings on the decided 
case laws were compared to the Basic Training Learning Programme to verify any correlation. 
The review of the Basic Training Learning Programme, case laws, and data obtained from 
interviews and various other writings informed the recommendations made in Chapter 7.   
 
Overall, this chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a better understanding into the 
methods used, the manner (how) and the circumstances under which the research was 
undertaken. 
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Chapter 3 
OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE TRAINING IN THE 
BASIC TRAINING LEARNING PROGRAMME OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE (SAPS) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction 
Operational police officials are daily placed in challenging situations in the execution of their 
duties. Having recently joined the democratic order of nations, South Africa as a country did not 
formally recognise human rights prior to the implementation of the interim Constitution of 1993 
and the new Constitution of 1996. This sentiment is shared by Joubert (2001:10) who maintains 
that in the “greater part of the twentieth century South Africa’s government lacked legitimacy…., 
the police were seen by many as the upholders of Apartheid,………”. The use of lethal force is 
contrary to the fundamental right to life as stated in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa. 
Keeping in mind the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land (section 2 of 
Constitution) the following sections in this chapter deal with a review of the content of the Basic 
Training Learning Programme that was adopted by the SAPS for the period from July 2004 to 
June 2006. However, at the time this research was conducted the old curriculum was in the 
process of being reviewed. It must further be borne in mind that the Basic Training Learning 
Programme has subsequently been reviewed and changed in certain aspects of content.  
 
3.2 Background on use of lethal force in the SAPS  
Prior to the 1996 implementation of the new Constitution, human rights were not a major 
policing priority. The Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 allowed for the use of a firearm 
(e.g. firing of a warning shot, or threat to use to subdue, etcetera) to affect an arrest on a suspect 
escaping from an alleged commission of a Schedule 1 offence (see Appendix C for full list of 
offences). 
 
Previous to the amendment, section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) 
provided the following in terms of use of force:  
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“Use of force in effecting arrest. –  
(1) If any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting another,  
 attempts to arrest such person and such person – 
(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force; or 
(b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or resists 
such attempt and flees, 
The person so authorised may, in order to affect the arrest, use such force as may in 
the circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent 
the person concerned from fleeing. 
(2) if the suspect committed or was reasonably suspected of having committed a  
Schedule 1 (serious) offence, the arrestor was authorised to kill the suspect if the 
arrest could not be effected in order to prevent the suspect from fleeing (Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) s49 (1-2).11 
 
Prior to the amendment to s49(2), police officials were entitled to use their firearms on a fleeing 
suspect who was allegedly wanted for the suspected commission of a Schedule 1 offence (see 
definitions). Police shootings, where a suspect for a Schedule 1 offence/s was fleeing from arrest 
and that which resulted in fatalities, could be deemed justifiable homicide (Joubert, 2001:245).  
 
After the introduction of the Constitution, the old section 49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 (Act 51 of 1977) was called into question especially after various case laws and the 
intervention of the Constitutional Court. In 1998 parliament called for the amendment of s49 but 
which only took effect on 18 July 2003 – nearly five years later. The delay was as a result of 
concerns from the then Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete and the National 
Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi. National Commissioner Selebi indicated in 2002 that the 
SAPS was “not ready” for the amendment (Maepa, 2002:12). The amendment brought with it 
confusion and misconception as police officials believed their policing powers had now been 
limited. They felt threatened because they “no longer” had the legal right to shoot to kill a 
suspect fleeing from a Schedule 1 offence and thought that they could no use a firearm assist in 
                                                
11
 Subsection 2 was declared inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid – Constitutional Court Order – 
Government Gazette, 23453 Government Notice No R. 745, 31 May 2002.  
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making such an arrest. However, the amended s49 still allowed that if the suspect threatened the 
life of the police official or any other person, the police official had the right to shoot such 
suspect. Based on the research conducted, it is the opinion of the researcher, that this distinction 
was not initially realised and contributed to the misconception around the amendment to section 
49. The research, which was conducted four years after the amendment to section 49, concurs 
with the earlier submission that there is a great deal of confusion and misconception around the 
use of lethal force in policing.12  
 
Coming back to the events leading to the amendment to s49, Joubert (2001:245) succinctly 
pointed out at that stage that whilst the Constitution upheld the right to life, s49 (2) “appears to 
be unconstitutional”. While these parliamentary, government department and legal debates were 
carrying on the SAPS had to introduce training in human rights (as advocated by the 
Constitution) into the Basic Training Curriculum for new recruits. In addition, training measures 
needed to be introduced to address the management of change and transformation in the 
organisation as a whole. 
 
The ensuing review of the Basic Training Learning Program (2004-2006) is limited to those 
aspects regarding the use of lethal force. An overview of those modules in the program that 
related specifically to the use of lethal force, will be discussed. This discussion will then reflect 
on the information obtained in the data collection phase, i.e. the review of the relevant use of 
lethal force training material in the Basic Training Learning Programme will be juxtaposed with 
that of the data obtained from the in-depth one-on-one interviews held with the sample 
population as extracted from the 29 respondents interviewed in the Sasolburg, Free State 
Province and Vaal Rand Police Emergency Services, Gauteng province respectively. 
 
The present Basic Training Learning Programme, which came into effect from July 2006, will 
not be included.  
The researcher undertook a review of the Basic Training Program from April 2006 to September 
2006. The purpose was to firstly, establish the gist of the specific training provided on the use of 
                                                
12
 24% of the research population believe that suspects have more rights than they do, 34% of the sample believe 
that the rights of police officials have been limited whilst 24% are unhappy and/or angry with the situation around 
the amendment to s49. See Chapter 6 - 6.3.3 for perceptions on the use of lethal force in police. 
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lethal force, and secondly, to investigate the alignment of such training to the physical reality and 
experiences of operational police officials on the street. However, during September 2006 while 
this review was being undertaken it was discovered that the Basic Training Learning Programme 
of the SAPS had again been revised. 
 
Consequently only the Basic Training Learning Programme before July 2006 was reviewed. The 
old Basic Training Learning Programme during the above-mentioned period comprised of the 
following: 32 Unit Standards; 42 Modules; 48 Assessment Instruments; and 2 Portfolios of 
Evidence.13 
 
The foregoing discussion will provide a review of the Basic Training Learning Programme in the 
SAPS implemented for the period July 2004 to June 2006. 
 
3.3 Overview of the Basic Training Learning Programme in the SAPS in relation to  
 use of lethal force as from July 2004 to June 2006  
By way of introduction it needs to be mentioned here that in the Basic Training Learning 
Programme of the SAPS a learner needs to demonstrate the specific outcomes embodied in unit 
standards. According to Erasmus and Van Dyk (1999:4), Outcomes Based Education (OBE) is a 
“results-orientated approach to learning and is learning-centred”. OBE focuses on outcomes 
versus the “traditional curriculum-driven education and training”. In other words, the learner 
must demonstrate the outcome (in practical terms) of the training. In the context of this study this 
is an important point since the study reviews whether an operational police official was able to 
implement (put into practice) any of the principles and practical measures supposedly taught and 
learnt in the Basic Training Learning Programme for when dealing with use of force. 
 
The Basic Training Learning Programme is introduced first by way of an overview of the SAPS 
and basic Principles of Policing. However, for the specific purposes of this research, four themes 
related to use of lethal force (which comprised of thirteen modules) were reviewed.  
 
                                                
13
 This information compiled from slide presentation done by L Stephen: SAPS Division Training (undated). (See 
Annexure H). 
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During March 2006 the researcher requested a copy of all learning material handed to learners 
from the SAPS Basic Training College in Pretoria West.14 The researcher obtained 62 
modules/handouts which fall into eleven subjects/themes. They were reviewed and are illustrated 
diagrammatically as follows: 
 
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF SAPS BASIC TRAINING PROGRAMME 
FROM JULY 2004 TO JUNE 2006 
NO OF 
THEMES 
 
TITLE OF THEME 
NO OF 
H/OUTS 
1 CRIME INVESTIGATION 12 
2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF POLICING (consisting of five 
handouts: General Principles of South African Criminal Law; Specific 
Crimes [38 crimes discussed]; Law and Policing; Statutory Law [17 
crimes]; and Criminal Procedure). 
10 
3 FITNESS AND STREET SURVIVAL (consists of five handouts: Use 
of Force; Move tactically in pairs; Physical control of suspects; 
Crowd management; and Weapon skills). 
8 
4 COMMUNICATION 6 
5 CRIME PREVENTION 6 
6 COMMUNITY SERVICE CENTRE 5 
7 INFORMATION AND SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 5 
8 SELF MANAGEMENT [Incl. HIV handout] 5 
9 PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 
10 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 1 
11 SAPS OVERVIEW (consists of an Overview and The Principles of 
Policing handouts). 
1 
 
 
                                                
14
 A copy of all modules in the SAPS Basic Training curriculum was requested and obtained from Snr Supt Callie 
Schultz at the SAPS training College in Pretoria West in March 2006. A detailed excel sheet with diagrammatic 
layout is attached as per Appendix G. 
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All 62 handouts were reviewed and three relevant themes were identified with 12 handouts 
relating to the use of lethal force training – these 12 are further indicated in brackets in the table 
above. Specific and relevant to this dissertation on the use of lethal force, the following aspects 
were focused on: Fitness and Street Survival (five modules) and the Regulatory Framework 
which includes Law (five modules). The researcher surveyed the rest of the curriculum and 
believes that, although relevant to Basic Training of a police official, not all the modules relate 
specifically to the training on the use of lethal force. (See overview of research in Chapter 1 – 
1.2.) 
 
In terms of the number of modules handed out to the students, the subject of Crime Investigation 
appears to have been given the most attention (12 handouts) followed closely by Regulatory 
Framework (for policing) (ten handouts) whilst Fitness and Street Survival has the third highest 
number of handouts. Collectively, three subjects (12 modules) relevant to this study will be 
discussed, namely: An overview of the SAPS and the Regulatory Framework. The following 
discussion will start with an overview of SAPS (two modules), as background to the field of 
policing, followed by the Regulatory Framework (ten modules).15 
 
3.3.1 South African Police Service (Overview) 
Unit Standard 11974: 2004. This module outlines the legislative and regulatory framework 
which provides the mandate for policing. The module goes on to provide that this mandate lies in 
the following documents: 
• The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) particularly Section 205 
• Green Paper on Safety and Security (1994)  
• White Paper on Safety and Security (1999 -2004) 
• South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) 
• Regulations under the SAPS Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) 
• Police Standing Orders  
 
                                                
15
 In order to avoid confusion as to author referencing, i.e. multiple references to SAPS, 2004 etc., references used in 
this section are to the title of the actual module from which the information used was taken.  
33 
 
This module also outlines the functioning of the SAPS within government, i.e. within the 
Department of Safety and Security with oversight (monitoring of behaviour and conduct etc.) 
provided by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). In addition, the eleven rank 
structures, line of communication and reporting structures are introduced. Police symbolism and 
insignia such as the purpose and/or meaning of the aloe, star, sword, staff, hexagon etcetera are 
communicated. The module deals effectively with “discipline” which means training, education 
and teaching.  
 
Recruits are given background knowledge on the rules (regulatory framework) that govern SAPS 
behaviour. If these rules are transgressed, disciplinary action may result. Basically the module 
expects recruits to behave in a professional and responsible manner that is acceptable to the 
community and the SAPS as an organisation (South African Police Service (Overview), 
2004:37). 
 
3.3.2  Principles of Policing 
Unit Standard: (not listed): Title: Apply Crime Prevention Principles in Crime prevention related 
duties (not dated). This module takes the recruit through the twelve policing principles as cited in 
Van Heerden (1982:78-79). Principle 2 interestingly talks of police authority. It is mentioned that 
“police have no legislative or judicial powers” therefore they cannot determine guilt or 
innocence (Principles of Policing: nd:11). Abuse of this authority may occur through excessive 
use of force. Principle 5 deals with ‘Public Consent and Approval’. In order to best attain this, it 
is stated that the recruit needs to be courteous and friendly, i.e. be “ready to make personal 
sacrifices in order to save lives”. Principle 6, appropriate to this study, discusses the use of force. 
Geldenhuys (1997:194) as quoted in the module, touches on the principle of subsidiary, namely 
“if an alternative to force is available, no force may be used”. Minimum force is also mentioned 
and defined to mean that in most cases no force at all should be used. The module further 
provides that the history of policing “has been characterised by a dynamic search for the means 
by which to optimise the use of legitimate force: using it as necessary to maintain order, but not 
to the extent that it is excessive and abusive” (Principles of Policing, nd:17). Accordingly, when 
the law is to be enforced police officials should act swiftly, consistently and with impartiality.  
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However, the field research revealed that operational police officials are unhappy with the 
amendment to s49 since many of the respondents believe that their powers have been limited16. 
Principle 5 on public consent and approval where the police official is called upon to “make 
personal sacrifices” to save lives was not in much evidence in the interviews. 
 
In one of the interviews an inspector, with about thirteen years of service, commented that “I 
have heard policemen say if I respond to serious cases of armed robbery, I will take my time if I 
can’t use my firearm….if they shoot someone they get into serious trouble….they avoid a 
situation that get into trouble for it” (2006, Interview 5). (See Chapter 6, 6.3.3 for further 
discussion on the overall negative disposition on the use of lethal force as revealed in the 
research undertaken). 
 
3.3.3 Regulatory framework of policing 
For this section of the training the student receives a total of ten handouts of which only five 
were related to this research and only these five are reviewed here. They are discussed as below. 
 
3.3.3.i General Principles of South African Criminal Law: Learner’s Guide 
Unit Standard 11977: Identify and explain specific and statutory offences. 2004. This module 
consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to Criminal Law while Chapter 2 deals 
with the elements of a crime and the principle of legality. Chapter 3 goes on to explain an act as 
any “voluntary human conduct which conforms to the definition of the act contained in the 
definition of the crime” (General Principles of South African Criminal Law: 2004:12).  
  
Importantly for the purposes of this research, Chapter 4 deals with unlawfulness. Appropriately, 
the chapter indicates that “unlawful” means against the law. An act becomes unlawful if it is 
prohibited by law and conversely failure to act where there is a legal duty to act positively may 
also be deemed to be acting unlawfully (own emphasis) (General Principles of South African 
Criminal Law: 2004:24 ).17  
 
                                                
16
 See full discussion in Chapter 6 at Question 31. 
17
 Research indicates that police officials delay their response to serious and violent crime because they fear using 
their firearms. Refer to chapter 6 for detail at 6.3.4. 
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Operational police officials have a duty to act positively and if they fail to act they are acting 
against the law and may therefore be prosecuted. Interestingly in the interviews for this study the 
interviewees were generally saying that they delay their responses to serious crime for fear of 
using their firearms. In such a situation the question goes begging: are they breaking the law? 
While they have a legal duty to act positively, are they necessarily acting unlawfully if they fail 
to act/respond positively and promptly to violent crime? Interviewee 20 of the Flying Squad 
stated that: 
“…..that’s why I’m telling you ……I’m not using my firearm anymore …..like some of the 
members say, they can take the firearms away … because what’s the use you got a 
firearm …….you’re not allowed to use it …. Use it and you’re in trouble”. 
(See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of these and other aspects of the use of lethal 
force). 
 
In certain instances, a person’s conduct may conform to all the requirements of an offence and 
yet his/her conduct may be deemed lawful. In these cases the person may be justified in his/her 
conduct although he/she commits a prohibited act. Chapter 4 of this module reviews in more 
depth and deals with the grounds of justification. A police official’s conduct is expected to be 
reasonable and in the interests of the public. When a police official is called upon to use lethal 
force in the execution of his/her duties, it is expected of him/her to contravene a legal rule, i.e. 
shoot at (and possibly take the life of or seriously injure) a person, in order to protect the life of 
another. In other words, as a result of certain circumstances, the police official has had to 
contravene a legal rule (not kill a person). The police official, under these circumstances, may 
rely on the principle ‘grounds of justification’ for his/her action.  
 
Some of these grounds of justification have come up frequently before and the courts have had to 
lay down guidelines for these situations. Some of these grounds for justification are Private 
Defence, Impossibility, Consent, Right of Chastisement, Acting upon an Order, Official 
Capacity, etc. See further comment on obedience to orders and the power of authority in Chapter 
4 at 4.7.1.  
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Important to this study on lethal force, is the ground of justification of ‘Private Defence’, or as 
sometimes commonly referred to as ‘Self Defence’ (General Principles of South African 
Criminal Law, 2004:25-37). 
 
According to the module mentioned above, private defence is a ground of justification upon 
which a person can rely if he/she protects his/her own or another’s interests against an unlawful 
attack which has commenced or is imminent at the time he/she protects the interests. The 
requirements for Private Defence are also outlined, namely: 
• the attack may consist in a positive act or an omission; 
• the attack must be unlawful; 
• the attack must be directed at one or other legal interest; 
• the attack must have commenced or be imminent (General Principles of South African 
Criminal Law, 2004:24). 
 
Each of these requirements is discussed more fully in the module. They are tailored to address 
private defence firstly in terms of the attack or threatening attack; and secondly, the defensive 
action. The guide gives clear indication that although in most cases a person acts to protect 
his/her life or bodily integrity, a person may also act to protect some other legal interest as well.  
 
Some of the case laws quoted in the module to illustrate this and the principle of the ‘protection 
of property’ are Ex parte Minister van Justisie in re S v Van Wyk v 1967 (1) SA 488(A) and S 
Mogholwane 1982 (2) SA 587 (T). The Mogholwane case appears to have been presented in 
depth in the module. For defamation of another person’s wife in public the case of S v Van 
Vuuren 1961 (3) SA 305 (ECD) is used; where private defence was used as a justification against 
an unlawful arrest the case of R v Nomahleki 1928 GWL 8; for intrusion in a home, R v 
Mahomed 1906 NLR 396; and in the case of trespass where private defence was used the case of 
S v Botes 1966 (3) SA 606 (O) is cited (General Principles of South African Criminal Law, 
2004:27). 
 
Interestingly, S v Mokoena 1976 (4) SA 162 (O) was also quoted to indicate that a person may act 
in private defence to protect another person, although there is no relation between the person 
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who acted and the person whose interest was threatened (General Principles of South African 
Criminal Law, 2004:27). 
 
The study indicated otherwise. When asked if there is any correlation and/or difference between 
the use of lethal force during arrest and acting in private defence, many of the police officials 
interviewed understood the use of private defence to be associated with the use of force whilst 
off duty. It appears that the use of term “private” refers to the use of lethal force whilst police 
officials are off duty. It may also imply that operational police officials understand private 
defence to be applicable to those circumstances where they (police officials) use lethal force to 
protect their families, i.e. there must be a relationship between the person who acted and the 
person whose interest was threatened. But, as provided for in the module under discussion this is 
clearly not what acting in private defence is about. A detailed discussion on this interpretation of 
private defence appears at Question 30 in Chapter 6. 
 
Also, important to this study, the defensive action for Private Defence embodies the requirement 
of acting with reasonableness. This means that the police official acting in Private Defence may 
not cause more harm than is necessary to ward off an attack. So logically a person may not kill 
another for merely stealing a pencil.  
 
In addition, the principle of proportionality is brought into the explanations namely the 
“threatened interest” must not outweigh the “violated interest” (General Principles of South 
African Criminal Law, 2004:29). These private defence case laws used in the module are 
supplemented with X and Y character scenarios that allow for simple and easy understanding of 
the concepts mentioned. Together with this module a handout containing questions and scenarios 
was given to the learner. An example of a question posed in this section being: What is private 
defence?  
 
This is important for police officials to understand so that they may continue with policing while 
understanding their limitations and their own and another person’s right to life.18  
                                                
18
 Police officials interviewed in the research did not differentiate between use of lethal force in effecting arrest and 
the use of force in private defence. See chapter 6 for details – questions 29 and 30. 
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An example (see below) provided in Scenario No. 1 in Chapter 4 of the module provides that 
causing the death (killing) of another (murder) is prohibited. The scenario is if X causes Y’s 
death in order to save his/her own life. For example, where Y was about to kill X, we cannot 
maintain that X acted unlawfully. Unlawfulness is absent because there is a ground of 
justification, i.e. private defence (General Principles of South African Criminal Law, 2004:25). 
Also studied in this part of the Basic Training Learning Programme is the use of lethal force in 
the police, (as per National Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1 (5) dated 2003-07-18). This 
instruction does not detract from the provisions of the use of force in private defence as 
mentioned in the module. A brief look into the National Instruction confirms the amendment to 
s49 by the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act, 1998 (Act 122 of 1998) which came into 
operation on 18 July 2003 (about five days after the issue of this instruction). The National 
Instruction is two-fold and informs on the following: 
 
• Principles not affected by the amendment to s49 to wit, private defence and use of force 
which is not likely to cause death or serious injury i.e. use of minimum force which is 
reasonable and proportional to the circumstances; 
 
• Changes as a result of the amendment to s49, i.e. use of force that is intended or may cause 
death or grievous bodily harm to the person to be arrested (SAPS, 2003:1-3). 
 
The instruction requested police members to take note that the discharging of a firearm at a 
person is regarded as the use of force which is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm. 
Further, there is a promise that the Office of the National Commissioner will issue further 
comprehensive instructions on the use of force. 
 
In brief, three guidelines are issued under the banner of changes brought about by the 
amendment to s49. They are as follows: 
 
• Firstly, when a member reasonably believes that his or another persons life is in imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm, or that there is substantial risk that the suspect will 
cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed or, if such 
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offence is in progress, of a serious in nature, involving life threatening violence or there is a 
strong likelihood of grievous bodily harm;  
 
• Secondly, if the use of such force mentioned above is necessary to overcome the resistance of 
the suspect, then such force must be proportional to the degree of the resistance encountered; 
 
• Thirdly, in light of the above, and where it is inevitable that force is to be used, the member 
must issue clear warning that lethal force is to be used unless the suspect submits to police 
custody. Where appropriate the member must fire a warning shot first if it is safe to do so. 
This requirement does not apply to instances where the member acts in private defence 
(SAPS, 2003:1-3).19 
This national instruction was written after the watershed decision made in the Walters (South 
African Law Reports, 2002:615) and Govender (The South African Law Reports, 2001:286) 
cases respectively. These decided cases now limited the use of lethal force by the police when 
effecting arrests. When compared with the research findings in this study, only four police 
officials briefly explained the use of lethal force when acting in private defence and when using 
lethal force in making an arrest.  
 
As discussed earlier, the understanding of private defence by operational police officials, which 
has a close relationship with the use of lethal force and is one of the situations in which the use 
of lethal force may be justified, needs to be revisited by the SAPS. Within the theme of the 
Regulatory Framework, the following module on specific crimes was provided to learners.  
 
3.3.3.ii Specific crimes: Learner’s Guide 
Unit Standard 11977: Identify and Explain specific and Statutory Offences: 2004).  
This module deals with crimes committed against a person, property, the state and public 
administration and lastly crimes against the community. A total of 38 crimes are discussed in 
five chapters. Chapter 2 deals with crimes against life. Specific to this research mention is made 
in the guide that the use of lethal force may result in death and a police official could be charged 
with murder.  
                                                
19
 Refer to Annexure I for copy on National Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1(5) dated 2003-07-18. 
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Chapter 3 in this module deals with bodily integrity and dignity, while Chapter 4 has a section 
which addresses offences and crimes against morality. Specific to this research is the crime of 
rape which is defined as occurring “when a male intentionally and unlawfully has sexual 
intercourse with a female without her consent” (Specific crimes: Learner’s Guide, 2004:36). It is 
interesting to note at this point that in the module on General Principles of South African 
Criminal Law: Learner’s Guide, (2004:26) discussed in point 3.3.3 (i), it is indicated that one can 
act in private defence to prevent rape, arson, and crimen injuria.  
 
So too, Chapter 5 handles crimes against property. One of the requirements of private defence is 
that one may use force that is reasonably necessary to protect his/her interest therefore one’s 
property may be defended or protected against unlawful attack. Chapter 5 also addresses crimes 
such as theft, arson and robbery, etcetera (Specific crimes: Learner’s Guide, 2004:44-78). This 
module is supplemented by a workbook which provides questions and role plays regarding 
selected crimes. These are relevant in order to sensitise the learners to the practical problems of 
policing and dealing with these when policing on the ground.  
 
The research into the legal framework on lethal force indicated that the right to life is protected 
by the Constitution. Private defence to protect property or even in the case of crimen injuria may 
therefore in the context of the lethal use of force, come under scrutiny. Accordingly, the police 
official needs to be made aware that the principle of proportionality is to be applied in every 
situation.  
 
At this stage it is necessary to briefly discuss the principle of proportionality. The Constitution, 
1996 (Act 108 of 1996) affords all citizens basic human rights as contained in Chapter two (also 
known as the Bill of Rights) (Murray & Soltau, 1997:5-17). The rights of citizens can, however, 
be limited in certain circumstances as provided for in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution, which 
states that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights may be lawfully limited only if the limitation 
is: 
• contained in the law of general application; and 
• is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the principles of 
human dignity, equality and freedom (Joubert, 2001:23). 
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When we speak of the limitation of the right being reasonable, the President of the Constitutional 
Court found in S v Makhwanyane and Another 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC), that the reasonableness of 
the limitation of a right must be determined on the basis of the principle of proportionality. 
Joubert (2001:24), correctly asserts that the degree to, and manner in which a right is limited 
must be proportionate to the purpose of the limitation.  
 
One of the gaps identified is that the module under review does not unpack the principle of 
proportionality adequately. What does it mean to act or be “in proportion” to something? The 
South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002:936), defines “in-proportion” as “according (or 
not according) to a particular relationship in size, amount or degree”. Therefore it is submitted 
that when police officials need to limit a right of a suspect or accused, the limitation (such as the 
use of lethal force which limits the right to life) must be aligned with the seriousness of the 
offence for which the suspect or accused is to be arrested.  
 
This means that to shoot at an unarmed, fleeing suspect, who is suspected of having committed a 
minor offence, would be acting in conflict with the principle of proportionality. 
 
When determining whether the limitation of a person’s rights were proportionate and thereby 
reasonable, the court takes the following factors into consideration as explained in Murray and 
Soltau (1997:14): 
• the nature of the right; 
• the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
• the nature and extent of the limitation; 
• relationship between the limitation and its purpose; 
• whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
When we look at proportionality in terms of the use of lethal force, police officials are now 
required to weigh the seriousness of the offence that was committed against the life of the 
suspect. This practice however, is not new to police officials. Section 13 (3) (b) of the South 
African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, provides inter alia, that force may only be used by an 
official provided that such a member uses only the minimum force that is reasonably required in 
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the circumstances. When we examine the concept of “reasonableness in the circumstances”, Nel 
and Bezuidenhout (1997:201) explain that only the minimum use of force that is reasonable and 
necessary should be used to achieve the purpose.  
 
3.3.3.iii Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide  
Unit Standard 11979:  Identify and apply relevant knowledge about the law in general related to 
policing, 2004 
 
This module consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the law to wit: “Law is made for the 
people by the people” (Law and Policing: Learners Guide, 2004:1). It goes on to 
describe/classify South African National Law and appropriately “Police Law”. 
 
In this module police officials are urged to have a good understanding of Public Law which deals 
with the “relationship between the state as an authoritative power and subjects of the state…” 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:7). Two branches of formal law are also very 
important namely the Law of Criminal Procedure and Law of Evidence, since they describe the 
responsibilities of police officials in the execution of their duties. The fields of law that are 
collectively referred to as Police Law consists of: 
• Constitutional Law; 
• Criminal Law; 
• Law of Evidence; 
• Administrative Law; and 
• Law of Criminal Procedure. 
 
This study module goes on to provide a brief history of South African law. Relevant to this study 
is the discussion in the module on case law and the Constitution (Law and Policing: Learner’s 
Guide, 2004:13-14). Aptly, the study module indicates that “courts must also take into account 
their previous judgements in similar cases because they are bound to the approach followed in 
the past. The reason for this lies in the system of judicial precedent…” (Law and Policing: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:13). 
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It is necessary at this point to briefly discuss “precedence” and its relevance to this study. The 
South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002:918) defines “precedent” (own emphasis) as “a 
previous case or legal decision that may be or must be followed in subsequent similar cases”.  
 
In South Africa, sources of criminal law include legislation (common law and statutory law), the 
Constitution and judicial decisions (case laws). Snyman (1991:11) explains that “a lower court is 
in principle bound to follow the construction placed upon a point of law by a higher court, and a 
division of the Supreme Court is in principle also bound by an earlier interpretation of a point of 
law by the same division”. This in essence is referred to as the principle of judicial precedence 
and confirms the judicial hierarchy of the South African courts. Lower courts are bound by the 
decisions of the higher courts with respect to interpretations of the law.  
 
It is for this reason that Chapter 4 in this study focuses on previously decided case laws on use of 
lethal force. In the module the supremacy of the Constitution is touched on (Law and Policing: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:15). Chapter 2 in the module introduces the criminal justice system, i.e. 
the role of a police official to reporting and investigation of a complaint/crime, prosecution, trial 
and post trial. In this module, emphasis is placed on the need of police officials to have a 
“working knowledge” (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:21) of the system. 
 
Although 41% of the research population had forgotten case laws studied during basic training, 
three out of the twelve police officials (who did remember), had completed their training in 2002 
and 2004 respectively. They also could not recall any Constitutional or Appellate division case 
laws. This is a poor reflection on the interpretation of the law by many of the operational police 
officials.  
 
Chapter 2 of the Basic Training Learning Programme also gives an overview of the mandate for 
the role of policing in the criminal justice system. Policing powers in terms of section 205 (3) of 
the Constitution, the SAPS Act, Act 68 of 1995, the SAPS Code of Conduct and National Orders 
and Instructions are mentioned. Below, for purposes of clarity, each one according to the study 
module, is outlined with a brief discussion. 
 
44 
 
Section 205 (2) of Constitution 
“National legislation must establish the powers and functions of the Police Service and must 
enable the police service to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the 
requirements of the Provinces” (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:22). 
 
SAPS Act 68 of 1995 
As set out in the Constitutional provision above, the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 
68 of 1995) was enacted to ensure the safety and security of all citizens within the country and 
protects the basic rights of persons (as provided for in the Constitution). The specific relation to 
the use of lethal force and training is outlined in three sections of this Act, namely:  
 
• Section 13(1) 
A police official may exercise such powers and carry out such duties as bestowed upon him, 
subject to the Constitution and with due respect to every person’s basic human rights (Law and 
Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:23). 
 
• Section 13 (3)(b) 
A police official who is duty bound to carry out such duties, must perform these duties in a 
fitting and reasonable manner. Moreover, where a police official is authorised by law to use 
force, “he or she may use only the minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances” 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:23). 
 
• Police Regulations: Section 24  
This provision in the SAPS Act allows for the Minister of Safety and Security to put measures 
into place to regulate inter alia: 
• the conduct of police officials in the execution of their duties; 
• “training conduct and conditions of service” 
• The management and maintenance of the SAPS; and importantly 
• “standards of physical and mental fitness” [own emphasis added] of police officials 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:23). 
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In the context of this study it was discovered that there are many shortcomings in reality when 
compared to this learning material. There also appears to be a lack of the practical 
implementation of these learnings.  
 
In Question 14 in the research survey used in this study, the following responses are most 
revealing of the situation on the ground, namely, 69% of the respondents could not adequately 
explain or define properly ‘Human Rights and policing’, while 59% indicated that they had not 
received any specific training on the subject at all (see Chapter 6 for more detailed discussion of 
this point). It is evident that more needs to be done in regulating and implementing a practical 
aspect to the basic training programme in the SAPS. 
 
The research conducted revealed that the majority of operational police officials interviewed 
were not trained on Human Rights. So how are they going to be protective of the basic rights of 
others in a new democracy like ours? The common thread emerging in the interviews was that 
some police officials deliberately delay their response when attending to serious and violent 
crime for fear of using their firearms. How then could the operational police officials be acting 
responsibly and duty bound? See Section 13 (3) (b) above.  
 
SAPS Code of Conduct  
A Code of Conduct for the SAPS reflects police commitment to safety and security is made by 
SAPS members to, amongst others: 
 
• render a responsible and effective service with integrity; 
• uphold and protect the basic human rights of every person; 
• exercise the powers bestowed upon police officials in a responsible and controlled 
manner (saps.gov.za/saps). 
 
In the handout the learner is cautioned that any detraction from the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct may result in disciplinary action taken against him. 
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National Orders and Instructions 
In order to render an accountable and efficient police service, the National Commissioner of the 
SAPS, from time-to-time, issues National Orders and Instructions. These may be repealed by 
way of a Consolidation Notice (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:24). 
 
Provincial orders (Section 26 of SAPS Act) issued from the offices of the Provincial 
Commissioner have to be consistent with the issued National instructions, although they apply 
only to those police officials working in that specific province. An appropriate example would be 
the National Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1(5) dated 2003-07-18).  
 
Chapter 2 concludes by identifying all the role-players in the criminal justice system, namely: 
SAPS, Department of Justice (including the National Prosecuting Agency) and the Department 
of Correctional Services. Chapter 3 in this module goes on to explain the structure of the 
Constitution. Interestingly, mention is made that in the judicial system in South Africa, the 
Constitutional Court “is the highest court in all Constitutional matters” (Law and Policing: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:26). Here the doctrine of precedent is brought in. Refer to discussion 
above on judicial precedent.  
 
Chapter 4 of the module is of importance to this study as it contains a discussion on ‘human 
rights’, which is linked to Chapter Two of the South African Bill of Rights as contained in the 
Constitution. The influence of human rights and the Bill of Rights on law is discussed with 
reference to case law of S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (in which the death penalty was 
declared unconstitutional). In this part of the module (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 
2004:31-50), the learning outcomes are that upon completion of this chapter (Chapter 4 of the 
Basic Training Learning Programme) the learner is expected to: 
 
• explain Human Rights according to Chapter 2 of the Constitution; 
• explain the Constitutional supremacy in relation to other laws; and 
• explain the lawful limitation of rights (section 36 of the Constitution) and how it 
operates. 
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This chapter is important to this study because it allows the use of lethal force to infringe upon 
the right to life (section 11 of the Constitution). Police officials are empowered to limit that right 
when they are called upon to effect arrests to protect other lives as well as their own.  
 
The decision to use lethal force is then contradictory to the provision of a fundamental right in 
the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution). The authority vested in police officials stems 
from the right they have to limit certain human rights. Now, although the Bill of Rights affords 
basic human rights to all, it also empowers police officials to limit these rights under certain 
circumstances. Joubert (2001:22) correctly points out, as does the module, that three provisions 
in the Bill of Rights significantly influence policing powers, namely: the limitation clause; the 
exclusionary rule; and the right to just administrative action. A look at each, as discussed in the 
module of Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, (2004:13), will be undertaken in the following 
sections. 
 
The first provision in the Bill of Rights that influences police powers is the limitation clause, i.e. 
Section 36 (1) of the Constitution. Learners are advised that human rights are not absolute and 
may be limited. However, any limitation of certain rights must be reasonable, fair and in line 
with equality, freedom and dignity. Rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited: 
 
• in terms of the law of general application (this means law that is found in either common or 
statutory law). An example is given here in both Joubert (2001:23) and the module (Law and 
Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:40), of a person who defends himself and kills his assailant 
during an armed attack. The person who defended himself therefore limited the right to life 
of the assailant but he can rely on private defence (found in common law) to justify his 
actions; 
 
• provided, it is reasonable, justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the 
principles of human dignity, equality and freedom. Some attempt is made to explain both 
“reasonable” and “justifiable” in the module. “Reasonable” is very briefly illustrated by 
issuing a J175.20 Instead of arrested a person in order to secure his attendance in court. 
                                                
20
 J175 – a summons containing the charge and date of appearance in court at a particular date and time (Joubert, 
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“Justifiable” is explained as the learner must be able to explain his actions to a court 
afterwards.  
 
• Further, the module then provides that to act in line with being reasonable and justifiable 
when limiting a right, the learner must apply the proportionality test. 21  
 
• As provided in section 36(1) of the Constitution, the factors to be considered when limiting a 
right are the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature 
and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:40-41). 
 
The role of the limitation clause is the “link” between the Constitution and other laws that 
empower police officials (Joubert, 2001:25). Learners are cautioned to familiarise themselves 
with law and the limitations when they need to limit people’s rights (Law and Policing: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:43). 
 
The second provision in the Bill of Rights that influences police powers is the Exclusionary rule 
found in section 35 (5) of the Constitution which provides that “Evidence obtained in a manner 
that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence 
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice” 
(Murray & Soltau, 1997:14). The module points out the consequences of wrongful police action 
and its implications, e.g. the inadmissibility of evidence by a court, criminals will walk free and 
the increase in crime in the country. Trainee police officials are encouraged to use credible 
investigative methods to obtain evidence or run the risk of allowing possibly guilty parties of 
being set free (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:44). 
 
Joubert (2001:25) provided a better angle in that although previously police officials who 
obtained evidence unlawfully, were criminally, civilly and/or departmentally prosecuted, section 
35(5) of the Constitution now provided that this evidence may be totally excluded from the trial. 
                                                                                                                                                       
2001:226).  
21
 Refer to earlier discussion on proportionality in this chapter at 3.3.3.ii Specific crimes: Learner’s Guide, for more 
detail on principle of proportionality. 
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This specific research into the use of lethal force did not explore the adducing of evidence as 
such. The third provision in the Bill of Rights that influences police powers is the right to just 
administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution, i.e “Everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair” (Murray & Soltau, 
1997:12).  
 
The module points out that a police official therefore represents the state and as such all his/her 
“official actions are administrative actions that must be consistent with the requirements of the 
Constitution…” (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:45). The module also illustrates this 
with an example of section 38 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977, (Act 51 of 1977) which 
prescribes the four methods of securing the attendance of an accused in court.  
 
It is mentioned in this module that in terms of securing the attendance of an accused in court, 
police officials previously had “no obligation” to use the “least severe” means and that police 
actions were not “strictly prescribed” in terms of this act i.e. to achieve the purpose of ensuring 
the attendance of an accused before court.  
 
It is interesting to note that s38 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) prescribes 
four methods for securing the court attendance of a suspect. These four are:  
• summons (prepared by the prosecutor – secures the attendance of the accused in a lower 
court); 
 
• written notice to appear (prepared and handed over to accused by a peace officer –applies to 
minor offences where a certain amount is prescribed as per Government Gazette. Accused 
can pay an admission of guilt without appearing in court);  
 
• an indictment (this applies to cases that appear at a “superior court” (Joubert, 2003:86). This 
is drawn up by the Director of Public Prosecutions); 
 
• arrest of accused. According to Joubert (2003:86), the arrest of a person is the “drastic 
infringement of the rights of an individual”. Joubert goes on to add that wrongful arrest may 
give rise to claims and the police official may be held liable (Joubert, 2003:87). 
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And yet, none of these four methods are expressly mentioned or listed anywhere in this basic 
training module. This means that in the past, police could arrest a person for a minor 
transgression instead of for example issuing a written notice to appear or serving an indictment 
upon the accused to secure his/her attendance in court.  
 
Joubert (2001:229) indicates that arrest seriously infringes upon an individual’s right to privacy 
and human dignity. Police need to use this tool (arrest) with care and need to weigh the situation 
between the interest of the individual and interest of community. 
 
Importantly, and for the purpose of this research, the researcher is of the opinion that since the 
use of lethal force stems from the need to arrest and incarcerate an accused or suspect, 
operational police officials should be well versed in the alternatives available to ensure the 
accused stands trial. Notwithstanding the fact that s38 refers to an accused person whilst s49 
involves the use of force when effecting the arrest of either and accused or a suspect, the four 
methods in s38 should have formed part of the study.  
 
It is clear then that no prescription existed which compelled police officials to use the least 
restrictive means (of the four mentioned alternatives) to secure the attendance of an accused in 
court. Could this have been the situation when it came to the use of lethal force? Did the absence 
of clear prescription to or no obligation on police officials to use the “least restrictive means” 
allow for the abuse of lethal force when effecting arrests?  
 
The researcher postulates that this was probably the case. Research conducted indicates that 
operational police officials are unhappy with the amendment to s49. Further, that the amendment 
has “limited” their rights as police officials and disempowered them. 22  
 
An interesting notion to consider would be whether these feelings arose because the majority of 
police officials interviewed have not had the relevant training on the amendment to s49 or 
whether some police officials are disappointed that they could no longer shoot at suspects fleeing 
from serious offences whom they needed to arrest, or both, is an interesting question.  
                                                
22
 For a detailed discussion on Findings see question 31 in Chapter 6. 
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With the advent of the Constitution the kaleidoscope of policing was impacted on to a great 
extent. For the first time in the history of South Africa, there was a sovereign law that protected 
every individual’s right to life (Murray & Soltau, 1997:6). Police officials are now obliged to use 
minimum force to secure the arrest of a suspect or to use the least restrictive means to secure the 
attendance of an accused in court. The Constitution imperatively posed challenges to the old 
version of s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) which authorised police 
officials to shoot to kill, not only at violent suspects but those who were unarmed and escaping 
from police after committing offences that were not of a life threatening nature e.g theft of motor 
vehicles. The use of lethal force is to be used in very limited circumstances only.23  
  
The guide goes on to discuss ‘administrative action’ and the police official (section 38 of 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977)) as follows: 
 
• liability for wrongful action (unlawful arrest and excessive use of force are given as 
examples) (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:46);  
 
• state liability (the police official is a servant of the state and the state can be held liable if the 
police official acted within the scope of his/her duty – two case laws are quoted, namely 
Minister of Police v Gamble 1979 (4) SA 759 (A) and Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) 
SA 590 (A) (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:47) ; 
 
• personal liability (the police official may be charged criminally, the state may recover 
expenses incurred by the police official and he/she may face internal disciplinary hearings) 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:47);  
 
• criminal liability (the police official may himself be found guilty of committing a crime) 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:48); and 
 
• civil liability (consists of actions by and against the state as a result of any police action) 
(Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:48).  
 
                                                
23
 See case law Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) – Chapter 4 for detail. 
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Interestingly, in Question 31 of the research survey (see Chapter 6 for detail), the comments by 
respondents revealed that as police officials they are fearful of the impact and consequences 
(liabilities) of possibly using lethal use of force when policing and responding to crime or 
domestic violence incidents in terms of job loss, losing their homes (economic impact if placed 
on suspension or dismissed), break-up of families (divorce or other emotional impact of divorce) 
etcetera. 
 
The chapter goes on to mention the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) and its pivotal 
role in policing (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:49-50). In this module there is also a 
section on victims’ rights which includes information on women and domestic violence, and 
rape.  
 
The guide indicates that the victim must be treated with “extra dignity and care” and sensitivity. 
The police official is also guided towards acting professionally, impartially and responsibly, 
especially when dealing with the issue of domestic violence (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 
2004:56).  
 
In this research study, police responses to such situations like domestic violence where women 
were victims and where there was the possibility of the use of lethal force, were tested. A 
specific set of three related scenarios was developed and put to respondents at the end of the 
research survey questionnaire (see Annexure E). These scenarios and questions were posed to all 
respondents in the study in order to test the effectiveness of the legislation on domestic violence 
and to probe the conduct of police officials when attending to domestic violence complaints.  
 
Further, the researcher wished to explore the conduct and behaviour of operational police 
officials in cases of domestic violence that warranted and/or carried the possibility of the use of 
lethal force. 
 
Incidentally, the training of police officials on the Domestic Violence Act, 1998, Act No. 116 of 
1998 commenced during 2003 (SAPS, 2004:40). It appears from the research conducted that this 
training failed to provide practical training on when and how to deal with actual violence. In the 
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research study conducted, when faced with Scenario 1 (see Annexure E) that involved dealing 
with a suspect in a domestic violence situation, who was unarmed and had badly beaten up his 
wife prior to police arrival and who was resisting and attempting to flee to avoid arrest, one 
respondent indicated that: 
“……….you have to give a first warning to a person, if he does continue….then you have 
to, you have to shoot to a person but to injure him so that ….can overcome 
the….the….running………but no to, to place his life under death (sic)….just to injure a 
person so that you can overcome the resisting of arrest.” (2006, Interview 14).24  
 
Clearly, this is not a constitutionally and procedurally acceptable way of dealing with this 
complaint. Neither the complainant nor the police official in the scenario was placed in imminent 
life threatening danger. The police official (above) also appears to be confused on his 
understanding of the use of lethal force. The use of lethal force is the use of a firearm “which is 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm…” (Hall & Whitaker, 1999:393).25  
 
The police official cannot be absolutely certain that the split second decision he arrived at, to 
shoot at suspect, will result in the suspect being fatally wounded or just wounded. Therefore the 
use of lethal force is to be considered as potentially fatal. In this scenario the identity of the 
suspect has been established and his arrest could be executed by proper investigative procedure.  
 
The victim may have been placed at a place of safety.26 The police official is required in terms of 
the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) to assist the complainant to find suitable 
shelter and obtain medical treatment. 
 
The use of lethal force would have been excessive in this situation and disproportionate in the 
circumstances. The police official’s use of lethal force would have been justified if the suspect 
had threatened his life or the life of another at that immediate moment in time. Naturally these 
circumstances could change depending on how the scenario changes (i.e. whether the violence 
level in the situation escalates).  
                                                
24
 See discussion under 3.3.3 iv below and Chapter 6 for more detail.  
25
 See 1.6.2 in Chapter 1 for definition on lethal force. 
26
 Refer to Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) Section 2a at http://www.acts.co.za/dom_viol/index.htm 
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In support of this submission above, The Citizen newspaper in 2008 reported that the police were 
not complying with the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998). It was stated in the 
news article that 65% of police stations countrywide fail to treat domestic violence victims as 
prescribed by the law (SAPA, 2008). The Independent Complaints Directorate report27 to 
Parliament’s portfolio committee was reviewed and the following statistics were revealed for the 
period January to June 2007. The results are tabulated as follows: 
 
Table 2:  ICD Report on Domestic Violence: January to June 2007 
Province Number of cases of non-
compliance to Domestic Violence 
Number of cases where police officials 
were suspects for Domestic Violence 
Gauteng 24 3 
Western Cape 18 0 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 5 3 
Eastern Cape 3 3 
Limpopo  3 2 
Mpumalanga 2 1 
North West 5 1 
Free State 5 2 
Northern Cape 1 3 
 
In their report (undated but released in 2007) the ICD stated that the SAPS is making progress in 
adhering to the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) and that “continues (sic) training 
is needed to maintain the professionalism” in the SAPS Community Service Centres. In the first 
six months of 2007, it is illustrated that 18 police officials were themselves suspects of domestic 
violence.  
 
This is all the more reason for improved training on Domestic Violence for operational police 
officials. In 2002 an ICD Report on Domestic Violence training of police officials, pointed out 
“…for as long as the SAPS management continues to preclude the ICD from assisting in 
identifying the weaknesses at certain stations, civilians will continue to receive poor and 
                                                
27
 See www.icd.gov.za – Report: Domestic Violence Report to Parliament for the period January to June 2007. 
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insensitive service from untrained members”.28 In fact, as early as 2002 the then Minister for 
Safety and Security, Minister Charles Nqakula, had tabled an earlier ICD report in Parliament on 
13 November 2002 wherein the ICD had indicated they were of the opinion that “an in-depth 
training intervention would in fact assist the SAPS to understand the social complexity of 
domestic violence” (ICD, 13 November 2002).  
 
It is therefore evident that the SAPS were aware of the need for in-depth training on the handling 
of domestic violence complaints as early as 2002. Research conducted by Smythe (2004:19),29 
focused on the use of weapons in incidents of domestic violence as was reflected in protection 
order applications in three Western Cape jurisdictions. She discovered that weapons are often 
used in domestic violence and stated that if the police and magistrates make full use of their 
powers to seize weapons, it will certainly pro-actively protect women and the broader public.  
 
The article in The Citizen (SAPA, 2008), pointed out that in 2008 (six years down the line) 
police are still not complying fully with the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998). 
Why has this training intervention (if any), therefore not filtered down to operational police 
officials? 
 
The research conducted for this study revealed that some police officials would shoot at a fleeing 
domestic violence suspect. In the scenario30 put forward in the interviews, the suspect was armed 
(suspect did not produce/draw the weapon), but attempted to flee without posing an imminent 
life threatening danger to the police official or any one else. Under the same scenario 
circumstances, three of the respondents stated that they would shoot the fleeing suspect in the 
leg. 
 
This would be acting contrary to legal provisions. In the Walters case, the judge provided 
guidelines to arresting officials (South African Law Reports, 2002 (4): 616 at G). Pertinent to 
this scenario, the eighth guideline provides that under ordinary circumstances the shooting of a 
                                                
28
 http://www.icd.gov.za/reports/2002/16days2.htm - (ICD's Report on the 16 days of activism of no violence 
against women (25 November to 10 December 2001). 
29
 See SA Crime Quarterly, 10. December 2004 for full report .  
30
 See scenario 3 in Chapter 6 for detail. 
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suspect merely to carry out an arrest is not permitted unless the suspect/s poses a threat of 
violence to the arrestor or other persons or is suspected of having committed or threatened to 
commit an offence of serious bodily harm and there are no other means to carry out the arrest, at 
that time or later (own emphasis). In the scenario provided, there were other means to ensure the 
appearance of the suspect in court. The accused could well be arrested later. His identity is 
known and he could be easily traced by a detective. The victim may also be placed at a place of 
safety after she receives medical attention.  
 
Further, the respondents were asked if they had received any in-service training on the 
amendment to s49 after they had undergone Basic Training. An overwhelming majority (86%) 
indicated that they had not. See Question 15 in Chapter 6 for detail. These findings reveal that 
operational police officials are insufficiently trained to make use of lethal force decisions in line 
with legal requirements. The understanding here is that additional training (refresher training) on 
lethal force after the amendment to s49 would upskill operational police officials to make 
decisions on the appropriate use of lethal force.  
 
It is therefore clearly evident that the training on domestic violence, which as illustrated is a 
violent crime which may warrant the use of lethal force, has made very little or no impact on 
operational police officials.  
 
These shortcomings of the training on the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) 
support the findings which are relevant to this study that looks at how and when to use lethal 
force.31  
This module then concludes with the rights to a fair trial as per Section 35 of the Bill of Rights. 
The accused has a right to be presumed innocent and that the state has to prove its case “beyond 
reasonable doubt” (Law and Policing: Learner’s Guide, 2004:62).  
 
Interestingly the conclusion in the module appropriately states that as from 1994 policing in 
South Africa has changed from policing in an apartheid era to focusing, with the arrival of a new 
democracy, on human rights. It goes on to add that the apartheid era, with its widespread 
                                                
31
 See Chapter 6 on research findings based on the scenarios on attending a domestic violence complaint. 
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violation of human rights, is in the past and that no police official is above the law, or can act 
with impunity, especially in terms of such issues as the misuse of the use of force option when 
policing crime. Therefore a police official’s actions must be respectful and in support of human 
rights as per the South African Bill of Rights. 
 
3.3.3 iv Statutory Law: Learners Guide 
Unit Standard 11977: Identify and Explain Specific and Statutory Offences, 2004 
 
The module for Statutory Law comprises a discussion of 17 statutory offences. Below is a list of 
the statutory offences as described in the module. Learners are expected to explain the elements 
of these offences as per the learning outcomes. It was deemed unnecessary to fully define each 
crime for the purpose of this study.  
 
a) Intimidation, e.g. the threat to assault or injure another person; 
b) Domestic Violence, e.g. physical, sexual, emotional abuse in a domestic relationship; 
c) Corruption, e.g. giving/offering a benefit to someone else to whom it is not legally due 
with the intention to unduly influence the person; 
d) Stock theft, e.g. stealing of stock/produce belonging to another person; 
e) Liquor, e.g. the illegal sale of liquor or the sale of liquor at unauthorised times; 
f) Drugs and Drug Trafficking, e.g. unlawful use or possession of a prohibited drug; 
g) National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act 93 of 1996) e.g. driving under the influence of 
alcohol; 
h) Trespass, e.g. to occupy a land or building without the permission of the owner thereof; 
i) Inquest Act, 1959 (Act 58 of 1959) e.g. authority of police to investigate unnatural 
deaths; 
j) Child care, e.g. crimes against children such as assault, unlawful removal and sexual 
abuse; 
k) Sexual offences, e.g. rape;  
l) Animal protection, e.g. police authority to put down a diseased or injured animal; 
m) Labour relations, e.g. explains the police official’s rights in terms of Labour law with 
regard to strikes and lockouts; 
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n) Mental health, e.g. duty of police official to apprehend/detain mentally ill persons who 
pose a threat to themselves or others; 
o) Dangerous weapons, e.g. it is an offence to possess a dangerous weapon; 
p) Explosive Act, e.g. prohibits the possession of explosives; and 
q) Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000), e.g. the possession of ammunition or an 
unlicensed firearm. 
 
The examples above were based on the Basic Training Learning Programme module under 
review (Statutory Law: Learner’s Guide, 2004:1-175). 
 
The learner was required to be able to explain the elements of these statutory offences upon 
completion of this module. For the purposes of the research we will focus on the Domestic 
Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998). The discussion in 3.3.3 iii on domestic violence above 
reiterates the reason for this focus. In addition, the South African Police Services Strategic Plan 
for the period 2005 to 2010 identifies crimes against women and children as a focus area. The 
strategic priority of the SAPS is to reduce the incidence of crimes against women and children, 
expressly domestic violence (SAPS, 2004:39).  
 
In order for this priority to be realised, the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) must 
be effectively implemented. Although the SAPS has taken steps to address this focus area by 
rolling out a comprehensive prevention of domestic violence training program, research and 
studies as outlined above, illustrate that these attempts are missing the mark, hence the choice of 
focussing on domestic violence in this study.  
 
So too, the Basic Training Learning Programme module slants heavily towards the Domestic 
Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) – it is discussed in a total of 44 pages. The module goes 
on to add that the SAPS is committed to prevent/combat crimes against women and children – 
which have been identified as a policing priority. The National Instruction 7/1999 is quoted and 
gives a clear indication on responding to Domestic Violence as well as obligations placed upon 
the police official in responding to this type of priority crime.  
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The definitions in the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) include domestic 
relationships, certain myths that have over the years arisen in dealing with domestic violence, 
e.g. that the police should not get involved in dealing with any domestic violence and the victim 
should leave the aggressor, (i.e. get out of the house and end the relationship). The conduct of the 
police official when responding to a domestic violence complaint is also discussed, e.g. physical, 
sexual, damage to property, economic abuse, emotional, verbal, psychological abuse, 
harassment, intimidation, stalking etc. Police officials are taken through the whole process of 
responding to a case of reported domestic violence from the receipt of a domestic violence 
complaint, dispatching of a vehicle to the responsibility of a Community Service Centre (at the 
police station). This is followed by mention of other aspects such as the securing of the scene of 
domestic violence, conduct on arrival to dealing with the complainant and the aggressor 
(Statutory Law: Learner’s Guide, 2004:8-24). 
 
In the research study conducted and during the interviews, when posed with Scenario 1 (see 
Annexure E) that involved dealing with a suspect who was unarmed but had threatened to shoot 
the complainant in a domestic violence complaint, 48% of the operational police officials 
interviewed indicated that they would call for backup to arrest the suspect who attempted to flee.  
 
In this scenario, the police official and his colleague could very well have executed the arrest 
without backup because it had been confirmed that the suspect was unarmed at that stage. Is the 
call for backup rather more as a call for advice on how to proceed in cases of domestic violence 
where a weapon is involved? Are police officials unsure and/or improperly trained on how to 
deal with domestic violence complaints where a weapon is involved?32 
In addition, this module deals with the seizure of firearms and other dangerous weapons. In any 
situation where an element of violence is present the police official is encouraged to inter alia: 
 
• Search any person and seize any arm/ammunition from any person who: - 
− displays the intention to harm himself or another; or 
− is inclined to violence, has a mental condition or/and is dependent on drugs/liquor 
(Statutory Law: Learner’s Guide, 2004:24).  
                                                
32
 See Chapter 6 for detail. 
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The module goes on to discuss Section 102 of the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000) 
which allows the registrar to declare a person unfit to possess a firearm if the Registrar receives 
information provided in a statement under oath/affirmation. Moreover a person, against whom a 
final protection order in terms of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) is issued, 
may be declared unfit to possess a firearm.33  
 
This module goes on to state that the police official may arrest any person who is in a domestic 
relationship and who is suspected of having committed an offence with the element of violence. 
Section E goes on to describe the rendering of assistance to the complainant (Identify and 
Explain Specific and Statutory Offences, 2004:28). 
 
The trainee police official is taken through the proactive measures initiated in terms of the pro-
active charge policy whereby the SAPS has received evidence of violence in a domestic violence 
case and can proceed without the complainant (pressing charges), i.e. the police official can 
proceed with registering a criminal case without necessarily having to rely solely on a 
complainant laying charges and indicating that the police should continue with investigation of 
the case) to the procedure whereby a complainant is assisted with possibly going on to the 
witness protection programme; an application for a protection order; collection of personal 
property (if they have left the joint residence or ended the domestic relationship ecetera) and 
proper record keeping for each domestic violence incident reported to the police (Statutory Law: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:31-35). All this is highly indicative of the priority status afforded to the 
crime of domestic violence and it is in line with the new 1996/1997 prioritisation of certain 
crimes.  
The module ends with the police official being reminded that the police are not above the law 
and should a police official fail to comply he/she will be subjected to the disciplinary process. 
 
3.3.3 v Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide 
Unit Standard 11978: Identify and apply sections of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2004. 
The module has six chapters. Chapter 1 deals extensively with search and seizure with various 
                                                
33For more detail on the declarations of persons unfit to own or use a firearm see Minnaar & Mistry, 2003 and  
 Mistry & Minnaar, 2003. 
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case laws being referred to and quoted. The module goes on to provide that minimum force 
which is reasonable under the circumstances may be used during search and seizure. Chapter 2 
discusses methods to secure the attendance of an accused in court. The object of arrest as well as 
the requirements for a lawful arrest, are also discussed (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 
2004:40). 
 
This chapter touches on the use of force in effecting arrest and states that there “should be no 
need for the use of force” unless it is necessary and then such necessary force to be used should 
still be reasonable. It also points out that a police official who uses force which cannot be 
justified, should expect to be dealt with severely (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 
2004:55). 
 
In this module the important section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) is 
introduced. This section is the one that provides for and allows a police official to use force in 
order to overcome resistance by a person who has been placed under arrest. The use of force 
under these circumstances may be justified provided that the police official considers the human 
rights afforded to every individual as enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (see later section 
for more detailed discussion of the implications and case law on section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977)). 
 
The module (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:45) goes on to describe the 
Constitution Section 12(1)(c) to (e) is quoted, namely the individuals right to freedom and 
security, including the right: 
• not to be subjected to violence; 
• not to be tortured in any way; and 
• not to be treated in a cruel, inhumane or degrading way. 
 
Section 11 of the Constitution, which addresses the right to life – is also discussed in some detail 
as well as section 35 (3) (h) – right to a fair trial and being presumed innocent. Within this rights 
context the guide cautions the police officials about the use of force (need to use) when effecting 
an arrest (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:50). 
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The learner is advised that Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) was 
amended by the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No 122 of 1998). 
Reference to the National Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1(5) dated 2003-07-18 is quoted and 
learners are informed that their prescribed book contains the old section. A handout of the 
amended version of s49 was given to the students. 
 
Chapter 2 goes on to discuss the principles not affected by the new s49. The two principles are 
listed as: 
• Private Defence; or 
• the use of force that does not cause death or serious injury (Criminal Procedure: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:56) 
 
In this module Private Defence is dealt with in greater detail and is explained as: 
• Any member who finds himself or herself in the situation in which his/her life or the life of 
another person is in danger and in which there is no other reasonable manner in which he/she 
can remove the threat against his/her life or against the life of such person, may use any 
means (including his/her firearm) to defend himself/herself or such other person (Criminal 
Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:57). 
 
When dealing with situations where the use of lethal force may be used, the learner, having 
foreseen the possibility that by resisting arrest the suspect may endanger the life of the police 
official or other person/s, the police official must be extremely careful and be ready to use 
his/her firearm if that is reasonably necessary, to protect his/her (police official’s) life and the life 
of another.34 
 
The principles that remain in effect are mentioned such as section 13 (3) (b) of the South African 
Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1996), i.e. the use of minimum force must be reasonable 
according to the specific circumstances. The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) 
section 39 is quoted in terms of arrest, i.e. where a person subjects (willingly or without 
                                                
34
 However, the research in this study appears to indicate otherwise. The research findings show that generally 
police officials are afraid to use lethal force. Eighteen of the 29 respondents interviewed where either confused or 
could not explain private defence (see Question 29, Chapter 6) 
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physically resisting) him/herself to the arrest, no force is to be used against such person 
(Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:40). 
 
During the arrest, only reasonable force necessary under the circumstances must be used to 
overcome any resistance. In addition, the use of force must be proportional to the seriousness of 
the offence committed. In order for the use of force to be “proportional in the circumstances” it 
must comply with the following: 
• the police official has reasonable grounds to believe that force is necessary; 
 
• this belief is based on facts that existed at the time when force was used, e.g. the conduct 
and/or words of the person to be arrested or information received by the police official. Any 
other person in the position of the police official should arrive at the same decision when 
presented by the same position for one to act reasonably; and 
 
• the “type and degree of force” applied during the arrest was “proportional to the seriousness 
of the crime that was committed” (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:58). 
 
 
Important to this study on the use of lethal force, the foregoing discussion regarding the changes 
brought about by the new section are discussed in more detail. 
 
The learner is told that the new s49 relates to the “use of force that is intended or likely to cause 
death or grievous bodily harm to the person to be arrested”. The module further explains that 
the discharging of a firearm at a person is regarded as use of force which is likely to cause death 
or grievous bodily harm, irrespective of the part of the body aimed (Criminal Procedure: 
Learner’s Guide, 2004:58). 
 
The SAPS Legal Services guidelines to which police officials must adhere with regards to the 
use of force were provided to the student as a handout. These are provided below in full detail as 
they are extremely important being the only real guidelines of how to interpret and act in 
accordance with the new (amended) s49: 
64 
 
The decision to use a firearm could result in the death or grievous bodily harm of the person to 
be arrested. This decision must therefore be based on reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds 
are based on the following provisions: 
 
a) force to be used is immediately necessary to protect the police official or other person 
lawfully assisting the police official from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm 
 
b) Substantial risk exists that should the arrest be delayed, the suspect will cause imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm to another; or 
 
c) The offence is in progress, of a serious nature, and life threatening violence or grievous 
bodily harm may be the result if the suspect is not arrested immediately (SAPS Special 
Service Order, 2003:3 – also see Annexure I). 
 
According to the module (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:58), if force is to be used, 
it should be only such force that is reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance of the 
suspect and force used must be directly proportional to the degree of resistance. When it 
becomes necessary to use lethal force to effect an arrest, a police official should, if it is 
reasonable to do so, issue a warning to the suspect that lethal force is to be used unless he/she 
submits to the arrest.  
Where it is appropriate and/or safe to do so, a warning shot must be fired first before firing at the 
actual body of the person. The module gives no prescription or precaution as to and how the 
warning shot should be fired, e.g. into the air or ground. This requirement is not necessary if the 
police official is acting in private defence when his/her life or the life of another is in imminent 
danger (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004:59). 
 
The prescribed book titled Applied Law for Police Officials (Joubert, 2001), contains the old 
section 49 (2) since it was printed in 2001 before the amendment was introduced. It does, 
however, discuss the following relevant use of lethal force case laws: 
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• S v Martinus 1990 (2) SACR 568 (A) (deals with private person using a firearm to effect 
an arrest and how his/her actions will be judged); 
• Matlou v Makhubedu 1978 (1) SA 946 (A); 
• Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA); 
• Ex Parte; Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 
2002 (4) SA 613 (CC); 
• S v Barnard 1986 (3) (SA) 1 (A); and 
• Macu v Du Toit 1983 (4) SA 629 (A) (at 635).35 
 
The six case laws mentioned above as well as others, are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this 
research study. 
 
In the Basic Training Learning Programme, Chapter 3 dealt with ascertaining bodily features of 
an accused and holding an identification parade, whilst Chapter 4 deals with the right to legal 
assistance. Chapter 5 addresses pleas and other trial related matters. Chapter 6 concludes the 
module with procedures applicable to a police official in court when trials are conducted.  
 
This brings to an end the review on the Regulatory Framework of Policing theme in the Basic 
Training Learning Programme. Below we turn to the third theme of the Basic Training Learning 
Programme to be reviewed, namely: fitness and street survival. 
 
3.3.4 Fitness and street survival 
In this theme six of the handouts received by the student constable are reviewed (relating to the 
use of lethal force). They are discussed as below. 
 
3.3.4.i Use of Force: Presenter’s Guide 
Unit Standard 14131: Use appropriate force to uphold and enforce the law and protect people 
and property, 2004 
 
                                                
35
 It must be noted here that the module does provide that other alternatives to use of force to be considered to detain 
a person to be arrested. 
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3.3.4.ii  Use of Force: Workbook  
Unit Standard 14131: Use appropriate force to uphold and enforce the law and protect people 
and property, 2003 
 
One of the specific outcomes of this module is to prepare the student constable to make use of 
force decisions that meet legal organisational and public requirements. Another interesting 
specific outcome is to enable the police official to communicate tactically in order to resolve 
conflict and to prevent the use of physical force. The introduction sets the pace with reflection on 
statistics that reveal that police officials are largely attacked (and killed) off duty when visiting 
shebeens or travelling to and from work.36 The police official is encouraged to identify risks in 
their own environment and be proactive in addressing them.  
 
The module is based on six fields relevant to any operational task. The writer states that these six 
use of force and survival principles will assist the learner police official to make good use of 
force decisions, contribute to “officer safety” and make appropriate “use of force” decisions. 
This section is discussed in detail because it is pertinent to the study. 
 
As per review of this module (from pages 5 to 29) the six principles are conveyed through the 
acronym – AITEST which refers to the following: A – Alert; I – Initiative; T – Techniques; E – 
Equipment, S – Scale of use of force and shooting decisions; and T – Teamwork, tactics and 
techniques (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:5-29). The module consists of four group 
discussions, one practical, three role-plays and five scenarios.  
 
The following is a summary of the AITEST. 
A – Alert 
Police officials are encouraged to be aware of risks, and amongst others, to develop the ability to 
anticipate danger and be prepared at all times for its presence in every situation. Being alert 
embraces information gathering, avoiding dangerous situations, the “plus-one rule” (the suspect 
to be suspected of not being alone, i.e. operates with an accomplice at all times) and tactical 
breathing (in a tense situation). 
                                                
36
 For more detail and statistics on the murder of police officials see Minnaar, 2003. 
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I – Initiative 
Safe progression and the OODALOOP decision making model – this model is referred to as the 
“continuous planning process”. The ideal response of the police official would be to get into the 
“suspect’s OODALOOP and take over the initiative” (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:12). 
OODALOOP is illustrated as a flow chart circle with the operational terms of: Observe, 
Orientate, Decision and Action. A study of the module did not explain the latter part of the 
acronym termed “LOOP”. A practical example of the implementation of the flow chart circle 
being an armed robbery where the police official is advised to take down details and call for back 
up before attempting to arrest the suspect/s.  
 
T – Techniques of tactical communication 
Police officials are discouraged from using arrogant body language. The learner is encouraged to 
be tolerant and open. Tactical communication involves asking questions, working towards a win-
win situation and being aware of non-verbal communication (body language) as it amounts to 
60% of communication. The section on tactical communication is complemented by two role 
plays, one of which involves the learner police official being expected to intervene in a violent 
domestic violence complaint and resolve the conflict (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:14).  
 
E – Equipment 
The writer indicates that it is the employer’s responsibility to provide the worker with the 
appropriate equipment in order to do his/her job properly, and goes on to state that “optimal use 
of uniform and equipment is an important aspect of tactical survival” (Use of Force: Workbook, 
2003:20).  
 
S – Scale for use of force and shooting decisions37 
(This is outlined in more detail in the Deadly force decision making model – discussed in a later 
section below) (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:22). All the above principles may be effectively 
used to retrain operational police officials or to provide refresher training on the use of lethal 
force. 
                                                
37
 Particular attention is paid (within the context of the research) to this 5th principle in Chapter 7 under 
recommendations, since it deals with use of lethal force. 
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While the Constitution precedes national legislation, the latter is enacted in order to enable police 
officials to carry out their tasks. Some of these laws (as previously mentioned) are the South 
African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 
1977) and Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 (Act 205 of 1993). Naturally the power to search, 
seize property, arrest and the use of firearms are included in the obligation or authority to police. 
Accordingly this learning guide deals with the prescriptions of the legislation regarding policing 
inter alia the use of force. It starts off with the objectives of the Service which are stated (as per 
Section 205 of the Constitution) as being:  
• preventing, combating and investigating crime; 
• maintaining public order; and 
• protecting and securing the inhabitants of the Republic and their property and upholding 
and enforcing the law. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (containing as it does Section 49) bestows 
on the police official “far reaching powers and authority…” to use force in exercising their 
powers (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:23). The Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 (Act 205 
of 1993), Sect 9 (1) and (2) is referred to where the police official is empowered to use force, 
including firearms, to disperse crowds. The South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 
1995) Sect 13 (3) (b) provides that: “police officials who are authorised by law to use, may use 
only minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances (Use of Force: Workbook, 
2003:24). 
 
In order to perform these functions and according to the writer of the module, the police official 
has to exercise discretion.  
 
In order to act with discretion the police official needs to be familiar with possible alternative 
actions he/she can take. The writer goes on to provide that added to the “complexity of the ‘use 
of force’ decisions”, the concept of “reasonableness” has to be considered. Appropriately, the 
concept as adapted and discussed in the guide as being that a person has reasonable grounds of 
use of force if: 
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• the police official really believes or suspects that there is imminent danger; 
• he/she bases the belief or suspicion on facts; 
• any reasonable person in the same position as the police official under the same 
circumstances would arrive at the same belief or suspicion (Use of Force: Workbook, 
2003:23). 
 
The Use of Force, Presenter’s guide module states that “the reasonable man test will be used to 
test reasonableness of all use of force decisions”. The Presenter’s Guide handout goes on to 
discuss private defence. The police official needs to know the requirements for justification for 
private defence. Private Defence in the guide is defined as: “Defence of self or somebody else 
against an unlawful attack on life, body, property or person” (Use of Force: Presenter’s Guide, 
2004:43-48).  
 
The conditions for private defence in terms of the actions of the attacker: 
• the attack must be unlawful; 
• attack must still be threatening; 
• the attack can be against a third party and not the person responding (Use of Force: 
Presenter’s Guide 2004:48).  
 
Requirements of the person acting in defence: 
• must be the only way out; 
• must be no more damage that what is necessary to overcome the attack (Use of Force: 
Presenter’s Guide 2004:48).  
 
The Use of Force Workbook module urges police officials to “master the principle of 
appropriate use of force”. Learners are encouraged to measure the use of force against the 
limitations set by the Code of Conduct, community policing principles, ethical principles and the 
law (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:24).  
The Use of Force Workbook module begs the question as to who the “appropriate/exact” police 
official or person is that has to make use of force decisions. In this context the guide proceeds to 
state that the police official must: 
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• have an extensive knowledge of police powers given by law; 
• with second nature, act in private defence as ground of justification in terms of common 
law; 
• be committed to upholding the constitutional parameters; 
• be committed to complying with the parameters set by the South African Police Service 
Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) and SAPS Code of Conduct;  
• understand the dynamics of the society that he/she serves and the root causes of crime in 
that society; 
• be able and committed to complying with the ethical principles of the SAPS and in doing 
so serve the Constitution and the Code of Conduct (Use of Force Presenter’s Guide, 
2004:25).38 
 
The module provides that police officials need to have a good understanding of social norms, 
dynamics and ethics as this will contribute to good use of force decisions.  
 
Deadly force decision making model 
The Use of Force Workbook module reviews the deadly force decision-making model which is 
discussed under the Scale for “use of force” and shooting decisions. Learners are cautioned that 
incorrect use of lethal force decisions may result in civil claims, criminal prosecution, poor 
community/police relations as well as “ruined professional and personal lives”.  
 
The writer goes on to add the following as being necessary for police officials to make 
“confident” use of lethal force decisions: 
• knowledge of legal restrictions; 
• excellent weapon handling skills; 
• a simplified decision making model; and 
• a dynamic outcomes based learning program based on the AI-TEST (Use of Force: 
Workbook, 2003:26). 
 
                                                
38
 Many of these guidelines were not displayed or evident in the interviews conducted for this study. Responses were 
very defensive and emotional (see Chapter 6 for detail on their responses). 
71 
 
According to the writer (Use of Force Workbook module), the deadly force decision making 
model allows for private defence as the only “rational decision” for the use of lethal force. The 
police official is told that he/she can only rely on self defence as a ground of justification for the 
use of lethal force (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:26). 
 
The “deadly force triangle” is described as an equilateral triangle with three factors, namely, 
ability, opportunity and jeopardy. The presence of all three factors may justify the use of deadly 
force (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:27). 
 
The module discusses the three factors as follows: 
 
Ability: The suspect’s physical ability to harm another – includes personal physical ability, i.e. a 
powerfully built man or a martial art practitioner. 
 
Opportunity: Refers to suspects’ ability to kill/seriously injure another. Opportunity does not 
exist if a suspect is far off or has taken cover.  
 
Jeopardy: This is when the suspect uses his/her ability and opportunity to place another in 
immediate life threatening danger (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:26-27). (In the guide a role-
play with three scenarios follows the above).  
 
With specific reference to the principle of “T – Teamwork Tactics and Techniques” in the 
AITEST, the student police official is guided towards identifying himself as a member of a team 
since survival on the streets (as an operational police officer responding to crime) depends on it. 
Moreover, police officials are encouraged to develop skills to communicate with team members. 
Those skills are acquired by regular practical scenario/team training. 
 
However, this ‘regular’ training appears only to be important during the Basic Training Learning 
Program and is conspicuously absent when police officials are assigned to operational police 
work at the police stations. Of all the research interviews conducted, 66% believe that practical 
training is essential. This is one of the gaps identified in the training of police officials on the use 
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of lethal force in the SAPS. (See Question 23 in Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion). 
Out of the 29 respondents interviewed, none of the candidates had undergone any form of regular 
use of lethal force training from the SAPS. Therefore police officials in general lack proper skills 
in lethal force training to effectively carry out their duties. 
 
In terms of tactics and techniques, thorough training in basic team movement skills such as 
leopard crawl, taking cover, cat crawl etcetera, are taught in the Basic Training Learning 
Programme. It is also pointed out that “high competency” (see above) in these techniques will 
reduce the risk of an attack on police officials. The police official is encouraged to adhere to the 
AI-TEST principles when off duty as well (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:29).  
 
The following five scenarios were reviewed in the section (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:31-
32). They are discussed as follows:  
 
Scenario 1: Fraud 
* the police official encounters a violent suspect who attacks him with a knife 
(investigating a fraud incident); 
Scenario 2: Vehicle stop 
* a vehicle stop with two alternatives 
  – escaping bank robbers 
– drunk armed passenger with an emergency situation 
 
Scenario 3: Bank Robbery 
* Bank Robbery – the police official arrives at the scene as suspects are fleeing – three 
variations: 
  – opens fire on police 
– armed suspects surrender 
  – suspect vehicle leaves some of their accomplices behind upon police  
arrival on scene 
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Scenario 4: Suspect vehicle 
* Suspect vehicle at roadside – two possibilities 
– armed suspects want to hijack the vehicle 
  – innocent persons returning from a party 
 
Scenario 5: People on foot wanting help 
* 2 possibilities  
  - hijackers staging an ambush 
  - innocent person genuinely in need of help 
 
This part of the Basic Training Learning Programme is very encouraging in that it is in line with 
helping a police official make proper and appropriate (situational) use of lethal force decisions. 
In conclusion, the module summary reflects on the difficult task of policing. It is said that split 
second decision-making is complex. The writer indicates that police officials are “generally 
average citizens, rather than highly qualified academics. Abstract theory and concepts can 
therefore not work in practice” (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:33). Further, the writer claims 
that by using the model of the acronym AI-TEST, complicated practical skills and knowledge 
can be simplified and provide for outcomes based learning (OBL) to take place. The writer goes 
on to state that the practical based scenarios will prepare police officials for real life scenarios.  
 
It is further proposed that all policy actions be measured in line with AI-TEST to determine if the 
level of force used was reasonable (Use of Force: Workbook, 2003:33). 
 
3.3.4.iii Move tactically in pairs during police operations 
Unit Standard 14125: Move tactically in pairs during police operations, 2004. This module deals 
with practical based tactical policing. It is accompanied by photographs and the workbook 
assessment is linked to observation checklists. The module is therefore focussed more on skills. 
There are seven study units as follows: 
Study Unit 1: The fundamentals of tactical movement; 
Study Unit 2:  Tactical communication in support of tactical movement; 
Study Unit 3: The use of cover; 
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Study Unit 4: Climbing techniques; 
Study Unit 5: The tactical approach of objects in pairs; 
Study Unit 6: Moving tactically in pairs in and around buildings; and 
Study Unit 7: Reacting tactically to attacks 
 
In terms of competence, the learner demonstrates foundational, practical and reflective 
competence. Related to use of force, Study Unit 7 deals with reacting tactically to attacks. The 
OODALOOP is referred to and the learner is advised to use the OODALOOP to conduct a 
“situational analysis” (Move tactically in pairs during police operations, 2004:2). When the 
police official has made a decision, he/she is at the action stage. A note in the module cautions 
the police official that any action to be taken must comply with the principles of legality around 
the use of force. The police official will therefore have to take accountability for his/her own 
actions.  
 
3.3.4.iv Physical control of suspects 
Unit Standard number not listed: No title, 2004. This module prepares the learner to take 
physical control over the person (suspect) to be arrested. Weapon retention techniques, grappling 
and unarmed defence tactics are introduced. This type of training and preparedness is relevant 
because the police official does not rely only on his/her firearm to effect an arrest. He/she will 
consider alternatives to take control of suspects for the purposes of arrest. This is in line with the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 106 of 1998), the South African Police Service Act, 
1995 (Act 68 of 1995) and other related legislation such as s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 (Act 51 of 1977). 
 
3.3.4.v Crowd management: Learner’s Guide 
Unit Standard number not listed: No title, not dated. The goal relevant to this study on use of 
force is to understand the principles in relation to the use of force tactics for crowd management. 
One of the specific outcomes of the study is to comply with legal requirements when deciding to 
use force against crowds. 
 
 
75 
 
This workbook outlines the so-called “Five C Stairs”, and discusses this in terms of “Crowds in 
perspective” with crowds described as being “dangerous …in a group, individuals become 
primitive, aggressive and may even become violent” (Crowd management: Learner’s Guide, 
nd:23).  
 
The workbook also deals with the legal framework which starts with policing and basic human 
rights. Here the right to life is emphasised and “shall be protected by law” and good police 
practice is identified as “lethal use of force by police when it is in accordance with the law, 
strictly necessary, and proportionate to the situation”. Human rights are discussed in detail in 
the guide. The module goes on to discuss the authority of police as bestowed upon them by the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996) s205(3); the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
(Act 51 of 1977); the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) (Crowd 
management: Learner’s Guide, nd:47). By this legislation the SAPS is enabled to disperse 
crowds to the extent that lethal force may be used where necessary. However, the student is 
cautioned and urged to consider all options and to exercise discretion (Crowd management: 
Learner’s Guide, nd:53-55).  
 
Discretion is described in the Crowd management Learner Guide as the student police official 
asking the following questions: 
• Do you have the power? 
• Is it reasonable and justifiable to act? 
• What about the Constitution? 
• What about the Code of Conduct and SAPS Act? 
• Don’t you have professional ethics as a police official? (Crowd management: Learner’s 
Guide, nd:55).  
 
The concept of reasonableness is also discussed. The reasonable person’s test must be used for 
all use of force decisions. Section 36 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1995 (Act 108 of 1996) 
dealing with lawful limitations of rights as mentioned in the Bill of Rights is here also discussed 
as well as the SAPS Code of Conduct and the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 
1995) section 13 (3) (b). The discussed ethical principles include: 
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• Integrity; 
• respect for diversity; 
• obedience to the law; 
• service excellence; and 
• public approval (Crowd management: Learner’s Guide, nd:60). 
All of these principles must be considered in order to make appropriate use of force decisions. 
 
Community policing and Crowd Management: AI-TEST and Crowd Management 
The AI-TEST as mentioned earlier is also applied to crowd management – based on a balanced 
view (by the police official) on human rights and the powers of the police. In the guide this is 
introduced via the five “C Stairs” and links up with the AI-TEST (Crowd management: 
Learner’s Guide, nd: 22). The following handouts listed were very similar in content and 
reviewed together.  
 
They are listed as follows: 
3.3.4.vi Weapon skills: Study Unit 1-Z88 
3.3.4.vii Weapon skills: Study Unit 2-RAP 401 
3.3.4.viii Weapon skills: Study Unit 3 - Musler 12 Guage Shotgun 
3.3.4.ix Weapon skills: Study Unit 4- R5 Rifle 
 
The introduction of the weapons skills units prepare the learner by again mentioning the 
murder/assault on police officials in the country. The learner is told “firearms don’t kill people, 
people kill people”. Caution is advised in the use of firearms with the learner warned that “you 
will have to bare [sic] with the consequences of wounding or killing another person” (Weapon 
Skills: Study Unit 1. 2000:2). 
 
In the first phase of the Basic Training Learning Programme for firearm training, the student 
police official undergoes training on the safe/accurate handling of two pistols, namely the Vektor 
Z88 and RAP 401. The Musler 12 gauge shotgun and R5 Rifle is also included. The student is 
then developed further in terms of practical skills at the College for Advanced Training 
Maleoskop (north of Pretoria). 
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Safety precautions and dealt with in depth. Maintenance and operation, stance, practical work 
and range procedure are also discussed. According to Study Unit 2, the RAP 401 was designed 
for daily tasks. Study Unit 3 – dealt with the use of the Shotgun whilst Study Unit 4 addressed 
the use of the R5 rifle. This study unit is similar to the module, Use of Firearms in a Policing 
Environment compiled in 2003 on General Firearm Safety (Use of Firearms in Policing 
Environment, 2004). 
 
3.4 Regulation of use of lethal force training 
The Use of Force training is regulated by the South African Qualifications Act, 1995 (Act 2 of 
1995).  
 
3.4.1 What is SAQA? 
The South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) is a body of 29 members who are appointed 
by the Minister of Education and the Minister of Labour. These members’ responsibilities are 
twofold namely: 
 
• To oversee the development of the National Qualification Framework (NQF) which includes 
monitoring and auditing of standards; 
 
• To oversee the implementation of the National Qualification Framework which includes 
registration and accreditation against national standards and qualifications.39  
 
These members also act as advisors to both Ministers. SAQA’s structure comprises of two 
“arms”. Firstly, the Standard Setting Body which comprises twelve National Standards Bodies 
(NSB’s) and, secondly, the Standards Generating Bodies (SGB’s). These bodies generate and 
recommend standards and qualifications for registration on the National Qualification 
Framework (NQF).  
 
                                                
39
 See http://www.saqa.org.za 
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The second extension of SAQA is the Quality Assuror’s leg. It comprises of the Education and 
Training Quality Assurance (ETQA’s) and the Service Providers. This body is accountable for 
the providers of education and qualifications which are registered on the NQF.40  
 
3.4.2  The National Qualification Framework  
The National Qualification Framework (NQF) is a framework set up to “monitor qualifications 
and assure quality”41 while the quality assurer body in South Africa is the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA).  
 
The objectives of the NQF as mentioned in the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 
(Act 2 of 1995) are as follows: 
• create a national framework for learning achievements; 
• facilitate mobility and progression in education and training; 
• to enhance the quality of training and education; 
• to accelerate the redress of unfair discrimination in education, training and employment 
opportunities; and 
• contribute to full development of each learner. 42  
 
The NQF comprises of eight levels and three bands. The three bands are General Education and 
Training (GET), Further Education and Training (FET) and Higher Education and Training 
(HET). There are 12 fields of the NQF namely:43 
• Agriculture and Nature Conservation;  
• Culture and Arts;  
• Business, Commerce and Management Studies; 
• Communication studies and languages; 
• Education, Training and Development; 
• Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology; 
• Human and Social Studies; 
                                                
40
 See http://www.saqa.org.za. 
41
 See http://tutor.petech.ac.za 
42
 See http://www.saqa.org.za.  
43
 Obtained from website http://tutor.petech.ac.za/educsupport/html/probsolv/slide2.html 
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• Law, Military Science and Security; 
• Health Sciences and Social Services; 
• Physical, Mathematical, Computer and Life Sciences; 
• Services; and 
• Physical Planning and Construction. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Standards Generating Bodies (SGB’s) are responsible for generating 
criteria towards obtaining qualifications for registration on the NQF. A unit standard is a 
statement that prescribes education and training required towards achieving a desired 
qualification. This education and training is holistic in that it embodies the knowledge, skills and 
attributes necessary towards achieving the outcome in the unit standard. The learner is expected 
to demonstrate competency and skill in the specific outcome. 
 
In terms of the regulating of use of force training the Unit Standards prescribe/guide the 
development and facilitation of such training and allied training that impacts on the actual use of 
force. Some of the allied/ancillary unit standards consulted in this research were those on the Use 
of a handgun (10748); Use primary weapons for medium to high-risk assault team operations 
(115319); To assess the compliance of various bodies with Human Rights and democratic 
standards (123435); Describe the relevance of Human Rights and democratic practices in South 
African society (119662); and Handle and use a handgun (119649). 
 
3.4.3 Outcomes Based Education  
In the Basic Training Learning Programme of the SAPS a learner needs to demonstrate the 
specific outcomes embodied in unit standards. According to Erasmus and Van Dyk (1999:4), 
Outcomes Based Education (OBE) is a “results-orientated approach to learning and is learning-
centred”. OBE focuses on outcomes versus the “traditional curriculum-driven education and 
training”. In other words, the learner must demonstrate the outcome (in practical terms) of the 
training.  
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3.4.4 The Safety & Security Sector Education & Training Authority44 
The SAPS Division Training situated in Pretoria, is responsible for research, development and 
training in the SAPS. They therefore need to form a relationship with the Safety & Security 
Sector Education & Training Authority (SASSETA) (former POSLEC-SETA) as part of the 
policing field. This SETA was established in March 2000 in terms of Section 9 (1) of the Skills 
Development Act, 1998 (Act 97 of 1998). The aim of the POSLEC-SETA (SASSETA as from 
2005)45 was to contribute to the South African economy by developing skills and redress the 
education inequalities of the previous years. 46  
 
3.4.5 Overview of functions/responsibilities of SASSETA 
SASSETA is governed by a council comprising of seven chambers namely: 
1. Legal; 
2. Investigation and Private Security Activities; 
3. Policing; 
4. Correctional Services; 
5. Justice; 
6. National Intelligence Agency and South African Secret Services; and 
7. Department of Defence. 
 
In essence the responsibilities of the chambers are inter alia: 
• to assist SASSETA in meeting targets on strategic issues; 
• facilitate skills planning and development; 
• identify the need for learnerships, skills programmes, standards and qualifications; 
• to ensure quality assurance in education and training; and 
• oversee grants and finances. 47  
 
                                                
44
 The acronym POSLEC SETA stands for the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice 
Sector Education and Training Authority. 
45
 1 July 2005, POSLEC SETA and the Diplomacy, Intelligence, Defence and Trade Education and Training 
Authority) (DIDTETA) amalgamated and this union resulted in what is known today as SASSETA.  
46
 DIDTETA’s mission similarly was to promote multi-skilling and lifelong learning in its sector. SASSETA  
 now collectively represents the fields of Safety and Security SETA in South Africa. See http://www.sasseta.org.za. 
47
 See http://www.sasseta.org.za. 
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The chambers of the SASSETA are therefore pivotal in ensuring skills development strategies 
are effectively carried through in their respective areas of responsibility. The policing chamber 
has 25 representatives.48 The overall responsibility for basic training and the setting of unit 
standards in the SAPS is therefore in the hands of these representatives of the Policing Chamber. 
They are tasked with identifying education and training needs in the policing field, for example 
the training needs in respect of the use of lethal force in the SAPS.  
 
3.5 Summary  
In this chapter the researcher reviewed the Basic Training Learning Programme curriculum as 
was implemented in SAPS training during the period July 2004 to June 2006. During the time of 
this research, the Basic Training Learning Programme was being revised. Be that as it may, the 
review of this Basic Training Learning Programme was compared to the research data obtained 
from the interviews conducted as per Chapter 6.  
 
The training content was juxtaposed with the legal framework (Chapter 4) and research findings. 
The content was compared to these two constructs to identify gaps and anomalies. From the 
research conducted it is evident that the majority of police officials have not received appropriate 
use of lethal force training in line with legal requirements. The current information in the Basic 
Training Learning Programme reviewed was tested against the responses of the operational 
police officials.  
 
Some overall comments on the Basic Training Learning Programme under review with specific 
reference to the use of (lethal) force are: 
• The Criminal Procedure module indicated that a handout on the new s49 will be given to 
students. The handout introduces the changes brought about by new s49 in 199649 – 
promising that further comprehensive instructions from SAPS Legal Services will be 
communicated on the use of lethal force. The second communication from Legal Services 
was sent out in 200350 (see Annexure I).  
                                                
48
 See http://www.sasseta.org.za/about-chambers.html, accessed on 11 March 2005.  
49Instructions Relating to the Use of Force in Effecting an Arrest: Special Service Order dated 1996-08-14 – Ref 
31/1/1/5/3 
50National Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1 (5) dated 2003-07-18.  
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• This means that those police officials who attended training during this period would 
have only received the second communication after they had completed their basic 
training. The research revealed that 86% of the police officials interviewed did not 
receive any in-service training (See Chapter 6, Question 14), whilst 79% did not attend a 
workshop on the use of lethal force (See Chapter 6, Question 17). It appears that the 
second communication (or the guidelines) of the 2003 Special Service Order was merely 
a formal communication and not meant to be followed up with re-training. It may be 
pointed out that the majority of the sample population attended basic training before 1996 
and before the amendment to s49. But the question would then be: Why have the majority 
of operational police officials who completed basic training before and after the 
amendment to s49, not received any type of training after the law was amended?  
 
• The handout refers to the principles not affected by the new section – it falls short by not 
explaining those aspects that were affected by the new s49. Some of these aspects that 
were not fleshed out are: 
− the principle of proportionality; 
− the Schedule One offences that formed a major part of old s49 does not appear in the 
amended version and how this impacts on the use of lethal force in policing. This 
meant that police officials could no longer shoot at suspects fleeing from Schedule 1 
offences; and 
− what is meant by terms such as “substantial risk” and “future death”. 
 
On the other hand, it needs to be pointed out that the module on Street Fitness and Survival is 
concise and has a good combination of knowledge, skills and behaviours (provided role-plays). 
Survival tools for effective operational policing included the AITEST, and the Deadly Force 
Decision-making model. In addition, this section is coupled with group discussions and practical 
scenarios. This type of training is also in line with outcomes based education where a learner 
demonstrates the outcome of the training – see 3.4.2 above. Further gaps and anomalies are 
identified and discussed in more detail in the findings in Chapter 6. The following chapter 
explores the legal framework on the use of lethal force. 
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Chapter 4 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK/REGULATION OF THE USE 
OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Before 1994 criminal procedure was “subject to the sovereignty of parliament and the whims of 
the executive,” (Steytler, 1998:1), which allowed the government of the day to enforce its 
discriminatory laws on the citizens of the country. However, the new Constitution of 1996 
(incorporating the Interim Constitution of 1993) brought with it a new democratic order. Chapter 
2 of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights which has made a significant impact on criminal 
procedure and policing in South Africa. One can then assume that the purpose of the Bill of 
Rights is to protect the individual human rights of persons who come in contact with organs of 
the state, by enforcing certain restrictions and responsibilities on for example police officials 
who are empowered to use lethal force under certain circumstances (Steytler, 1998:1). 
 
The police are empowered by many statutory powers that impact on the rights of individuals 
afforded by the Bill of Rights. This study on s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 
1977) (which is statutory law) deals with the use of lethal force which is in direct contradiction 
to the right to life (section 11) of the Constitution. This chapter looks at the regulatory 
framework on the use of lethal force, the protection of human rights by the Bill of Rights, a 
commentary on international perspectives on human rights, specifically the right to life as well as 
decided case laws on the use of lethal force. Naturally, the progression of human rights and the 
Constitution led to the new amended s49, which will be introduced and commented upon in the 
next chapter. The next chapter will also elaborate on an interpretation of the new s49 and explore 
different opinions. 
 
4.2 Brief history of Human Rights 
According to Nel & Bezuidenhout (1997:3), the term “Human Rights is in effect only two 
centuries old”. Prior to 1948 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 
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United Nations in that year, human rights was an important concept that grew progressively 
more powerful. A study of these earlier eras will provide an in-depth understanding of its 
development. However, some of the following developments culminated in the respect for 
human rights in the world as we know it today. 
 
The Magna Carta of 1215 granted certain rights and privileges only to the English nobility. The 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 passed by the English parliament, provided for similar rights for 
ordinary citizens. Any person who has arrested another was ordered to produce such a person in 
court to determine the legality of such an arrest. The Period of Enlightenment (16th and 17th 
century), saw in the “independence of man” (Nel & Bezuidenhout, 1997:8). 
 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the USA in his 1941 “Four Freedoms Speech”,51  
provided the backdrop for human rights as epitomised in the Universal Declaration for Human 
Rights of 1948.  
 
In South Africa, the Orange Free State’s (Boer Republic) Constitution of 1854 contained a list of 
fundamental rights (Nel & Bezuidenhout, 1997:11). Unfortunately, in 1910 these rights were 
excluded from the Constitution. Black resistance to this situation gave birth to the African 
National Native Congress in 1912, ironically in Bloemfontein, the former capital of the Orange 
Free State Republic. The victory of the National Party in 1948 elections allowed for further 
inhumane and unjust apartheid laws to be adopted such as the Group Areas Act, 1950 (Act 41 of 
1950) and the Separate Amenities Act, 1953 (Act 49 of 1953) etc. 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) during this time steadfastly held onto the Freedom 
Charter, which was an important human rights document drawn up and adopted in Kliptown 
(south-east of Johannesburg in the black township of Soweto) in 1955. In 1986, the Law 
Commission was asked to draw up a report on human rights. The findings “caught the 
government unawares” (Nel & Bezuidenhout, 1997:13). It called for the protection of human 
                                                
51
 The four freedoms mentioned in United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s state of the union address 
delivered to the United States Congress on January 6, 1941, proposed four fundamental freedoms humans in the 
world ought to enjoy. They were the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom from 
want and the freedom from fear. See http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm accessed 
on 19/1/09 
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rights as opposed to the protection of group rights. Nelson Mandela was released from 
imprisonment in 1990 and after multi-party negotiations, the present Constitution Act 108 of 
1996 was signed by President Mandela and came into effect on 4 February 1997. According to 
Nel & Bezuidenhout (1997:14), South Africa has only (in 1997) passed “the standard-setting 
phase”. Accordingly the post-1996 new Constitution challenge for South Africa would be the 
implementation phase and planning for the future towards international respect for human rights. 
 
Our current Bill of Rights of the Constitution calls for the following: 
• the protection of the rights of individuals; 
• places certain restriction on police and judiciary; and 
• imposes a duty on the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights” (section 7 (2) of the Constitution). 
 
It contains firstly the general provisions that impact on policing and criminal procedure. For 
example the right to life which is especially significant to this research on the use of lethal force 
by the SAPS. Secondly, it contains provisions that guide criminal justice, for example rights of 
an arrested, detained and accused persons. 
 
Moreover, section 39 (2), provides that every court, tribunal or forum must give due 
consideration to and promote the spirit of the Bill of Rights. This means that the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights must be consulted and legal decisions are to be complimentary to its provisions. In 
specific relation to this research the right to life is afforded to every person and the use of lethal 
force during arrest may result in causing of the death of such a person.  
 
4.3 Commentary on international perspectives on human rights  
According to Steytler (1998:13), the South African Bill of Rights was influenced by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).  
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The Bill of Rights was also extensively influenced by the Canadian Charter in that the limitation 
clause is modelled on Section 1 of the Charter (Steytler, 1998:13). However, the Bill of Rights 
does not replace the CPA. It does serve as a “safety net” and guides the interpretation of other 
laws (Steytler,1998:3). The right to life (section 11) of our Constitution is synonymous with 
many Human Rights’ guidelines and conventions. 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 comprises of a preamble and thirty 
articles. Article 3 states that: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person”52  
 
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) comprises of a 
Preamble with fifty-three articles contained in six parts. Part III of Article 6 (1) provides that: 
“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life”.53  
 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), Section 1 which deals with Rights and Freedoms, Article 2 (1) provides that: 
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his/her life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his/her conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law”.54  
 
Interestingly, Subsection 2 of Article 2 (below) is apposite to South Africa’s new amended 
version of s49 (2) in that it allows for the use of lethal force in certain circumstances. Subsection 
2 of ECHR’s Article 2 states that: “Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary (when): 
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; (and) 
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” 
                                                
52
 See http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm. 
53
 See http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html.  
54
 See http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/treaties/html/005.htm. 
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Firstly, in respect of unlawful violence, Article 2 Subsection 2 (a) is similar to Section 49 (2) (a) 
of the CPA which allows for the use of deadly/lethal force: 
• if it is necessary to protect the arrestor or any person from imminent or future death or 
grievous bodily harm; and 
• if the arrest is delayed there is risk that the suspect may cause imminent or future 
death or grievous bodily harm. 
 
Secondly, with respect to lawful arrest, Article 2 Subsection 2 (b) of ECHR, is similar to Section 
49 (2) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), in that the latter allows for the 
use of deadly/lethal force under the following conditions: 
• when conducting a lawful arrest for a crime which is in progress and of a serious and 
forcible nature where life threatening violence exists or there is a strong likelihood 
that such an offence may result in grievous bodily harm. 
 
As illustrated, these four are considered major international Human Rights instruments and they 
have had major influence on the Bill of Rights in the Constitution in South Africa. 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7, recognises everyone’s right to life. The 
rights afforded to Canadian citizens may be subjected to “reasonable limits” and would have to 
be justified in a democratic society as in South Africa.55  
 
So too, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Chapter 1, Article 4 also protects the 
right to life.56 The basis of human rights in South Africa is therefore very much in line with those 
of the international arena. As we turn our attention back to the South African situation, human 
rights is contained in our new Constitution and below a discussion on these follows. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55
 See http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/charter/charter.text.html.\ 
56
 See http://www.diplomacy.edu/africancharter/acharter_rights.asp. 
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4.4 An overview of Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa, 
1996 (Act 108 of 1996) 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 comprises of a preamble, 14 chapters, 
seven schedules and an index. Section 11 which relates to this study protects the right to life. 
This research deals with the use of lethal force which may directly result in the loss of life. 
Further, the Table of Non-derogable Rights embodied in section 37 of the Constitution stipulates 
that the right to life (section 11) is protected entirely and may not be limited. 
 
Paradoxically, section 36 of the Constitution indicates that certain rights may be limited in terms 
of the law of general application (such as the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) and 
section 49(2) thereof) provided it is justifiable in a democratic society (The Constitution of South 
Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). Moreover, section 49(2) authorises the use of lethal force, albeit 
under limited circumstances, which deprives the person of his/her right to life which the 
Constitution states is entirely protected. Clearly, every police official needs to understand the 
conditions of those limited circumstances thoroughly in order to arrive at an informed decision 
on the use of lethal force. 
 
However, the research conducted for this study indicates otherwise. In light of the illustrated 
conflicting provisions and research results, it may be assumed that the Basic Training Learning 
Programme is clearly not achieving its outcomes. (See research findings in Chapter 6.) 
 
4.5  The South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 98 of 1995) Section 13 (1) 
Section 199 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of a security service for the 
Republic of South Africa. The South African Police Service is established by virtue of this 
provision. The police service is regulated by the enactment of the South African Police Service 
Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) and comprises three main aspects namely powers, duties and 
functions of police officials, Regulations of the Service and Orders and Instructions (Joubert, 
2001:15). Joubert goes on to explain that the preamble sets out the objectives of the Service as 
follows: 
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• to ensure that all persons in the country’s national territory are safe and secure; 
• to protect the rights of every individual as guaranteed by the Constitution; 
• to combat crime by working closely with the community it serves; 
• to have respect for victims of crime and consider their needs; and 
• to function under civilian supervision. 
 
It is not necessary to discuss the entire Act but very relevant to this research are sections 13 (1), 
(3) and section 25. In terms of powers, duties and functions, section 13 (1) states that police 
officials must exercise their powers and duties with due regard to the rights of every individual 
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution. As discussed earlier, the human rights 
provisions are contained in Chapter 2 which is the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 
 
In addition, section 13 (3) regulates the actions that are to be taken by the police official. It 
cautions that these actions must be reasonable and where police officials are authorised to use 
lethal force in the execution of their duties, they may use minimum force which is reasonable in 
those circumstances. 
 
4.5.1 National Instructions 
Within the legal framework it is necessary to take note also of section 25 (Orders and 
Instructions) of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 98 of 1995).  
 
It authorises the National Commissioner of SAPS to issue National Orders and Instructions as 
may be appropriate for the Service to ensure that the service fulfils its requirements in terms of 
Section 205 of the Constitution. Annexures I and J respectively, are the National Instructions 
titled Special Service Order Relating to the Use of Force in Effecting an Arrest (dated 
18/07/2003) and Constitutional Court Judgement on Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 (Act No 51 of 1977) dated 24/5/2002, are such examples. In terms of the South African 
Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995), we find that the use of lethal force is not to be taken 
lightly. Decided case law and precedent also guides the use of lethal force. Below a few which 
played a key role in the re-shaping of s49, are reviewed and examined. 
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4.6 An analysis of case laws on the use of lethal force in SAPS 
Joubert (2001:7) explains case laws as “court decisions [from] which we interpret both common 
law and statutory provisions and adjust these provisions to fit the realities of the day.” For our 
purposes, decided case law allows courts to change old laws to suit the needs of present day 
society, for example section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act had to be amended to remove the 
power of persons to take the lives of fleeing suspects who do not pose a danger (imminent threat) 
to anyone. So why do we need to study case laws in this study? Studying case law is important 
because by doing so we can see how the practical day-to-day concerns of operational police 
officials may be resolved and more importantly, it allows one to understand and interpret s49 
appropriately. (Please note that while case laws are discussed in this section and reference to old 
and new s49 is made the actual full content, wording and provisions of s49 (old and new) will 
only be discussed in Chapter 5 wherein the full provisions of both old and new versions are 
outlined). 
 
The need for amendment of the existing s49 was as a consequence of the new Constitution and 
the changing needs of the new democratic South African society. When the law is challenged 
during criminal proceedings, the court’s findings in the form of case laws or court decisions are 
studied in order to interpret the meaning of the law. Whereas previously the courts had no power 
to question the content and implementation of legislation, today the South African Constitutional 
Court (set up by the new Constitution and the first ever of its kind in South Africa) is empowered 
to do just that.  
 
This ensures that citizens are protected against unjust and discriminatory laws (Van Niekerk and 
Le Roux, 2000:148). The old section 49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act discriminated against 
the constitutionally protected fundamental right to life (section 11) including the right to freedom 
and security (section 12) as mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(Murray & Soltau, 1997:6). 
 
Since the inception of the Constitution, various court decisions tested the constitutionality of the 
use of lethal force in South Africa. In these cases both South African and international case law 
had an influence on the decisions taken. An example of this is Tennessee v Garner case 
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mentioned in the Govender case (which case will be briefly discussed later in this section). The 
reasoning for the foregoing discussion is that the correct interpretation would lead to correct 
application of the new s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1997). 
 
The following nine decided case laws played an important role in the amendment of section 49. 
To contextualise the resulting research findings a brief synopsis and the decision made in each of 
the following are discussed. 
4.6.1 Matlou v Makhubedu 1978 (1) SA 946 (A)  
4.6.2 Macu v Du Toit 1983 (4) SA 629 (A) (at 635) 
4.6.3 Tennessee v Garner 471 US (1) 1985 
4.6.4 S v Barnard 1986 (3) (SA) 1 (A) 
4.6.5 S v Martinus 1990 (2) all SACR 568 (A) 
4.6.6 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo and Another 1996 (1) S.A. 
355 (5) 
4.6.7 Raloso v Wilson and Others 1998 (1) BCLR 26 (NC) 
4.6.8 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) 
4.6.9 Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and 
Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC). 57 
 
The two main cases which played a pivotal role in re-shaping the amendment to Section 49, were 
the Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 (1) SA 959 D & CLD and Ex Parte 
Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 
(CC) cases. In both these cases the courts provided clear guidelines on the use of force. (Both 
these decisions will be looked at in greater detail after the other cases.)  
 
To contextualise the resulting research findings a brief discussion and the decisions made in each 
of the above listed cases are outlined. The cases are arranged by year dates for ease of reference 
as well as to understand the logical outflow of each of the previous decisions.  
 
                                                
57
 The reference for all nine case laws are from the South African Law Reports and are quoted in full in the List of 
References. 
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4.6.1 Matlou v Makhubedu 1978 (1) SA 946 (A)  
In this case a constable attempted to arrest a suspect who was fleeing. The police official 
believed that the suspect was escaping from the offence of being in possession of suspected 
stolen property (SALR, 1978:947). The suspect was shot in the back. The suspect survived. It 
was established that no warning shot was fired (SALR, 1978:947). 
 
The Matlou v Makhubedu case dealt with the reasonableness of the arrestor’s conduct. The case 
law gave guidance on the arrest of a suspect based on the following grounds: 
• the use of lethal force must be weighed against the “seriousness of the suspected 
offence”  
• the arrest could not have been affected in any other way, i.e. no other lesser force 
could have been used to arrest the suspect; 
• a verbal (oral) warning should be given; 
• a warning shot should be fired into to ground or air, depending on the circumstances; 
and  
• if the suspect still does not submit to arrest, the arrestor may shoot the suspect in the 
legs (SALR, 1978:947). 
 
Furthermore, the judgement in this case emphasised that a weapon (firearm) should be 
considered for use only after an arrestor has given a verbal warning and if the suspect failed to 
submit to the arrest then the arrestor may fire a warning shot. It also provided that, in general, a 
firearm may not be used unless a warning shot was fired. In any event, the Matlou case 
impressed the need to judge each case on its own merits. However, it is the opinion of the 
researcher that these guidelines were not appropriate in the current South African context. 
Firstly, shooting at a fleeing suspect is contrary to the provision of the Constitution which 
protects the right to life (Section 11). Secondly, the provisions of the amended s49, do not 
provide for the use of lethal force unless the life of the arrestor or another person’s life is in 
imminent life-threatening danger.  
 
In addition, the amended s49 also allows for the use of lethal force if the suspect will (is thought 
potentially to) cause future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed or if the offence 
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for which the suspect is wanted is in progress and of a serious nature. The amended Section 49 
also introduces the principle of proportionality. This means the amount of force that is to be used 
must be weighed against the degree of force a police official decides to use. Therefore shooting 
at a fleeing suspect for being in possession of suspected stolen property would, in these 
circumstances, be deemed to be excessive use of force. The use of lethal force in the Matlou case 
may not be justified in the current legal context in South Africa. 
 
4.6.2 Macu v Du Toit 1983 (4) SA 629 (A) (at 635) 
In this case, the appellant was caught stealing sheep from the respondent’s farm. When the 
appellant was arrested, he managed to break free and flee. The respondent then fired at the 
appellant, hitting and wounding him three times. He (the appellant) then approached the court in 
an action for bodily injuries. His appeal was unsuccessful for the following reasons: 
 
• Firstly, the appellant was aware that there was a clear attempt being made to arrest him (he 
broke free and fled); 
 
• Secondly, the force applied must be reasonably necessary. Based on the facts of the case in 
point, the court took into consideration that both respondents were middle aged and unfit and 
could not have chased the appellant and it was highly likely the appellant was carrying a 
knife as he was stealing sheep (to cut their throats) (SALR, 1983:651). 
 
Under these circumstances, the court held that it was unreasonable to expect the respondents to 
find alternative means to arrest the appellant. This means that the suspect could escape arrest, 
therefore the judgment condoned the shooting of the fleeing suspect wanted for stock theft. I am 
of the opinion that after the introduction of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 
1996) and the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act’s s49 (use of lethal force), this 
judgement would be both unconstitutional and considered to be contrary to the provisions of the 
amended s49.  
 
The Constitution (1996), which is a supreme law, protects the right to life (section 11), as well as 
the right to bodily and psychological integrity (section 12) (Murray and Soltau, 1997:6). 
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The amended section 49 introduces the principle of proportionality. Basically this entails 
weighing the type and degree of force to be used as compared to the right that is being infringed 
upon or the seriousness of the offence that was committed.  
 
Furthermore, offences listed as per Schedule 1 in the old section 49 do not appear in the 
amendment to s49. When this case (Macu v du Toit) came before court, stock theft was listed as 
a Schedule 1 offence.58 This meant that police officials (and private persons) could shoot at a 
suspect fleeing from a Schedule 1 offence. After the implementation of the Constitution of South 
Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) and the amendment to s49, this is no longer the case.  
 
This view is supported by Chapter 1, section 2 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 
108 of 1996) which states that “All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, 
continues to be in force, subject to – 
(a) any amendment or repeal; and 
(b) consistency with the new constitution” (Murray & Soltau, 1997:3). 
 
Here it becomes evident that all laws are subject to the Constitution. Where there are 
inconsistencies (such as old s49) these laws shall be amended to fall in line with the Constitution. 
In comparison to the Govender case law (discussed below), it is evident that the actions of the 
respondent in the Macu v du Toit case (SALR, 1983), would be deemed unlawful. 
 
But a great influence on South African courts was initially the judgement reached in a US 
Supreme Court case, namely, Tennessee v Garner 471 US (1) 1985. 
 
4.6.3 Tennessee v Garner 471 US (1) 1985  
The approach of our courts in terms of these decided cases (the Govender and Walters case), 
refer to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Tennessee v Garner 471 US 
(1) 1985. A Tennessee statute provided for where a police official gave notice to arrest a suspect 
and the suspect flees or forcibly resists “the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the 
arrest”. A Memphis police official shot and killed Garner’s son after he had been ordered to halt. 
                                                
58
 See Annexure C for a list of Schedule 1 offences. 
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He was suspected of burglary and fled over a fence at night. The police official was “reasonably 
sure” the suspect was unarmed and +17 years old. The father claimed damages for violation of 
his son’s constitutional rights. The District Court found the police official’s actions to be 
constitutional whilst the Appeal Court found the Tennessee statute to be unconstitutional because 
it allowed for the use of deadly force on an unarmed suspect. It was further decided that such 
lethal force may only be used to prevent escape when the police official reasonably believes that 
the suspect threatened death or serious physical injury to the police official or others. 
 
The judge in this case, Judge White, stated in his judgment that: “we are not convinced that the 
use of deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing 
of nonviolent suspects”. He went on to add “a police officer may not seize an unarmed, or 
dangerous suspect by shooting him dead” (Tennessee v Garner, 1985). Consequently, the 
Tennessee statute having a bearing on this case was considered unconstitutional since it 
authorised the use of deadly force against fleeing (non-violent) suspects. Barak (2000:244) is in 
agreement with this view, and accordingly states that the use of force may be justified when a 
suspect: 
 
• resists arrest and threatens a police official or others; 
• is committing a “forcible felony” (e.g. armed robbery); or 
• is fleeing from a “forcible felony” and is in possession of a weapon and posing a 
threat to the police official or others. 
 
The decision by the United States Supreme Court has played a very important role in re-shaping 
the South African interpretation on the use of lethal force. The following case study looks at 
another important requirement for the use of lethal force.  
 
4.6.4 S v Barnard 1986 (3) (SA) 1 (A) 
In this case the deceased discovered that his bakkie could make explosive noises if he switched 
his vehicles engine on and off whilst he was driving. He, together with a passenger, decided to 
drive through the streets of Pietermaritzburg one evening whilst causing his vehicle to make 
these explosive noises. A short while before, there had been a terrorist attack on the 
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Pietermaritzburg court building and a police official heard the vehicle making explosive noises 
near the court building.  
 
The police official proceeded to the court building believing that the terrorists were getting away 
in the bakkie (that was letting off the explosive noises). The police official (appellant in the 
matter) gave chase – when the deceased in the bakkie failed to stop and react to police signals, 
the appellant opened fire on the driver, fatally wounding him.  
 
The driver died as a result of the shooting. The police official relied on the old s49 (2) to justify 
his use of lethal force to effect the arrest. The court found that it must be clear to the person to be 
arrested that an attempt to arrest him is being made. In this case the deceased appeared to be 
unaware that he was being pursued when the police official fired upon him. The police official 
was convicted of culpable homicide in the matter. 
 
The police official appealed the matter. Upon appeal, Judge Van Heerden stated that there must 
be a clear attempt by an arrestor to arrest a person – this was not the case in this matter. The 
fleeing person must then flee with the intention of foiling the attempt to arrest him. Further to 
this, the appeal court also found that it was unreasonable for the police official to believe that the 
terrorists had returned to the scene after the police had (certainly) been notified (SALR, 1986:3).  
 
The police official in this case was not sure that the deceased was indeed involved or responsible 
for the terrorist attack earlier in the day. In addition, the Judge in the appeal case again 
emphasised the fact it had not been apparent to the deceased that the police official wished to 
arrest him. The use of lethal force under these circumstances was therefore in this case 
proclaimed to have been unlawful. Again the bottom-line for the use of lethal force in the South 
African context must be in line with the Constitution and the amended version of s49.  
 
Accordingly the Appeal Court further held, on the basis of the facts put forward, that: 
• The police official did not make it clear to the driver that he was going to arrest him 
(the driver); and 
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• Further if the deceased had become aware of this intention of the police official to 
arrest him, he must have sought (deliberately) to flee. 
 
As a result the conviction of the police official for culpable homicide was upheld in this matter. 
In the present climate and within the context of the amended s49, the police official could also 
face criminal and civil charges.  
 
The police official’s conduct would be contradictory to the provisions of the new s49 and the 
Constitution. (The Govender case discussed (further on in this section) will shed further light on 
this aspect of the issue of the use of lethal force.) 
 
4.6.5 S v Martinus 1990 (2) all SACR 568 (A) 
On 5 January 1986, the complainant (Dr Graham Monteith) was wounded in the face by a rubber 
bullet fired from a shotgun by the appellant (Martinus). The complainant was in a canoe on the 
Crocodile River going towards the Hartebeespoort Dam (west of Pretoria). The appellant 
(Martinus) had tried without success to keep canoeists off his riverside property and establish his 
rights in respect of the river which extended to the mid-line of the river.  
 
He had come to the conclusion that canoeists had no rights in respect of the river and that they 
were guilty of trespass. He then further concluded that he was empowered by s 49(1) (old 
version), to use force to effect an arrest should the arrestee resist and flee. The appellant was 
charged with attempted murder after he shot the complainant in the face. He was found not guilty 
of attempted murder because it was found that he lacked the intention to kill the complainant. 
Instead he was found guilty of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and fined R800,00 
or six months imprisonment, which was suspended for four years. The magistrate further found 
that he (the appellant) went beyond the scope of s49 (1) by using excessive force to prevent the 
complainant from fleeing. The appellant appealed. The conviction was altered to one of common 
assault with a fine of R200,00 or two months imprisonment. The appellant again appealed. 
However, it was held that the appellant clearly exceeded the bounds of force permitted by s49 
(1). The court further held that “the use of a firearm in an attempt to effect such an arrest should 
be resorted to with even greater caution” (SALR, 1990:644). Furthermore, it was stated in the 
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judgement that the test for the reasonable use of force is objective and this provides a “salutary 
safeguard” against unreasonable use of force when effecting an arrest (SALR, 1990:646). The 
appellant used an unreasonable degree of force and therefore acted unlawfully. The appeal was 
dismissed.  
 
This case is an example of how the old s49 allowed for the gross violation of the human right to 
life. It this case the complainant did not threaten the life of the appellant. Arguably, he may have 
been guilty of trespass but is it justifiable that he pay for this minor crime with his life? The 
appellant most definitely acted unlawfully and exceeded the bounds of his authority. It is for 
these reasons that the principle of proportionality is communicated to police officials and private 
citizens alike. Although the above mentioned case involves a private person’s use of lethal force, 
both the private person and the police official are compelled to use lethal force with utmost 
caution. The use of lethal force should only be permitted in limited circumstances where there is 
an imminent threat to life (SALR, 1990:644). 
 
4.6.6 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo and Another 1996 (1)  
S.A. 355 (5) 
It must be borne in mind, that although the above case involves a soldier, it is necessary for 
police officials to heed the decision taken when they perform duties at road blocks. So too, police 
officials must consider whether others may be injured before they shoot, and act in accordance 
with such insight. 
 
In the Basdeo case (South African Law Reports, 1996:450), a road block had been set up by the 
Defence Force at the border between South Africa and Transkei (one of the former so-called 
self-governing homelands/independent Bantustans). Vehicles coming from the Transkei were 
searched. Occupants in a Ford Sierra were travelling in the opposite direction towards the 
Transkei. They passed the “roadblock ahead” sign and with the intention of having some fun at 
the expense of the soldiers, made a U-turn and sped toward the border. The soldiers then heard 
the screeching of tyres and the southern stopper group believed that the vehicle and its occupants 
were now entering South Africa from the Transkei. Attempts to stop the vehicle by two soldiers 
failed when the driver drove straight towards them forcing them to jump out of the way. One 
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soldier fired a shot with his rifle aiming at the left-hand tail light. The bullet struck the tarred 
surface, ricocheted and penetrated the vehicle and struck the passenger in the left front seat. He 
died a week later. Trial court held that the soldier was negligent and had caused the deceased’s 
death.  
 
The soldier, the court held, should have reasonably foreseen that there could be a passenger in 
the vehicle who might be injured if he had fired. The driver of the vehicle was held to be 
contributory negligent. 
 
The judge in this case, Judge Hefer, in his judgement pointed out that “Section 49 (2) invests 
arresting officers with the power of taking human lives even on a mere (albeit reasonably held) 
suspicion. Such an awesome power plainly needs to be exercised with great circumspection and 
strictly within the prescribed bounds. ….Section 49 (2) should not, and indeed cannot, be 
regarded as a license for the wanton of killing people” (SALR, 1996: 469). 
 
I am in agreement with this submission/decision by the judge. Every suspect/accused is innocent 
until proven guilty. The question that is posed: Why should a suspect be (wantonly) killed before 
reasonable steps are taken to properly arrest, charge and convict him in a court of law? Where a 
suspect poses no immediate threat to the life of others and flees, he should not be subjected to (or 
expect) lethal force. 
 
The “standard of reasonableness” outlined in the same judgement indicated that:  
“If a reasonable man placed in the circumstances of the defendant, he would have 
foreseen that his conduct might endanger or prejudice the lives of others in regard to 
their legally protected interests, the defendant is then deemed to have been under a legal 
duty toward such others to exercise appropriate care” (SALR, 1996: 469).  
 
The judgement followed the reasoning that the soldier should have realised that others may be 
injured if he shot at the departing vehicle (without being able to see whether there was a 
passenger inside, i.e. on the left – the side of the vehicle at which he shot – and therefore should 
have acted in accordance with such insight. 
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The Basdeo case judgement was given in 1996, the new Constitution already being two years 
old.  
 
In the Mistry et al., (2001:49) research report (five years after the Basdeo judgment) it was stated 
by a flying squad member interviewed in the study, that if suspects refuse to stop while in a 
vehicle chase with police “we will use a firearm and aim at the wheels.” The Mistry et al., 
(2001) study clearly indicates that even with a five-year gap operational police officials remain 
largely uninformed on these matters and interpret or exercise their power incorrectly (or even 
unlawfully), i.e. some police officials still believe that they may shoot at a fleeing vehicle when 
their lives are not threatened. This judgement provides that when police officials exercise the 
powers granted to them in terms of section 49, they need to exercise extreme caution and 
consider the consequences of their actions carefully.  
 
4.6.7 Raloso v Wilson and Others 1998 (1) BCLR 26 (NC) 
Another important decision regarding the amendment to s49 is found in the Raloso case law 
(SALR, 1998). The applicant’s ten-year-old son was shot and killed by a policeman, Lance 
Sergeant Wilson, on the roof of a building at 18:50 at night. On arrival both police officials heard 
people running on the roof. A verbal warning was issued. The police official (Wilson) was 
unaware that both suspects were children as it was dark. He saw someone pass the window 
whilst in a crouching position. He had fired a shot at the person, which was fatal. The police 
official in question relied on section 49 (2) to justify the killing. 
 
Because the incident occurred eleven days before the Interim Constitution, 1993 (Act 200 of 
1993),59 came into effect, the applicant, acting in public interest, requested the matter be referred 
to the Constitutional Court to determine the validity of the section. It was submitted that section 
49 was not in line with the Constitution.  
                                                
59
 South Africa operated under the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, from 27 April 1994 to 4 February 1997. It 
allowed time for the Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution under a government of national unity. For 
more info go to http://41.208.61.234/uhtbin/cgisirsi/20090112044215/SIRSI/0/520/S-CCT23-96 as well as 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/history.htm#1993. Website accessed on 19/1/2009. 
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However, though Judge Buys agreed with the submission, he refused the referral to the 
Constitutional Court. At the time of the request, the matter was still to be debated upon in 
Parliament and had to follow the legislative process (SALR, 1998:369). This again indicates 
clearly, how policing power on the use of lethal force may lead to negligence and abuse.  
 
The following case (Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001) provides a clearer 
indication to police officials wherein they are cautioned that a firearm may not be used to prevent 
an unarmed suspect from fleeing. 
 
4.6.8 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) 
The Govender case is one of the most defining cases in South Africa in the whole debate around 
section 49. On 16 June 1995, the plaintiff’s son, one Justin Govender, was a suspect and 
occupant in a suspected stolen motor vehicle which was involved in a high speed vehicle chase 
with police. The vehicle crashed and both suspects got out, abandoned the vehicle and attempted 
to flee on foot.  
 
Whilst fleeing from the scene, one of the policemen (Sergeant Cox) chased Govender on foot 
and aiming at his legs, fired a shot. The bullet struck the suspect in his back, paralysing him. The 
trial court incorrectly held that the use of force was reasonable and proportionate to the crime of 
theft of motor vehicle and therefore held that the policeman had been justified in terms of section 
49(1). The plaintiff (father of Justin) sought damages and disputed the reasonableness of the 
conduct of the police in this case.  
 
The father also submitted that section 49 in its entirety, violated section 9, 10 and 11 of the then 
Interim Constitution, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) which was in effect from 27 April 1994 to 4 
February 1997 – the period during which the Govender case was brought to trial). (See footnote 
above in Raloso case.) Justin Govender’s father therefore challenged its constitutional validity. 
The defendant pleaded that section 49(1) did not violate the Interim Constitution, 1993 (Act 200 
of 1993) whilst section 49(2) was irrelevant to the specific case. 
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The trial court’s Judge Booysen found section 49(1) to be constitutional and valid. He also found 
that the validity of section 49(2) was not relevant in the case because the suspect had not in fact 
been killed. However, on appeal, The Supreme Court of Appeal (Judge Olivier) deemed the 
shooting unlawful. The case qualified for damages. 
 
In the Govender case s49 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) was 
interpreted to mean that although the use of reasonable force in effecting arrest may be necessary 
in order to prevent the person from fleeing, such force excludes the use of a firearm unless the 
person to be arrested: 
• poses an immediate threat to the arrestor or any other member of the public. In this 
case Justin was fleeing (and apparently unarmed) – he was far from posing any 
immediate or imminent threat to policeman Cox; 
• has committed a crime of grievous bodily harm where an open wound was inflicted. 
The facts in the case showed no evidence that Justin had committed any such a type 
of crime. 
 
The finding of the Appeal Court therefore stated (held) that a firearm should not be used in 
circumstances where there is no immediate threat of serious bodily harm. Deadly force or a 
firearm may not be used merely to prevent the escape of an unarmed suspect. Basically, this 
meant that Sergeant Cox should not have used his firearm on an unarmed suspect who posed no 
threat to him or any other person. The Govender case resulted in the following circumstances 
where a firearm may be used in an arrest, being outlined: 
 
• Actual crime – where the person to be arrested endangered the life of anybody and 
caused serious bodily harm; and 
 
• Threatened crime – where the person to be arrested committed a crime during which 
he/she threatened physical/bodily harm to another. 
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Accordingly the Govender case limited the use of deadly force on a suspect fleeing from an 
offence where the life of a police official or any other person is not threatened. In such situations 
all factors must be considered before the use of a firearm can be considered. In other words the 
use of force must be proportional to the crime committed. This decision is consistent with that 
reached in the Tennessee v Garner case. 
 
When the findings of the trial judge and the appeal court judge are juxtaposed it becomes evident 
that (with respect to the implementation of the Interim Constitution during this time) the right to 
life and physical integrity is far more valuable than that of protecting of one’s property. In 
support of the opinion above, this significant distinction stems from the following: 
 
The trial court judge found that: 
“in my view, the force used was reasonable and necessary and proportionate to the 
offence of motor vehicle theft. The public interest involved in the use of deadly force as a 
last resort to arrest a fleeing car thief relates primarily to the serious nature of this 
crime, its increasing prevalence throughout this country and the public’s interest in the 
apprehension, prosecution and punishment of car thieves. In the result, in my view, the 
shooting was justified by s49 (1)” (SALR, 2001:279 at F).  
 
The judge in this case had weighed the collective interests of society, the escalation of this type 
of crime (to wit theft of motor vehicles and hi-jackings) in the country against the interest of the 
plaintiff (Justin). However, upon appeal, the appeal judge found to the contrary. He (Judge 
Olivier) stated that: 
 
• the principle of proportionality should be expanded to include consideration of the nature 
and degree of force used and the threat posed by the fugitive to the safety and security of 
the police officers and society; 
 
• there is no allegation of hi-jacking or other type of physical violence committed by Justin 
(the now appellant). Nor was there any threat or danger to the police officials or the 
public.  
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● Furthermore, the judge provided that there was no “pressing” interest of society that 
justified the “violation of Justin’s physical integrity”. Can it be said that in our law the 
protection of property (via the criminal law system) is invariably more important than life 
or physical integrity? Surely not. The respondent also failed to show that had Justin not 
been shot at, his arrest could not have been by other means such as fingerprinting, 
witness accounts and further investigation (SALR, 2001:286 at C).  
 
Incidentally this distinction did not come out too clearly in the review of the Basic Training 
Learning Programme. Research conducted in this study reveals that 38% of the respondents in 
the sample are not familiar with the new s49, whilst 27% did not modify their behaviour when it 
came to the new amended version of s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). 
Regrettably, three years after the Govender judgement and its finding, operational police officials 
are still exceeding the bounds when it comes to the use of lethal force. The research conducted 
further reveals that an operational police official and his colleagues fired upon suspects fleeing 
from a theft of motor vehicle scene sometime in 2004 (one suspect shot in the leg) (Interview 
20). It is evident that there is inadequate or no use of lethal force training taking place in the 
SAPS. Moreover that operational police officials are not adequately trained to make use of lethal 
force decisions in line with the legislative requirements (SALR, 2001).60  
 
4.6.9 Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 
2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) 
Whilst the Govender case dealt primarily with the constitutionality of s49 (1), the Ex Parte 
Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) 
case directly challenged s49 (2). An interesting point in this case being that the deceased was 
shot and killed by civilians and not police officials. This was the decisive case on the 
constitutionality of s49 (2) and it made reference to the events leading up to the amendment to 
s49.  
                                                
60
 See also question 28 of findings in Chapter 6 for detail. 
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In brief the facts of the case being that in a shooting incident in Lady Frere, two accused, a father 
and son, shot and wounded a burglar fleeing from their bakery. The suspected burglar’s wounds 
were fatal which resulted in a murder charge being laid against them. The two accused relied on 
s49(2) as a defence and the trial court referred the matter to the Constitutional Court with 
reference to the validity of s49(2). Appeal Court Judge Kriegler held that the provisions of s49(2) 
authorise the use of force against persons and justifies homicide.  
 
This is contradictory to three fundamental elements of the Bill of Rights to wit, the right to life, 
the right to human dignity and bodily integrity. It must be borne in mind that during this time 
there was a great deal of uncertainty, concern and insecurity amongst functional police officials 
on the street regarding the use of the provisions of s49 , particularly within the new human rights 
oriented policing framework and community policing principles being adopted and implemented 
by the SAPS. The tactful Judge Kriegler went on to reiterate that the lives and personal safety of 
police officials must be protected and is “in no respect diminished”. In his finding, he reassured 
the police that these judgements do not mean that if a police official’s life is threatened, that 
reasonable proportionate force may not be used to defend him or herself from life threatening 
danger. Put simply the judgement means that one may not shoot at a fleeing suspect merely 
because they will get away and cannot be arrested. A firearm may therefore only be used (fired at 
suspect) to arrest a suspect under certain very limited circumstances. 
 
According to the Constitutional Court, the Govender case interpretation on s49 (1) (b) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) is “constitutionally sound” and the 
Constitutional Court supported the Supreme Court of Appeal’s general warning against using a 
firearm to prevent the escape of a suspect who poses no threat to life or bodily harm (SALR, 
2002 (4):615 at D).  
 
The following comments made by the Constitutional Court in the Walters case, are of import to 
this study: 
• one needs to give serious consideration before risking the lives of suspects and using a 
firearm or some other form of potential deadly force merely to prevent escape of such 
suspect (SALR, 2002:615 at G); 
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• The right to life, human dignity and bodily integrity are both individually and collectively the 
foundation of the value system upon which the Constitution is based. If this very foundation 
is compromised then “the society to which we aspire becomes illusionary” (SALR, 2002:631 
at G); 
 
• It can be reasonably assumed that police officials have been trained on the use of firearms 
and have a basic understanding of the legal requirements for effecting an arrest (SALR, 
2002:633 at A); 
 
• The “crux” of the problem is how to strike a balance between public interest and limitation 
of certain rights when s49 is put into operation (SALR, 2002:632 at E); 
 
• The Constitutional Court indicated that there is a need for “proportionality when sanctioning 
deadly force to perfect an arrest” (SALR, 2002:637 at G);  
 
• Succinctly put by Judge Kriegler: “There is a glaring disproportion in depriving an unarmed 
fleeing criminal of life merely in order to effect an arrest there and then” (SALR, 2002:638 
at G) and with reference to the Govender case, there is a disproportion between the rights of 
the suspect to be infringed as apposed to the interests the arrestor wished to promote (SALR, 
2002:639 at E) 
 
The research analysis and findings in Chapter 6 explores how these court findings and comments 
differ greatly from the research findings of this study. 
 
Additionally in his judgment, Judge Kriegler further tabled nine clarifying judgment points to 
provide a clearer understanding and guidelines for police officials.  
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They are as follows: 
 
1. The purpose of arrest is to bring persons suspected of having committed offences before 
court for trial; 
 
2. Arrest is not the only means of achieving this purposed, nor is it always the best; 
 
3. Arrest may never be used as punitive measure; 
 
4. Where it is necessary to arrest, only necessary force may be used to effect the arrest; 
 
5. Where force is necessary, only minimum force to effect the arrest may be used; 
 
6. The degree of force to be used must be proportional to the threat of violence to the arrestor or 
others and the nature of the crime the suspect is suspected of having committed; 
 
7. The shooting of a suspect merely to arrest is permitted in very limited circumstances only; 
 
8. Under ordinary circumstances such a shooting is not permitted unless the suspect/s poses a 
threat of violence to the arrestor or others or is suspected of having committed or threatened 
to commit an offence of serious bodily harm and there are no other means to carry out the 
arrest, at that time or later; and 
 
9. These limitations have no effect on an arrestor acting in self-defence or in defending the life 
of another (SALR, 2002:616). 
 
This judgment in particular led the South African Constitutional Court to declare s49 (2) to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. In the Walters case the Constitutional 
court upheld the decision in the Govender case as being correct.  
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The Umtata High Court, before which the murder trial started, was criticised because they 
refused to follow the decision in the Govender case and instead criticised the Govender decision 
(SALR, 2002:617).  
 
4.7 Comment on how the courts view the use of lethal force 
Hosten, Edwards, Bosman and Church (1995:414) submit that precedents (as set by previous 
court decisions) have a “binding quality rather than persuasive value”. However, it must be 
borne in mind that decisions made in these cases are based on a particular set of facts (situational 
context). 
 
Often the reasons for a certain judgement would refer to a particular case with a certain set of 
circumstances. The courts view is confined only to the facts in a particular case. Caution is 
exercised so that decisions are not generalised and applied to all situations. So too, when 
considering foreign law since different countries have different laws, contexts and situations. 
Accordingly some degree of circumspection should be used.  
 
From the perspective of the courts, a person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The 
police official who unjustifiably oversteps his/her powers and “punishes” a suspect before the 
suspect is arrested, charged and taken to court, must be held accountable for his/her actions. We 
do have a “fair and just” criminal justice system in South Africa and we all believe that ours is a 
civilised society. The Department of Justice has a responsibility to the people of the country. The 
courts may be seen as an institution that creates balance and stability rather than disorder and 
chaos. The inhabitants of South Africa are, accordingly, promised a safe and secure environment. 
 
4.7.1 View of society and the people of a democratic order 
The citizens of South Africa are protected by the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 
1996). The Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) enshrines the right to life (section 11). 
Furthermore, the Constitution protects citizens against the infringement of these rights.  
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The police official by virtue of the office he holds (official capacity as policeman) and by virtue 
of the fact that he/she is allowed to use lethal force (acting upon an order or provision as per 
legislation), is therefore empowered to take the life of another human being. Although his/her 
actions may be legally permissible it may also allow for police officials to abuse power and the 
authority vested in them. The Milgrim experiments61 of 1961, measured the willingness of 
participants to obey an authority figure who gave them an instruction to perform an act which 
conflicted with their moral values and conscience. The study found that adults are very willing to 
“go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority”. Interestingly, an ordinary person 
who is not generally hostile can “become agents in a terrible destructive process” (Milgram, 
1974). It was found that very few people had the resources (will or mental strength) to resist 
authority, although the instruction went against their moral beliefs. Related to this study, one of 
the findings of Milgrim’s research was that the power of authority dramatically increased 
compliance and obedience.  
 
In another interesting study led by Psychology Professor Zimbardo in 1971 and called the 
Stanford Prison Experiment,62 a team of researchers undertook to explore the impact of 
situational factors on the behaviour of participants. Participants had to play the role of prison 
guard or a prisoner in a prison environment created by the researchers. They were given the 
authority of prison guards and prisoners were subjected to fingerprinting and prison routines. The 
experiment grew out of hand when participants quickly began stepping beyond their roles. 
Prisoners were humiliated and treated sadistically. Prison guards became increasingly cruel. As a 
result the experiment was halted. At the time it was postulated that the experiment showed that 
people were obedient when provided with a “legitimizing ideology and social and institutional 
support.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment). What the experiment did 
indicate was that the situation that one is placed in will greatly influences one’s behaviour – and 
what the Stanford Prison Experiment also revealed was the underlying human aggression that 
came to the fore.  
 
 
                                                
61
 Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. Harpercollins: See 
 http://psychology.about.com/od/historyofpsychology/a/milgram.htm accessed on 2009-10-02. 
62
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford prison experiment: accessed on 2009-10-02. 
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It is important to note that the police may legitimately use lethal force and have social and 
institutional support as well. The above discussion then suggests that this may become a 
disastrous recipe which can feed human aggression in police use of (lethal) force situations. 
 
If use of lethal force by police officials is not restricted or regulated, they would, in all 
likelihood, possibly abuse of these powers. The police were on a number of occasions before 
1994 guilty of this – in a period when human rights were not protected or guaranteed by any 
constitution or legislation. As a result, police brutality remains an extremely sensitive issue in 
South Africa. The police have a responsibility to act fairly and responsibly. The interpretation of 
case laws on the use of lethal force plays a crucial role for effective policing. Such case law may 
be viewed as a guide and directive on the future use of force when affecting the arrest of suspects 
in our country. 
 
4.8 Summary 
The South African legal framework should, and must, form the basis and starting point for any 
police training on lethal force. Decided case laws, precedents, human rights and internal 
perspectives play a pivotal role in this process. Essentially a firearm cannot be used to prevent a 
suspect from fleeing if there is no threat of serious bodily harm or life threatening danger. Nel & 
Bezuidenhout (1995:21) succinctly point out that the police as an institution, moved from a 
colonial essentially repressive institution to a more democratic model of policing. Presently, 
police management needs to communicate and/or enlighten its operational police officials on 
limitations and powers of police on the use of lethal force. 
 
Arguably, in my view, in the case of the whole amendment, implementation and training of 
police officials in the nuances of the new s49, the police were not afforded time to digest the 
fundamental (use of force applications to specified situations) changes of such magnitude. The 
implications and impact would of necessity have had to involve re-training, workshops, 
seminars, correspondence, etc. This did not happen on a sufficient scale especially since the 
police had to continue with normal policing duties and commission of crimes obviously 
continued. 
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The historical kaleidoscope of human rights violations and apartheid era policies coupled with 
drastic legislative changes and precedent-setting case law could not, in my opinion, be cleared up 
merely by sending out Standing Orders, National Instructions and/or circulars. However, 
although the issue around the use of force is central to a number of aspects of policing and 
irrespective of the case law, it is an understatement to say, that especially here in South Africa, 
urgent intervention on lethal force is necessary and relevant. 
 
Policing must take place within the parameters of the law. In a democratic country, 
accountability in policing is necessary. This chapter touched one of the important aspects of 
policing within the legal framework when the need to use lethal force arises. 
 
A multi-faceted approach with the involvement of the government, the Ministry of Safety and 
Security and Civil Society (Civilian oversight such as the Community Police Forums etcetera), 
serve as a lever or control to ensure that the SAPS exercise their powers in a justifiable and 
responsible manner.  
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Chapter 5 
EXPLORING DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE NEW S49 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Ours is a society that is in a period of rapid transformation and transition, with persons 
encroaching on each other in many ways – politically, socially, economically, morally and 
physically (Eldefonso, 1968:5). Over forty years later, this sentiment echoes in modern day 
policing. Historically, the uniform of a police official may be viewed as a symbolic license to 
judge and to punish, representing on one level as it does, the right to arrest and most importantly 
it lends itself to the role of disciplinarian. However, in reality the enactment of laws and judging 
and punishment of offenders are outside of the scope of the South African Police Service.  
 
Essentially the old s49 allowed for police officials to take the life of a person on mere suspicion 
of having committed a crime. In the newly democratic South Africa the revision of the old s49 
was inevitable, especially with the arrival of the new rights-based Constitution coupled with the 
political support of international human rights conventions. Much has been written about this 
controversial topic since the revision of s49 in 2003. There have been differing views on its 
interpretation as well. This chapter will explore some of these views. 
 
It must be borne in mind that the requirements and/or right to private defence in terms of 
common law are not disputed in this research. This chapter will rather explore different opinions 
in an attempt to appropriately interpret the new s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 
of 1977).  
 
5.2 Old versus new legislation on s49 and how it impacts on operational police  
 officials 
None of the police officials interviewed explained or conveyed an understanding of the previous 
nor the current legislation on the use of lethal force. In fact 97% of the respondents interviewed 
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indicated that they had not received any training (whether in basic training, specialist survival 
training afterwards, or field training at the police station) on the use of lethal force. The 
responses of the majority of the research sample population do not measure up or meet the use of 
lethal force requirements as outlined in the Basic Training Learning Programme (as reviewed for 
the implementation curricula period of July 2004 to June 2006).  
 
More specifically, as indicated in the Basic Training Learning Programme in Chapter 3 (3.3.4. 
Use of Force, 2003), the police official is expected to use appropriate force to uphold and enforce 
the law and protect people and property.  
 
The research results indicate that operational police officials in the sample do not possess the 
relevant knowledge on the amended s49 nor the skills and attributes necessary to apply use of 
force correctly in order to prevent or combat crime. The majority of police officials interviewed 
therefore are ‘untrained’ and cannot make appropriate use of lethal force decisions to effectively 
police by fighting serious and violent crime. 
 
In terms of its current impact on operational police officials, the change from the old s49 to the 
new s49 has not been an easy or comfortable transition, nor fully (or even partially) understood 
by the majority of the operational police officials interviewed in this study. This statement is 
substantiated in Question 31 by the fact that 79% (23 respondents) revealed inter alia that their 
rights have been limited, suspects have more rights than they do and that they are unhappy 
and/or angry with the current situation. Incidentally the balance of 21% (six respondents) gave 
no response on this question. The following section examines the major points of contention 
between the old and the new s49.  
 
5.3 The old s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
As a starting point it is first necessary to look at the provisions of the old s49 (before making 
comparisons to the new s49). The old Section 49 states that if a person who is suspected of 
committing a certain offence and then flees or resists arrest and cannot be arrested and prevented 
from escaping by means other than by killing the person who is fleeing or resisting, such killing 
shall be deemed in law justifiable homicide (Du Toit et al. 1997:5-23). 
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More importantly and related to this research the old section 49 (2) provided that where the 
person concerned is to be arrested for an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on 
the ground that he/she is reasonably suspected of having committed such an offence, and the 
person authorised to arrest him under this Act or to assist in arresting him cannot arrest him or 
prevent him fleeing by any other means than by killing him, the killing shall be deemed to be 
justifiable (Du Toit et al. 1997:5-24). (For ease of reference a copy of Schedule 1 list of offences 
is attached as per Annexure C). 63  
 
On this point I concur with Du Plessis, (2001:3), who submits that the following criticisms can 
be levelled against s49 (2). Firstly, Schedule 1 includes many minor offences, for example the 
theft of a bicycle or a loaf of bread from a bakery. According to the old s49(2), a police official 
may shoot at the suspect fleeing on the bicycle he stole in order to secure the arrest.  
 
The suspect may be fatally wounded and could lose his/her life, and that over a mere bicycle. It 
is constitutionally unacceptable to mete out this type of punishment without affording the suspect 
the right to a fair trial as well as to protect his/her right to life. Moreover, the death penalty was 
declared unconstitutional (S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA391 (CC)), way before s49 was in fact 
amended and the change implemented). The question then that arises: how is it possible that 
police officials are granted this immense power without the suspect being afforded the 
opportunity to a fair judicial process? 
 
Secondly, the old s49 (2) justified the use of lethal force by police officials although there was no 
life threatening danger to themselves or any other person. Naturally, there was a need to bring 
s49 in line with the new Constitution and human rights. 
 
This legislation allowed for the police official to arbitrarily and unilaterally make an on the spot 
decision which could well end with fatal consequences.  
 
 
                                                
63
 This subsection (s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977) was declared inconsistent with the Constitution 
and invalid as set out in the Constitutional court order in Government Gazette 23453 of 2002/05/31. 
115 
 
As appropriately put by Bruce (2002b) this previous legislation (old s49) was “… created by the 
apartheid government to give the police maximum freedom to kill people, whilst disguised as 
operating under the rule of the law”. Later we will explore further reasons that led to the change 
of this legislation. The following amendment came into effect in July 2003, and it closely reflects 
where the country currently is in terms of the law on the use of lethal force in policing.  
 
5.4 The new s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
Below the amended version of s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act is set out (as in National 
Instruction 18/5/1 over 1/1/4/1(5) dated 2003-07-18).  
 
“49. (1) For the purposes of this section- 
(c) “arrestor” means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in 
arresting a suspect; and  
(d) “suspect” means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has or had a reasonable 
suspicion that such person is committing or has committed an offence. 
 
(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or 
resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being 
made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in 
order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and 
proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect 
from fleeing: Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this section in using 
deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a 
suspect, only if he/she believes on reasonable grounds– 
(a) that the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of protecting the arrestor, 
any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person from imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm; 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or 
grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or 
(c) that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of a forcible and 
serious nature and involves the use of life threatening violence or a strong 
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likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm (National Instruction 18/5/1 over 
1/1/4/1(5) dated 2003-07-18).64 
 
The amendment to s49 (Criminal Procedure Act, 1998 (Act 122 of 1998) came into effect on 18 
July 2003 after the Govender and Walters case as discussed in Chapter 4, challenged the 
constitutionality of the old s49(2). The new s49 had to be revised and it then introduced concepts 
such as the principle of proportionality, imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm and 
substantial risk. However, at the time the SAPS indicated that the new s49 was somewhat vague 
(Bruce, 2003b:2). Bruce further submits that the South African version is similar to Canadian 
legislation but that the South African version is “more clumsily formulated” (Bruce, 2003b:2). 
So, was it necessary for s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) to be amended 
and if so, why was it so necessary? Let us examine some differing opinions. 
 
5.5  Exploring different opinions on the new s49  
In his memorandum65 (submitted to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety & Security 
at the time of public submissions when the amendment was being discussed), Bruce (2002d), 
submits that the new s49 “suffers from a number of major flaws”. He goes on to say that it has 
been “resisted most notably” by the SAPS. In fact the Ministry of Safety and Security and the 
Department of Justice at the time did not see eye-to-eye on the amendment.  
 
In his article66 Becker (2002:8) similarly refers to the “bitterness between the SAPS and the 
Department of Justice…”. Becker goes on to list a number of practical implications on the use of 
force in effecting arrests as per the new s49 as follows: 
 
1. Although previously the court placed the onus for justification for the use of force on the 
arrestor, the new section does not implicitly indicate this. Becker believes it to be an 
“onerous task” if the state/arrestor was called up to lay a basis for its defence; 
                                                
64
 Copy of instruction to SAPS members attached as per Special Service Order Relating to the use of force in 
effecting arrest, dated 18 July 2003. Annexure H. 
65
 The Legal Framework on the Use of Lethal Force in Effecting Arrest – a new Section 49? 
66
 The utilization of firearms within the DSO environment: A legal perspective. 
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2. An additional requirement of the new s49 is that the force applied should be proportional to 
the seriousness of the crime committed (own emphasis); and 
 
3. The new section does not mention Schedule 1 offences (See Annexure C) – the whole of s49 
(2) has been replaced. The use of deadly force is permitted in limited circumstances such as 
when the life of the arrestor or anyone else is in imminent/future (danger of) death or 
grievous bodily harm. 
 
Interestingly the opinion of John Welch in his article67 on the revised s49 is more to the point. He 
alluded to the “conflicting interpretations by many” on the amendment to s49, but would appear 
to have added to the confusion (Welch, 2003:1). Welch (2003) is of the opinion that the scrapped 
s49(2) was called into question and criticised because it did not advocate the principle of 
proportionality between the extent of force and the crime committed. 
 
The new s49 allows for the use of lethal force only when the arrestor or another person is in 
immediate/future life threatening danger or when serious bodily harm takes place or is 
threatened. Of course private defence is not affected by this amendment. Welch too, like Becker 
(2002:8), concurs that the former s49 differs in two important ways from the new version 
(Welch, 2003:3). 
 
Firstly the principle of proportionality is introduced, i.e. the type of offence versus the degree of 
force to be used. Secondly, the circumstances under which lethal force may be used are limited. 
In other words it can be used only when the life of the arrestor and/or other person is in 
imminent/future (danger of) death or grievous bodily harm. 
 
The first part of s49(2) is limited to the use of non-lethal force such as pepper spray, physical 
force, etc. where the suspect is to be confined and taken into custody. In relation to this study, the 
second part of s49(2) which addresses the use of lethal force that may cause death or grievous 
bodily harm, is more closely examined.  
 
                                                
67
 Revised S49 : Before and after 18 July 2003. 
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The new s49 provides for the use of lethal force in limited situations only. Before arriving at the 
decision to use lethal force the police official has to have arrived at a belief (decision to make use 
of (lethal) force) which is based on reasonable grounds. 
 
The court will then examine this belief of the police official to determine reasonableness. What 
this essentially means is that the mere opinion of the police official only is therefore no longer 
adequate. It has to be backed up/supported by a set of facts. Each subsection of the amended 
version of s49(2) is elucidated separately below. 
 
Subsection 2 (a)  
This is very closely related and or linked to the definition of private defence. Welch (2003:5) 
points out that the provision of this subsection becomes complicated with the words “future 
death”. I agree with this submission because the police official would not always be in a position 
to determine whether or not the suspect may cause future death. 
 
On the one hand a suspect who has shot someone and flees with his/her firearm may (potentially) 
cause a “future death/s”. On the other hand how can one be sure that a suspect who commits an 
armed robbery and who did not fire a shot at the scene but escapes with his/her firearm, is not 
intending to cause a “future death/s”? This line of thought is reciprocated by Geller and Scott 
(1992:255), where it is put forward that nobody within the criminal justice policy community, 
has yet demonstrated the ability to predict a person’s “future dangerousness” by even a fifty 
percent accuracy.  
 
This situation points to the very real practical problem of police officers in such situations having 
to make split-second decisions on the situation and whether such “danger” warrants the use of 
force. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that the poorly defined legal framework and very little 
or no guidance from SAPS management leaves operational police officials exposed to 
prosecution (if they make the wrong use of force decision) and possibly vulnerable to attacks by 
criminals (if they hesitate because the situation does not lend itself to clarity for quick decision 
making in order to respond to a perceived threat or danger from criminals). 
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What impact does this have on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and safety and 
security in the country? Police officials are too afraid to use their firearms (as indicated by the 
research) and delay their response to crimes in progress. 
 
Joubert (2001:57) indicates that when private defence is raised as a ground of justification by the 
accused, the onus is upon the state to prove (beyond doubt) that the actions of such accused 
cannot be justified. Would a police official who invokes private defence when he/she uses lethal 
force then not possibly incriminate himself if the onus is placed upon him/herself to 
testify/justify the (lethal) force used in a specific situation?  
 
Getting back to subsection 2(b), Welch (2003:5) succinctly points out that this subsection is 
“based on the vague concept of a ‘substantial risk’ that the suspect ‘will (not may) cause 
imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm” if the police official delays the arrest.”  
 
What exactly is “substantial risk”? This concept is not specifically discussed or 
explained/clarified in the Basic Training Learning Programme reviewed by the researcher -nor 
do any of the case laws either (see Chapter 4). Substantial risk may then only be determined on a 
given set of facts for a particular case. One has to assume that the belief of such a risk would fall 
within the boundaries of reasonableness as well.  
 
The Criminal Procedure module in the Basic Training Learning Programme (2004:58) mentions 
that the decision to use lethal force depends on whether “substantial risk” exists that the suspect 
will cause imminent or future death. Again, no further elaboration or clarity is given to the police 
learner on this aspect. 
 
So the question here is: How does the police official determine “substantial risk” as mentioned 
in the new section? Each situation is unique and different people respond differently to certain 
situations. Precedent as set by the courts is often followed, where each case is judged on its own 
merit. The absence of guidelines for operational police officials on “substantial risk” is a great 
concern to many police officials and other observers (See Chapter 6: Question 31 for detail).  
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In my opinion “substantial risk” is too wide a concept and allows for too many possibilities. 
Without a clear framework/guideline each facilitator on Basic Training Learning Programme 
may provide his/her own version and understanding of the term, however appropriate it may 
seem. As a result police officials will therefore not have a common understanding and cannot 
apply the law consistently on the ground (operationally). 
 
In subsection 2 (c) of the new s49 (adapted from the amendment to s49 Act 122 of 1998), the use 
of lethal force during arrest is permitted if the police official on reasonable grounds believes:  
i. the offence is in progress;  
ii. the offence is forcible and of a serious nature;  
iii. there is the use of life threatening violence; or 
iv. a strong likelihood of grievous bodily harm.  
 
So, the police official’s response to a complaint with an element of violence alone, is not 
sufficient reason for such police official to decide to use lethal force (for example as in the 
Govender case). The situation must have escalated to the next level, namely it must then be 
accompanied by life threatening danger and the intention of grievous bodily harm, for the police 
official to justify the use of lethal force.  
 
The provisions of the new s49 therefore do not detract from the common law provision for 
private defence.  
 
When compared to the Basic Training Learning Programme (for the training period 2004 to 
2006) the module on the Use of Force (2003) strongly emphasises inter alia that police officials 
must “master the principle of appropriate use of force” apart from having extensive knowledge 
of police powers conferred upon the police official by law. The module introduces the deadly 
force decision-making model, namely: Ability, Opportunity and Jeopardy. This is introduced via 
the ‘S’ in AITEST which represents “Scale for use of force and shooting decisions”.  
 
The presence of all three – Ability, Opportunity and Jeopardy – may justify the use of lethal 
force. I am of the opinion that the deadly force decision-making model may be appropriately 
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used to explain subsection 2(c) of the new s49 (2) and must be considered in future training and 
development of operational police officials (refer to Chapter 7 for detail).  
 
Welch (2003:6) indicates that “Ordinary mortal beings, believing in justice, will certainly 
become victims of justice if they kill or seriously injure a criminal unless they strictly comply 
with the new law”. Further, Welch in an article68 dealing with justifiable homicide poses the 
question as to why it was necessary to replace s49 to wit, “Did our courts interpret the existing 
section wrongly?” (Welch, 1999:1-9).  
 
He mentions that “Some court decisions clearly indicate that the court expected almost the 
impossible from policemen” (and others involved in the arrest of alleged criminals) (Welch, 
1999:9).  
 
He goes on to add that the ratio (reasoning/rationale) for the amendment to s49 may be located in 
the obiter dictum in the Makwanyana case (supra) quoted as follows: 
 
“Greater restriction on the use of lethal force may be one of the consequences of the 
establishment of a constitutional State which respects every person’s right to life. 
Shooting at a fleeing criminal in the heat of the moment is not necessarily to be 
equated with the execution of a captured criminal” (Welch, 1999:9).  
 
But, if one of the consequences of this judgement might be to render the provisions of section 49 
(2) unconstitutional, the Legislature will have to modify the provisions of the section in order to 
bring it into line with the Constitution (SALR, S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA391 (CC)). 
 
Yet Welch is not convinced that the old s49 was unconstitutional. He is of the opinion that some 
courts may not have interpreted the law correctly and it did not necessarily mean that the law 
was wrong. Furthermore, Welch indicates that the new law is “everything but clear” (1999:9). 
 
I do not agree with Welch that the old s49 was constitutional. I believe that the courts 
                                                
68
 Justifiable homicide: A critical analysis of Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
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interpretation has been consistent in their approach and that the enforcers of the law, namely 
police officials, applied the law as per its provisions. The previous s49 did not provide for the 
right to life in that it allowed persons to shoot to kill fleeing suspects, those not yet convicted by 
a competent court, even though the lives of the arrestor or anyone else for that matter, was not in 
any immediate danger.  
 
How can this be considered as being constitutional? In fact, I am of the opinion enforcers of the 
law, i.e. police officials, abused and exploited this powerful piece of legislation. It may have 
allowed arrestors (police officials) to suspect, convict and impose the death penalty sanction – all 
at once – on suspects they encountered in the line of their policing work.  
 
This view is supported by Bruce (1999), who pertinently put it that ordinary members of the 
public, as well as the police official, have the right to use lethal, deadly force when their lives or 
property were threatened – even the highest court of this land does not possess the authority to 
impose such a harsh sanction (with the 1995 ruling by the Constitutional Court that the 
imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional in South African law). For the sake of 
argument, if the law was correct and its meaning was clear, the debate and subsequent 
amendment to s49, would not have arisen in the first place. I am of the opinion that the old s49 
was unconstitutional because it allowed for police officials to abuse the use of lethal force in 
certain circumstances.  
 
This view is supported by Judge Kriegler in the Walters case to wit: 
 
“an enactment that authorises police officers in the performance of their public 
duties to use force where it may not be necessary or reasonably proportionate is 
therefore both socially undesirable and constitutionally impermissible” (SALR, 
2002:6393 at H).  
 
I submit that the arrival of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) warranted 
the amendment to s49. In addition, that the South African s49 and the use of lethal force 
requirements needed to be comparable with other democracies such as Germany, France, 
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Canada, the Netherlands and some jurisdictions in the United States of America (SALR, 
2002:628 at E). (See also Chapter 4 – 4.2 on Brief History of Human Rights). 
 
Yet I tend to agree with Welch when he asserts that the law is unclear. As I intimated earlier 
terms like “imminent or future death” as mentioned in s49 (2)(a), or “a substantial risk that the 
suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm” as per s49(2)(b) are too 
wide and may be interpreted in different and contrasting ways. Significant changes were 
introduced with the amendment to s49. For example, the Schedule 1 offences were not 
mentioned and/or included in the Amendment. So too, the principle of proportionality is a new 
introduction brought about by the amendment to s49. 
 
I therefore submit that the absence of clear guidelines and lack of clarity contributed to the lack 
of any comprehensive and practical police training/re-training on the whole matter and 
implementation of the new s49.  
 
Apart from Bruce’s (2003b:2) submission that the amendment is “clumsily formulated”, he also 
believes that it (the amendment) will “perpetuate the existing confusion over the extended period 
of time that it takes for the courts to clarify its meaning through case law”. I have to agree that 
case law on the present amendment would significantly assist the police and other enforcement 
agencies in interpreting the new law appropriately. So too, the police may then be in a better 
position to drive a training program towards the use of lethal force when arrests need to be 
effected. 
 
5.6  A discussion on the “grey areas” of the new s49 : Why do we need clarity?  
Notwithstanding the earlier indication that the new s49 was unclear, (Welch, 1999:9), this 
section will tentatively propose that clarity on certain aspects will provide for an improved 
interpretation on the new s49. The parts referred to as “grey areas” are aspects that need 
definition and these will be commented upon. They are, namely: the principle of proportionality, 
imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm and substantial risk (as introduced by the new 
s49).  
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At the time this study was undertaken, the absence of a decided case on the amended s49 (2) 
made it a challenge for legal experts to provide clear guidelines on the correct and/or 
interpretation and application on the new version. As indicated by Bruce (2002b), “…the police 
and others have also expressed concerns about difficulties of interpreting the 1998 legislation.” 
On the basis of this study in terms of the research interviews, decided case laws and the Basic 
Training Learning Programme of 2004 to 2006, the following section will attempt to highlight 
those areas that need urgent clarity to assist operational police officials to conduct their duties 
more effectively and correctly (properly) within the framework of the law.  
 
Whilst the language used in the new s49 may appear simple, certain concepts are wide and it 
becomes difficult to draw the ideal interpretation. Comparatively, the new s49 differs from the 
old provision in two respects.  
 
Firstly, the new s49 introduces the principle of proportionality, i.e. the force used must be 
reasonable and proportional to the crime committed. Whereas, the old s49 allowed for police 
officials to shoot to kill suspects fleeing from violent and serious offences this is clearly not the 
case today. When attacked, the defence response must not be more than is necessary to ward off 
the attack.  
 
Although the research conducted for this study reveals that police officials are aware that they 
cannot shoot a fleeing suspect for theft – as they had done in the past, the research also revealed 
that police officials are afraid to make use of their weapons at all. With the majority (86%) not 
having attended and/or received training/workshops, it is clear that they are unfamiliar with the 
new s49 legislation and the use of lethal force.  
 
As far as case laws are concerned in respect of the principle of proportionality and protecting 
property, the cases of Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 (1) SA 488 (A) and S 
v Mogohlwane 1982 (2) SA 587 (T),69 may here be referred to and unpacked (SALR, 1967 and 
1982 respectively). In the Van Wyk case, after repeated break-ins, a shopkeeper rigged a shotgun 
so that it would fire upon an unsuspecting intruder. An intruder was duly shot and killed during a 
                                                
69
 These cases are not discussed in detail – refer to South African Law Reports for detail – see reference list. 
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break-in. The shopkeeper was accordingly charged with murder but was acquitted. The court 
found that lethal force may be used to protect property in exceptional circumstances. A similar 
decision was taken in the Mogohlwane case.  
 
However, as from 1996, the “constitutional democracy turned our legal system on its head” (Du 
Plessis, 2004:2). These case laws are contrary to the right to life (section 11) as guaranteed by 
the Constitution.  
 
It is clear that under these circumstances, our courts would not arrive at a similar decision today. 
Operational police officials need to familiarise themselves with the decisions taken by the courts 
in the past and how our new legal order impacts on them today. Today’s case laws such as the 
Govender case, clearly points out that lethal force can only be used when the suspect is an 
immediate threat to the arrestor or other member of public. The Walter case confirms the same 
standpoint as that of the Govender case. 
 
It is evident, that the debate and confusion within the rank and file of the police as well as within 
the authorities like the Department of Justice, SAPS Legal Services and the Ministry of Safety 
and Security, has impacted on the delivery of training to police officials on this matter. As long 
as this situation prevails, i.e. in the absence of clear guidelines on the use of lethal force, 
operational police officials will find themselves victims of this legal quagmire. 
 
This situation cannot afford to be left unchecked. The use of force in the old s49 was not 
proportional to the seriousness of the crime. There is consequently no distinction between 
Schedule 1 offences and other offences with the new s49. The right to protect property needs to 
be balanced with the suspect’s right to life. Du Plessis, (2004:3) succinctly points out that the 
“…right to life cannot be arbitrarily infringed, allowing for lethal force only in situations where 
lives of innocent persons require protection”.  
 
Secondly, the new s49 (2) (b) introduces the new terms: “substantial risk” and “future death or 
grievous bodily harm”. There is a further urgent need for clarity on these aspects of the new s49 
for operational police officials. (See also the Welch submission above). 
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S49 (2) limits the use of deadly force to cases where it is necessary to protect the arrestor or 
other person from death or serious injury either immediately or in the future. Whereas previously 
(old s49 ) the life of the arrestor need not be threatened by death or serious injury, i.e. a harmless 
fleeing suspect may be shot and killed merely for escaping after allegedly being involved in a 
Schedule 1 offence.  
 
The new s49 says there must be “…substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm.” The grey area being: How does the police official 
determine “substantial risk”? This is a very vague concept, and are there degrees of 
“substantial”? The police official must be able to convince the court objectively that force was 
necessary. Each situation is unique and different people respond differently to certain situations.  
 
As far as the application of Judge Kriegler’s nine points are concerned (from the Walters case 
judgment (see Chapter 3), it is clear that only minimum force may be used and the use of force 
must be proportional to the threat of violence or the nature of crime committed. This means no 
lethal force (firearm) may be used in an arrest for minor crimes such as trespassing, damage to 
property, theft, etc.  
 
Perhaps, the most important reason for clarity is that in the midst of the vagueness the existing 
confusion and uncertainty surrounding s49 is being perpetuated. In the meantime, the “police 
will face a choice of shirking their responsibilities or possibly standing trial for murder, not 
because of deliberate malfeasance on their part but because of the vagueness of the law” (Bruce, 
2003b:2). The corollary to this comment lies in the payouts made by police (claims by victims of 
illegal use of force by police officials) for the period 2005 to 2008. The police paid out claims 
which arose from wrongful arrest, assault, car accidents and shooting to the tune of R3.7 billion 
(Carter, 2008). It appears that the types of incidents the police were held accountable for, arise 
from the changes in the judicial system and South Africa’s dramatic change in its political 
landscape. Substantial police re-training is a necessity if the police want to curb such 
unnecessary financial losses – these monies could very well have been ploughed into training 
and re-training. In respect of malfeasance (wrongdoing by the police official), this research also 
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revealed that some police officials deliberately delayed their response to serious and violent 
crime, either in fear of (the consequences) or to avoid using lethal force.  
 
5.7  Summary  
Nevertheless, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, and the research conducted for this study, 
it is clearly evident that police management needs to urgently implement and drive an outreach 
program to enlighten its operational police officials on the use of lethal force.  
 
Whilst the old s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) has been in existence 
for over 165 years (Kriegler in S v Walters, 629: 2002), Nel (1995:21) succinctly points out that 
the police as an institution moved from a colonial to a democratic model of policing. This 
phenomenal change needs to be guided and actively pursued throughout the SAPS. As it stands, 
with the amendment being almost five years old, one cannot overemphasise the urgency for this 
type of intervention for operational police officials. 
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Chapter 6 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this research was to establish: 
 
• whether operational police officials were adequately trained on the new s49 to make use 
of lethal force decisions and act in line with existing legal requirements; and  
 
• to compare the Basic Training Learning Programme outcomes on the use of lethal force 
with the present understanding of current operational police officials on the use of lethal 
force. (See Chapter 1 for the full motivation for this study and the problem statement).  
 
With that in mind, the researcher set about interviewing 29 respondents (operational police 
officials) by means of in-depth one-on-one interviews.  
 
The procedure of analysis for the transcribed interviews took the form of a manual system for 
both the statistical and thematic coding of responses. The responses of each interview were cross 
checked and anomalies were identified. A pattern was thus identified, categorised and coded. In 
addition the interviewer compiled notes during the interview.  
 
The notes were consulted to cross check and verify information. The information was then coded 
and analysed accordingly. A copy of the questionnaire used in the interview is attached as per 
Annexure E.  
 
The foregoing discussion will present the findings of the research. A comparative analysis 
between the Basic Training Learning Programme and the research findings are woven into this 
chapter as the findings are unpacked per question. 
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6.2 Analysis of the questionnaire responses and interpretation of findings  
Question 1:  What is your gender? 
The research population was dominated by males (97 %) and of the 29 respondents interviewed 
only one female was drawn from the sample and interviewed. Basically this is a clear indication 
that operational policing in the SAPS is currently dominated by the male gender. The one female 
interviewed also did not have much operational experience and worked mainly indoors. 
 
Question 2: How old are you? (years) 
Fifty-two percent of the research population were 35 years or older, i.e. 15 of the 29 interviewed. 
A further 34% of the sample (10 respondents) were between 30 to 35 years old, whilst only 10% 
accounted for those respondents aged between 25 to 30 years of age. Only one respondent 
interviewed was between 20 and 25 years (3%). It can be assumed that the majority of 
operational police officials in these two provinces are in the early to mid-thirties.  
 
Table 3:  Ages of sample population 
52%
34%
10%
3%
 
 
Question 3: How long have you been in the SAPS (number of years)? 
Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the respondents (11 respondents) have between 10 to 15 years 
policing experience. Thirty one percent (nine respondents) have over 15 years of service in the 
SAPS whilst 17% of respondents (five respondents) served five years or less. Fourteen percent 
(four respondents) had between 5-10 years of service in the SAPS.  
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The majority of police officials interviewed did not attend the Basic Training Learning 
Programme during the training periods of 2004–2006. Therefore they had not been exposed to 
the specific Basic Training Learning Programme reviewed in this study. In terms of the short 
period that had elapsed (2004-2006) and the interviews it would not have been possible to have 
all those who passed out during the years 2004 to 2006 to already be operational police officials. 
In general terms this means that the majority of operational police officials serving the country 
may have undergone Basic Training prior to the new Constitution and the amendment to s49. 
(This is all the more reason for urgent training interventions for s49.)  
 
Question 4: In which unit do you currently serve? 
The Vaal Rand area (Gauteng Province) comprises of 13 station areas (www.saps.gov.za). From 
this area, ten respondents were selected, i.e. 34%. From the Sasolburg SAPS (Free State 
Province), ten respondents of the Community Service Centre (34%), eight respondents of the 
Crime Prevention unit (28%) and one respondent of the Dog Unit (3%) were selected.  
 
Table 4: Division of sample population 
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Statistics from 2001 to 2005 reveal that the following reported cases of violent crimes in South 
Africa increased or stabilised at high levels: 
 
● robbery with aggravated circumstances; 
● robbery of cash in transit; 
● House-breaking; 
● drug related crime; 
● rape; and  
● indecent assault 70  
 
Over this period, the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and theft of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles dropped, but not significantly. The crime statistics from 2001 to 2007 for the 
Vaal Rand area, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Gauteng province, shows a steady 
escalation in robberies at business premises, robbery of cash-in-transit and illegal possession of 
firearms (www.saps.gov.za). The majority of the incidents where lethal force was used (see 
Question 28) by those operational police officials interviewed in the study, appeared to be during 
theft of motor vehicles in progress, armed robbery and vehicle hi-jacking, as well as 
housebreaking-in-progress complaints. Apart from robbery at residential premises which falls 
under housebreaking,71 the other crimes have slightly dropped during this period, although 
‘stabilising’ at high levels.  
 
The crime statistics from 2001 to 2007 for the Sasolburg area which falls under the Free State 
province for jurisdictional purposes, show a steady escalation in ‘robberies at business premises’.  
 
Robbery with aggravating circumstances increased from 2006 to 2007, so did stock theft and 
malicious damage to property (www.saps.gov.za). The levels of crime in the Gauteng Province 
are significantly higher than that of the Free State – Sasolburg area. The sample population was 
extracted from both provinces. 
                                                
70
 Detailed crime statistics can be viewed at www.saps.gov.za. 
71
 Technically the term ‘housebreaking’ – a direct translation of the Afrikaans term‘huisbraak’ – refers to burglary 
but is widely used in South Africa. 
132 
 
Question 5: When did you receive your Basic Training at the SAPS Training College?   
  (passing out month & year date); and 
Question 6: In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the use of force and 
the provisions/requirements of Section 49 (use of force to effect an arrest) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977)? 
 
Collectively the majority of the respondents completed their Basic Training before 1995, i.e. a 
total of 69% (20 respondents). Nine respondents (31%) completed their Basic Training between 
1995 and 2005. Again, it must be borne in mind the Basic Training Learning Programme of June 
2004 to June 2006 was reviewed in this research. These statistics reveal too, that most of the 
operational police officials policing the streets of the Gauteng and Sasolburg areas received basic 
police training prior to the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) and the 
amendment of s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). Yet, when questioned 
as to whether they had received training on the use of lethal force and section 49, 97% (28 
respondents) indicated that they did whilst one respondent could not remember.  
 
Question 7: Did the training include reference to the applicable decisions by the Appellate 
Division and/or the Constitutional Court; and 
Question 8: If yes, briefly describe the extent of the training 
 
Here, 66% of the respondents indicated that their Basic Training did in fact include references to 
applicable decisions by the Appellate Division and/or the Constitution. However, when asked to 
briefly describe the extent of the training, 41% (12 respondents) had forgotten - their exact year 
date of when they had undergone their basic training. Below is the year date (of those who could 
remember) of when they underwent their Basic Training, as well as their current age.  
 
1984= 1 (46 years old) 
1985 = 1 (41 years) 
1987 = 2 (39 years and 41 years)  
1988 = 1 (38 years) 
1991= 1 (36 years) 
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1992= 1 (32 years) 
1993 = 2 (32 years and 35 years) 
2002 = 1 (32 years) 
2004= 2 (31 years and 28 years) 
 
In respect of the 12 who had forgotten, five (5) respondents completed basic training in the mid- 
to late 1980s – their ages being 46, 41 (2 respondents), 39 and 38 years respectively. Four (4) 
respondents completed basic training in the early 1990s – their ages being 32 (2 respondents), 35 
and 36 years old respectively.  
 
Three (3) respondents completed basic training in the early 2000s – their ages being 28, 31 and 
32 years old respectively. The response of the latter three respondents is disappointing. Their 
training certainly included constitutional matters and the right to life, etc. 
 
This research on the selected sample of 29 police officials in the Gauteng and Vaal Rand area 
reveals that many police officials are unsure and doubtful about the circumstances under which 
they may use lethal force. When asked whether their basic training included reference to case 
laws, 66% answered affirmatively.  
 
However, 41% (12 respondents) had forgotten. None of the respondents referred to any of the 
appropriate case laws (see questions 7 and 8 below). It must be taken into account that 86% of 
the sample did not receive any in-service training on the use of lethal force (see Question 16). 
Many of the police officials interviewed indicated that they were just asked to sign the national 
instruction. 
 
Whilst it may be argued that the basic training learning program for this period was not reviewed 
(this research reviewed the Basic Training Learning Programme from July 2004 to June 2006), 
the question arises, then why have those police officials who completed their Basic Training 
Learning Programme before the changes to s49 not been recalled/retrained in line with the 
changing face of the democracy and major difference in the policing environment?  
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The amendment to s49 was introduced only in 2003. Only two candidates could have had 
exposure and/training on the new law. The following diagram illustrates the situation. 
 
Table 5: Year of Basic Training of Respondents who forgot case laws 
 
 
 
If one looks at the ages of those who had forgotten – they are the majority (9) who completed the 
Basic Training Learning Programme in the 1980s and 1990s are between 30 to 46 years of age. 
They have the most policing experience and are the first officials to respond to crime incidents in 
progress such as armed robberies, housebreaking and other serious and violent crime.  
 
Ten out of the twenty nine respondents who forgot, all attended a Basic Training Learning 
Programme before the revision period of this research and two fall into the revision period of this 
particular study on the Basic Training Learning Programme in 2004.  
 
On the other hand 24% (seven respondents) stated that there was no reference to case laws in 
their Basic Training intervention. If this is added to the twelve above who forgot it totals 
nineteen respondents, i.e. 65% of police officials interviewed do not know of the case laws such 
as the Govender or Walters watershed cases. These cases changed the face of policing in South 
Africa.  
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It had a major impact on the use of lethal force when effecting an arrest which in turn led to the 
amendment to s49 in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). Can the police afford 
to find themselves in such a situation? 
 
The Basic Training Learning Programme that was reviewed in Chapter 3, to wit Law and Polici 
ng embodies an important unit standard. It calls for the identification and application of relevant 
knowledge about the law in general, related to policing.  
 
In this module, case law and the Constitution are discussed. The research results, however, 
indicate that operational police officials do not have a “working knowledge” of the legality 
around the use of lethal force when effecting arrests. 
  
Six respondents, 21% provided an irrelevant scenario/discussion and not a single appropriate 
case law was quoted let alone explained or discussed. Four of the respondents (14%) discussed 
the use of lethal force, however, only two of these discussions dealt with the use of lethal force 
during arrest. Their discussion is as follows:  
 
Interview 3  
The respondent has three years’ service in the SAPS and is patrol van driver. He completed his 
Basic Training in September 2003. He referred to an incident where two on duty police officials 
tried to stop a vehicle in order to search it on a highway. The vehicle failed to stop and the police 
officials “shot from behind” (2006, Interview 3). According to the respondent the police officials 
(his colleagues) should have called back up to stop the fleeing suspects somewhere ahead of 
them.  
 
He rightfully indicated that the police officials should have employed other means before they 
decided to use lethal force. The review of the Basic Training Learning Programme in this 
research covered the later period between June 2004 and July 2006 – a year earlier than the 
period the respondent attended training.  
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Interview 5 
The respondent works at the Community Service Centre, has 13 years of service in the SAPS and 
is aged 38. The respondent indicated that he thinks “quite a lot” of a case discussed in college 
where a man entered his bedroom and found his wife with another man. The husband 
“immediately shot” the other man and he did not walk away first and then come back, so he 
acted immediately in the situation described as “noodweer” (2006, Interview 5). This had 
nothing to do with the use of lethal force during an arrest. 
 
Interview 16 
The respondent has 15 years service and is aged 38. The respondent briefly mentions an incident 
where police chased a vehicle, police were shot at and they returned fire (2006, Interview 16). 
No further details could be remembered. 
 
Interview 22 
The respondent has served for 12 years and is 33 years of age. He recalled a case involving a 
private person where the “people was at home” (sic) and a beggar knocked. The owner “just 
took out a gun and fired shots through the door”. The owner was charged. When asked how he 
(the respondent) personally interpreted this scenario he indicated that he does not “condone what 
the owner did” (2006, Interview 22).  
 
Only two of the respondents explained/quoted the use of lethal force during arrest. None of the 
watershed cases, Govender or Walters, or any other of the cases discussed in Chapter 5 were 
mentioned. One may ask the question, so what does this imply? This means that the majority of 
operational police officials are uninformed and/or not in a position to correctly or appropriately 
make informed use of lethal force decisions in line with legal requirements. This is the 
requirement in the Basic Training Learning Programme reviewed in Chapter 3 as per Unit 
Standard 11978 where the police official is expected to identify and apply sections of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) (Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide, 2004). 
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Question 9: In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the Amendment  
to Section 49 (Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act (No. 122 of 1998)? 
Question 10: In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the topic of Human 
Rights & Policing? 
 
After s49 was amended 76% (22 respondents) of the group interviewed indicated that they 
received no formal training whilst only 21% (6 respondents) had some form of training on the 
amendment.  
  
South Africa has signed on with UNHRC and other human rights groups yet 38% (11 
respondents) claim that they did not receive training on Human Rights and Policing. Human 
Rights is the important part of the Constitution namely Chapter 2. On the other hand, 62% (18 
respondents) have received training on Human Rights and Policing. 
 
Question 11: If yes, what was the extent of the training? 
 
The respondents were then requested to describe/explain the extent of any formal training on the 
topic of Human rights and policing in their Basic Training program. Three percent had forgotten 
if they received human rights training, 3% are unsure, 31% made a poor or inadequate attempt or 
had some idea, whilst 14% provided an irrelevant discussion. That is a total of 51% of the 
respondents.  
 
If one adds the number of respondents who indicated that they did not receive any training on 
human rights (38%), it can be assumed that 89% of the sample population do not have 
appropriate knowledge on human rights and policing in general. One respondent indicated that 
he received poor training but was included in the percentage of those who had forgotten. 
 
The use of lethal force during arrest as indicated earlier has a major impact on human rights in 
policing. The use of lethal force may result in death whilst the right to life is protected by the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) and the Bill of Rights.  
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When asked to explain the extent of formal training on human rights in Basic Training, the 
following results were obtained: 
 
Table 6: Extent of formal Human Rights Training received by Respondents 
 
 
The research indicates that 62 % of the sample population are not well informed. The figure is 
the total of those respondents that forgot, unsure or irrelevant (21%) and those who claim to have 
received no training at all (41%). These results are surprising if not troubling. Human Rights is 
the cornerstone of the Constitution and yet it appears that its importance has been overlooked. 
 
Only two respondents (7%) provided a relevant Human Rights discussion. Their responses are 
discussed as follows: 
 
Interview 22 
The respondent indicated that human beings must be respected. Every person has the right of 
movement, be informed of his rights when arrested, has a right to privacy and the right to apply 
for bail. The respondent is a Captain with 22 years of service and attended Basic Training in 
1984 (2006, Interview 22). 
 
Extent of formal Human Rights Training received by 
Respondents
1 1
4
12
9
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Forgot Unsure Irrelevant No 
Some Idea
Correct 
Explanation 
Responses  
 Resp. 
Training  
Has 
139 
 
Interview 26 
The respondent learned during Basic Training that other humans are to be respected whether they 
are suspects or complainants.  
 
They deserve dignity and should not be treated badly. This respondent attended Basic Training in 
1993 (2006, Interview 26). A few of the 31% (nine respondents) made an attempt by mentioning 
the Bill of Rights and that everyone had rights. Some of the respondents discussed the Limitation 
clause and the right of the police to use maximum force. Another respondent of the crime 
prevention unit indicated that the extent of his training on human rights provided how to handle a 
suspect. He indicated that although minimum force must be applied “I’ll have still to bear in 
mind, he is still a person although he’s still a criminal” (2006, Interview 16). 
 
Question 12: Since receiving your Basic Training, have you attended any WORKSHOP OR IN-
SERVICE TRAINING on the topic of Human Rights & Policing - specifically 
related to the Bill of Rights and the importance of the limitation clause (Section 
36 of the Constitution Act 108, 1996). 
Question 13: If yes, when did you receive this in-service training or attend the workshop 
(month and year date)? 
 
The respondents were asked if they attended a Workshop or In Service Training on Human 
Rights and Policing relating to Bill of Rights or the Limitation Clause after they had completed 
their basic training. The majority (55%, i.e. 16 respondents) did not attend any such training 
whilst 45% (13 respondents) acknowledged in the affirmative.  
 
Many of them could not remember when the training took place so the training could not have 
been followed up to peruse the content. Of those who could remember the year (45%), 24% 
attended a Workshop or In-Service Training on the Bill of Rights between 2001 and 2005 whilst 
17% underwent training of this nature between 1996 to 2001 (five respondents).  
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Question 14: If yes, what was the extent of this training? 
However, when those respondents who did attend further training (45%, 13 respondents) were 
asked to elaborate on the extent of the in-service training/workshop on Human Rights and 
Policing especially the Bill of Rights and Section 36, the thematic analysis revealed the 
following: 
• 59% (17 respondents) had no Human Rights training – this figure increased from 
55% (see question 13 above) when originally asked whether they had attended 
training; 
• 7% forgot; 
• 3% did not understand the question; 
• 10% provided a relevant discussion; and 
• 21% made a very basic or poor attempt in responding to this question. 
 
In totality therefore, 69% of the respondents interviewed did not contribute meaningfully to the 
question on Human rights and Policing, of which 59% claimed to have received no training on 
the subject at all.  
 
Interestingly, of the respondents who had no Human Rights Training: (59%; 17 respondents) 
further analysis revealed: 
• The majority 24% (seven) were enlisted between 1990 and 1995; 
• 7% (two) were enlisted between 1995 and 2000; 
• 17% (five) were enlisted in early 2000; and 
• 10% (three) were enlisted in 1980 or before. 
 
Equally troubling were two respondents (7%) who did not understand the question despite 
attempts in the interview to rephrase the question. The following can be deduced from this 
analysis: 
• that the majority of the operational police officials who attended Basic Training up to 
and including 2000 indicated that they did not receive any Human Rights Training, 
i.e. 59%. 
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It therefore appears, by the research conducted, that prior to 1996 and the Constitution, Human 
Rights was not at the forefront of policing.  
 
Question 15: Since receiving your Basic Training have you received any IN-SERVICE 
TRAINING on the Amendment to Section 49 (Judicial Matters Second Amendment 
Act (No. 122 of 1998)? If NO, proceed to Question 17. 
 
The total sample of respondents (i.e. 29 respondents) were asked if they had received any in-
service training on the amendment to s49 after passing out of Basic Training. Only four 
respondents (14%) claimed to have received in-service training whilst an overwhelming majority 
of the respondents (86%, i.e. 25 respondents) stated that they did not receive any in service 
training. 
 
Table 7: No. of Respondents who received in-service Training on amended s49 after Basic 
Training  
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The research conducted indicates that police officials were called upon to sign an 
acknowledgment of the new instructions and the receipt of a copy of the new s49. This 
submission is synonymous with the instruction as per Annexure I. The signed copy serves to 
confirm that he/she understands the contents thereof and is to be filed on the police official’s 
personal file. Yet, the research indicated that they are not sure – but they complied with the 
instruction and signed the document.  
 
In accordance with the new instructions a police official will be held liable for and need to justify 
his/her actions when he/she uses lethal force (firearm). But if the research sample is any 
indication of the state of affairs regarding training on use of force in the SAPS then, since the 
change in the law (new amended s49), police officials (86% of the sample – see Question 15) are 
not being properly trained (or have this explained to them) on when it is authorised to use lethal 
force in the execution of his/her duties. Suffice to say, it’s no wonder they feel confused and 
unsure of what they should do in use of force situations.  
 
A point in instance being a respondent from the SAPS Sasolburg Community Service Centre 
who recalled an incident where a fellow police official had used his firearm. It had taken two to 
three years to finalise the matter. He went on to say:  
 “Dis hoekom… [ek my] vuurwapen nog nooit gebruik nie, nooit nie”.  
“Hierdie vuurwapen kan jy hom nie so maklik gebruik nie…….maak seker as jy hom 
gebruik… .dis beter om…. jy skiet hom seker dat hy doodgaan… dat hy daar nie ander 
storie kan praat...” (laughs) (2006, Interview 1).  
 
Another respondent had this to say about the matter:  
(Explains a scenario where he (respondent) could shoot at a fleeing armed robbery suspect):  
“While I’m still running, I can shoot them to the back. So I know that thing is there. So I 
feel bad. …because they will send you to jail. I know, I got two friends, the other is here in 
this jail.” (2006, Interview 4). 
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Another respondent shared his views in general saying:  
“the reality is that suspects don’t hesitate to shoot… training needs to be intensified… guys 
don’t know when to shoot – you have a split second to make a decision, …you have to 
protect yourself and the civilian, you can’t protect them if you are too scared. I have 
policeman say if I respond to serious cases of armed robbery, I will take my time if I can’t 
use my firearm. Police officers are too scared to use firearms, me too” (2006, Interview 5). 
 
Question 16: If yes, briefly describe the extent of the in-service training you received. 
Four respondents briefly mentioned that inter alia, a police official could no longer shoot at a 
suspect fleeing from a schedule 1 offence and that minimum force must be used to arrest a 
suspect. 
 
Question 17: Since receiving your Basic Training, have you attended any WORKSHOP in 
which you were informed of the Amendment to Section 49? (If NO, proceed to 
Question 19. 
 
Question 18: If yes, when did you attend this workshop? (Month and year date)? 
When asked if they attended a workshop on the amendment to s49, 17% (five respondents) 
confirmed having attended whilst 79% (23 respondents) of those interviewed did not attend any 
workshop of this nature with 3% (one respondent) indicating that he does not know or remember.  
 
Of those that attended (17%), none of them could remember the date or month of such learning 
intervention. Similarly Question 15 supra indicated that 86% did not receive any in-service 
training on the subject either. 
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Table 8: No. of Respondents who attended a workshop on amended s49 after Basic 
Training 
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The amendment came into effect on 18 July 2003, while the research was conducted in 2006 – 
three years down the line and ten years after the birth of the country’s Constitution and 
democracy. Irrespective of these timelines, 82% of the police officials in the study, who are 
engaged in operational policing in the SAPS, did not attend any workshop on the use of lethal 
force after the amendment to this all important (in policing terms) piece of legislation. 
 
Question 19: If you have received training on both the former and current Section 49 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, did it lead to any changes in the way you 
behave(d) regarding the use of lethal force during arrest? 
 
Eighteen (18, i.e. 62%) of the respondents stated that they have changed the way they behave 
when it comes to using lethal force whilst eleven respondents (38%) stated that their behaviour 
had not been impacted upon. 
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These responses are disturbing, to say the least. There has been significant changes to the use of 
lethal force when effecting arrests in policing. The in-depth discussion into the legal framework 
(Chapter 4) and legal opinion (Chapter 5) point out these changes. Despite the groundswell in 
discussion and opinion on the controversial topic, 38% (11 respondents) did not change and/or 
modify the way they behave when using lethal force to effect arrests. 
 
Question 20: If yes, explain how you modified or will modify your behaviour in a situation as 
described in Section 49- if you need to use lethal force. 
 
Those 18 (62%) respondents who answered in the affirmative on Question 19, i.e. said that their 
behaviour, with reference to use of lethal force, did change, were asked to explain how or in 
what way they had modified or will modify their behaviour if they need to use lethal force. Their 
responses were analysed further and categorised as follows: 
 
• Six of the 18 respondents will only use lethal force when their lives or someone else’s life 
is in imminent danger; 
 
• Five of the 18 respondents will consider using minimum force first. Could this be that 
they are fearful of using their weapons?; 
 
• Three of the 18 respondents will not shoot at fleeing suspects; 
 
• Three of the 18 respondents related operational tasks that were affected by the new s49 
and the use of lethal force, such as not shooting for property crimes and not firing 
warning shots. 
 
• One respondent, who although indicating that he did modify his behaviour, could not say 
how. 
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Table 9: How behaviour was modified after Amendment to s49 
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An in-depth look into the themes identified revealed that although the operational police officials 
interviewed modified their behaviour (to a certain extent), some are bitter or perceive the lethal 
force changes negatively. An extract of some of the interviews follows: 
 
• “Ja, to me I see restricting police members a lot to such extent that it puts them in 
danger, …this amendment put (sic) person in danger...” (Interview 9, 2006); 
 
• “…you were supposed to shoot when your life was in danger, but now things have 
changed even so much, even if your life in danger (sic), you can’t just pull out firearm…” 
(Interview 19, 2006). 
 
This is a mistaken belief. Police officials are not restricted in using lethal force if their lives are 
in danger. The Special Service Order relating to the Use of Force in Effecting an Arrest 
(18/07/2003) as per Annexure I, points out that the new s49 does not limit the use of lethal force 
when acting in private defence. If the life of the respondent above, was placed in danger, he 
could act in private defence to protect himself. This is one of many such misconceptions 
regarding the amendment to s49 prevalent in the interviews. The Basic Training Learning 
Programme also addresses this in the module: Regulatory framework of policing. (See 3.3.3 i in 
Chapter 3 for more detail.) 
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• “….the new section 49 …we police feel inferior about it, because we think that it covers 
more to…, it falls more to cover the suspect than you….” (Interview 22, 2006); 
 
• “…that’s why I say…not satisfied about s49 …cause you use a firearm these nowadays… 
you lose your job …you involved in a accident or …shooting or …any arrest, they don’t 
ask you how’s your life, they ask about the firearm first …this is the only thing that I hate 
…its only firearm that’s working here at the …SAPS …nothing else…” (Interview 27, 
2006). 
 
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution ensures that every person has the right to life – police 
officials included. However, the use of lethal force limits that right. Where a decision is made to 
use lethal force, the police official must be held accountable to justify its use. 
 
An interesting point to consider is: Do police officials believe that s49 is “inferior” and 
dissatisfactory because: 
 
• it restricts them in terms of when and how lethal force is to be used; or  
 
• they may no longer shoot at fleeing suspects as was allowed by the old s49? 
 
There is obviously a dire need to drill use of force principles and decision-making down the 
ranks in the SAPS and to specifically take the changes to s49 to operational police officials. 
 
• “…you too scared to do your job, ….you can’t do your job…you have to use force to arrest 
the guys and on the end the criminal is getting the… …they take his side, the policeman is the 
one that have to go stand in court and have to please explain there for doing your job right… 
I had an incident about ten months [ago]…get charged for murder, ja, I’m still waiting for 
that case… you can’t really do your job…” (Interview 29, 2006). 
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The common theme in all the responses received from those respondents who attempted to 
explain how they modified their behaviour was that they were synonymous with fear. This 
means that they modified their behaviour out of fear and not out of a deeper understanding of the 
changes in the political and social landscape or to the legislation (on s49). 
 
On the other hand it is evident that some police officials will consider using lethal force when 
their lives or another person’s life is in imminent danger. But is this enough and can the SAPS 
afford to let the situation go unchecked? 
 
Question 21: If no to Question 15, would you be interested in attending a course or workshop 
on the use of lethal force, specifically on the new Section 49? 
 
Encouragingly, 100% – all 29 respondents – indicated they would be very keen and interested in 
attending. There did not appear to be any lack of enthusiasm or desire to be trained on s49. 
 
Question 22: Do you think a learning program or in-service training on the use of force is 
necessary to prepare police members for policing on the streets? 
 
Likewise, in the following question, Question 22, 100% of the respondents (29) indicated that a 
learning programme on the use of lethal force is necessary to prepare police officials for policing 
on the streets.  
 
The Basic Training Learning Programme reviewed (2004 to 2006), confirms that new recruits 
undergo use of lethal force training. Did police officials who underwent police training before 
2000 receive refresher or in-service training to keep up with legislation? In this research sample 
of 29 respondents, 23 respondents had done their Basic Training prior to 2000. 
 
From these responses it would appear that operational police officials – the primary respondents 
to crime – especially those trained before 2000, facing the possibility of using their firearms are 
largely not trained in the correct use of force options or have not been taught situational analysis 
and how to come to a decision of under what circumstances they can make use of lethal force 
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(i.e. draw and fire their firearms). This is a shortcoming the SAPS can ill afford. The Minister of 
Safety and Security is urged to put measures into place to regulate the training conduct and 
standards of physical and mental fitness of police officials as per the SAPS Act, section 24.  
 
Question 23: From your experience what kind of use of lethal force training would you 
recommend be provided to police members? 
 
Responses from respondents were varied and they were categorised as follows: 
• 66% (19) stated training on where and how to use firearm (practical inclusive of shooting 
practice) 
• 31% (9) stated training on when and how to use firearm (theory) 
 
The combination of the above two responses would effectively improve the knowledge, skills 
and behaviour of operational police officials and equip them to effectively carry out their duties. 
There is a clear request and need for the abovementioned interventions. 
• 17% (5) cited self-defence training i.e. physical restraining techniques; 
• 7% (2) stated street survival training on use of lethal force; and 
• 3% (1) cited minimum force training (e.g. tonfa, handcuffs, pepper spray, restrainng 
techniques, e.g. headhold or arm behind back). 
 
The new s49 as well as the SAPS Act (Section 13 (3), Act 98 of 1995) calls for the use of 
minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances in order to effect an arrest.  
 
The use of physical restraining techniques will enable police officials to use minimum force 
instead of having to resort to the use of a firearm. 
 
• 10% (3) stated regular refresher training; 
• 7% (2) stated that workshops on the use of lethal force should be considered; and 
• 7% (2) stated in-service training on the use of lethal force is necessary; 
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Table 10: Recommendations for use of lethal force training on amendment to s49 
 
 
 
It is strongly recommended that the use of lethal force training be approached with a 
combination of theory and practical aspects. This type of intervention will allow for operational 
police officials to acquire skills, knowledge and techniques and equip them to render a quality, 
professional service. 
 
One of the questions in this context that goes begging is whether there is any obligation on the 
SAPS as an organisation to institute regular firearm shooting practice? The brief answer to this 
question is “Yes”.  
 
In terms of the Police Regulations in the SAPS Act, section 24 provides for the Minister of 
Safety and Security to put measures into place to regulate inter alia: 
 
• the conduct of police officials in the execution of their duties; 
• “training conduct and conditions of service”; 
• The management and maintenance of the SAPS; and importantly 
• “standards of physical and mental fitness” of police officials. (Own emphasis). 
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Despite the concerns it raised before the amendment to s49, the Ministry of Safety and Security 
now need to urgently roll out workshops and/or in-service training on the use of lethal force to 
operational police officials. As is evident in this research study, the majority of operational 
police officials interviewed have not been upskilled/trained after the amendment – see questions 
15 and 19 above. 
 
Question 24: From your experience are there any changes or additions you would recommend 
be implemented or added for improving the training on the use of lethal force and 
Section 49 in the SAPS? 
 
This question overlaps with Question 23 and the results of the analysis is similar to Question 24. 
However, the additional recommendations brought out the suggestion of simulation training 
(14% - 4 respondents). 
 
Table 11: Additional recommendations for UOLF training on Amendment to s49 
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The majority of the police officials did not appear to have given questions 23 and 24 much 
thought previously. Is it possible that the impact and/or severity of the lack of or poor training 
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has not dawned on them yet? The perception of the researcher is that they are reactive in 
responses, i.e. “if I can’t change it, [I] accept it” or “I only do what I am told to do”. There 
appears to be no participation in the process – they feel disempowered and are therefore probably 
not committed. And yet paradoxically, 100% indicated in Question 22 that training on the use of 
lethal force is very necessary and they are willing to be trained. See 7.3.4 in Chapter 7 for further 
discussion. 
 
Question 25: When responding to any serious crime situation do you make a conscious effort to 
keep:  
1. Use of lethal force training in the back of your mind? 
2. Training regarding fundamental human rights, in the back of your mind? 
 
All of the respondents answered in the affirmative.  
 
The second part of the question was whether they keep training on Human Rights in the back of 
their minds and 26 respondents out of 29 indicated “yes”. Three respondents honestly indicated 
that they do not keep any thoughts about possible human rights – violations of them or upholding 
of them – when entering a potential use of force situation. 
 
Question 26: Within the last five years have you had occasion to make use of your FIREARM 
while performing your police duties? (If NO, proceed to Scenario 1). 
 
Respondents’ feedback is illustrated as follows. 
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Table 12: No. of respondents who used lethal force in the last five years 
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Eleven (11) respondents (38%) had previously used lethal force whilst 18 respondents (62%) did 
not use lethal force. The following question elicited further information on those cases. It must 
be pointed out that the number of respondents who personally used lethal force decreased from 
11 to 9 when the details of these questions were probed.  
 
The number of separate incidents, however, increased to 18 incidents which were related by 14 
respondents.  
 
This included personal use of lethal force and those respondents who were witness to or present 
when lethal force was used (see Question 28). 
 
Question 27:  What were the outcome/s and result/s of the above event? (insert tick here) in the 
applicable boxes – there can be multiple ticks or none. 
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Arrest and detention of suspect  Injury to suspect/s  
Injury to bystander/s  Death of suspect/s  
Death of bystander/s  Criminal charges  
Suspension from duty  Conviction on charges  
Internal disciplinary hearing  Discharge from SAPS  
Any other (describe/list e.g death of a fellow police official) 
 
The outcome/s and result/s of the above events are discussed as follows. In this question ten 
respondents (34%) from the sample stated that they were involved in shootings.  
 
In these ten cases it was established that four suspects were injured, five were not injured and in 
one case the injuries were unknown. However, when probed further (Question 28), it was 
established that only nine police officials personally used lethal force.  
 
Table 13: Results of injuries in 10 reported UOLF cases 
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There were two cases in which deaths had resulted. The following is an illustration of the ten 
respondent’s feedback in terms of the deceased and survivors: 
 
Table 14: Life/Death outcome of ten reported UOLF cases 
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The two cases that resulted in death are summarised and discussed as follows: 
 
• In the first case the respondent related two shootings in which he was involved – the first 
incident took place between 1991 and 1993. In this incident it was alleged that two suspects 
tried to rob the police official of his firearm. The police official fired a warning shot and 
when the second suspect approached him with a knife, he (the police official) shot and killed 
the attacker. The year of the second incident is unknown (respondent could not remember 
precise date). The police official stated that he had responded to a break-in at a store, he saw 
suspects fleeing, gave chase on foot and one of the suspects tried to stab him with a broken 
bottle. The police official then shot the suspect. When asked to point out where the suspect 
had been shot, he pointed out to the researcher the back of the right thigh below the buttock. 
The police official apparently did not face disciplinary action but was charged with 
attempted murder. The criminal charge was later dropped and according to the respondent, 
the charge was withdrawn by the state prosecutor (Interview 4, 2006).  
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The first incident appears to be a case of private defence and in any event the old s49 was in 
effect at the time. The shooting may have been deemed justifiable homicide. The legality and 
circumstances around the second incident is questionable. There was no date or year of the 
incident provided so it cannot be properly contextualised. However, this scenario in present day 
policing may not necessarily result in a suspect being shot at. The crime of breaking into a 
business premises is a property crime. In terms of the principle of proportionality (that is, the 
degree of force used must not outweigh the seriousness of the crime) the courts may hold the 
view that a person should not have to surrender his life merely because he committed the crime 
of theft. The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) upholds the right to life. The 
use of lethal force limits the right to life.  
 
However, in terms of section 36 (limitation of rights) of the Constitution, the police may limit 
this right if his life or the life of another is in imminent (immediate) danger. The scenario above, 
the suspect was shot from behind. The question is: How could the suspect have been shot at from 
behind if he was attempting to stab the police official?  
 
This is an example of how police officials will be held accountable for their decisions to use 
lethal force after the amendment to s49 came into effect. Incidentally, prior to the amendment, 
and when the old s49 was in effect, this shooting would also have been deemed justifiable 
homicide because the suspect would have been fleeing from a Schedule one offence.  
 
• In the second incident, which took place in June 2005, the respondent and his colleagues 
chased a BMW motor vehicle which was towing a stolen Golf bakkie. Although the police 
allegedly turned on the sirens and blue lights, the suspects sped on, and almost bumped into 
other police vehicles. The respondent indicated that he “heard a shot……saw a flash from 
the left side…..of the BMW” and that’s when he and his colleagues “started shooting the 
tyres of the vehicles…” (Interview 29, 2006). The suspects lost control of the BMW and 
stopped. The suspects got out and fled the scene. The respondent saw one suspect still sitting 
in the bakkie and when he tried to get him out, the respondent realised he was bleeding and 
had sustained a gunshot wound to the back of the head. The firearms of the shottists (total of 
157 
 
four operational police officials) were still at SAPS ballistic experts for testing at the time 
this interview was conducted. 
 
Is the use of lethal force legitimate under these circumstances? The answer would be yes. The 
new s49 provides that when the police official reasonably believes that his life or the life of 
another is in imminent danger, he may use the necessary reasonable force to protect himself or 
another. Further, s49 also states that there must be a “substantial risk” that the suspect will cause 
imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm. Lastly, the offence committed by the suspect 
must be in progress and of a violent and serious nature. This scenario appears to have fulfilled 
these requirements. 
 
The crime of theft of motor vehicle had escalated to attempted murder when the suspects fired 
upon the pursuing police. In terms of the principle of proportionality, the seriousness of the 
offence (attempted murder of police officials) is to be weighed against the life of the suspect. 
(See Chapter 3 – Specific Crimes at 3.3.3. ii for more detail.)  
 
In addition, the Use of Force module which introduces three factors in the Deadly Force 
Decisionmaking Model, apply to this scenario. The factors are Ability, Opportunity and 
Jeopardy. In this scenario the suspects had the ability to harm the police officials, they had the 
opportunity to kill or seriously injure the police and the suspects used their ability and 
opportunity to place the lives of the police officials in danger. According to the module, the 
presence of all three factors may justify the use of lethal force (Use of Force: Workbook, 
2003:27). See 3.3.4 i for more detail. Therefore the use of lethal force by the police officials may 
be justified. 
 
The following is a look at the results in terms of the disciplinary and criminal cases of the ten 
respondents who where involved in use of lethal force cases. The reported cases were handled in 
the following manner. 
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Table 15: Disciplinary/Criminal outcome of ten reported UOLF cases 
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Nine (9) cases reported no disciplinary action taken whilst eight (8) respondents were charged 
but not convicted in criminal court. One case was pending at the time research was conducted.  
 
Question 28: If yes, briefly describe the event/situation where this occurred. 
 
In this question the respondents where asked to describe the incident/s wherein lethal force was 
used. These incidents were not restricted to situations where only the respondents used his/her 
firearm but to incidents where the respondent was present or was witness to incident/s where the 
use of lethal force occurred. The diagram and categories introduced further on will illustrate the 
respondents’ role when lethal force was used in the incident described. 
 
The total number of separate incidents where use of lethal force was reported amounted to 18 
(related by 14 respondents).  
 
These 18 related cases are summarised as follows: 
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• Eleven (11) separate incidents were related where nine (9) respondents personally used 
their weapons and fired shots; 
• Three (3) separate incidents were related where colleagues of respondents used their 
weapons and fired shots; and 
• Four (4) separate incidents were related where respondents attended to serious incidents 
where the use of firearms were imminent but no shots were fired. 
 
Table 16: Analysis of 18 related incidents: Types of crimes 
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These cases can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Table 17: Breakdown of crimes where lethal force was used  
 
BREAKDOWN OF CRIMES WHERE LETHAL FORCE WAS 
USED 
6% 6%
16%
16%
6%11%
6%
27%
6% info on F/arms
armed robbery
hijacking
house breaking
hostage situation
Shooting in Progres
domestice Violen
theft of m/v
police attacked
 
 
160 
 
It is evident then that the majority of cases where lethal force was used by the respondents 
interviewed occurred when they were responding to theft of motor vehicles in progress (5/18 = 
27%).  
 
When asked to describe the situation where he used lethal force recently, the respondent in 
Interview 20 related how he and his colleagues fired upon suspects wanted for theft of motor 
vehicle in Bloemfontein. He indicated that they approached the “bakkie” (which was confirmed 
stolen (via a check on the registration plate number) by police), with their blue lights flashing but 
the suspects had failed to stop “…..they then went into the field and they jumped….and we shot, 
first warning shots, and then direct on the suspect….one of the suspects, I think it was in the leg 
or in the back, I can’t remember…” (Interview 20, 2006).  
 
According to the respondent, this incident occurred sometime in 2004. The circumstances here 
are very similar in description of the sequence of events as had occurred in the Govender case of 
2001 (discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this research).  
The essence of the judgement being that the right to life and physical integrity is far more 
valuable than that of protecting of one’s property.  
 
Three years after the Govender judgement and its finding, operational police officials are still 
exceeding the bounds when it comes to the use of lethal force. The research conducted clearly 
indicates that operational police officials are not adequately trained to make use of lethal force 
decisions in line with the legislative requirements. The top three specific crimes in which lethal 
force was used in this sample population were Theft of motor vehicle in progress (27%), Armed 
Robbery and Hi-jacking (24%) and House-breaking in progress (16%). 
 
An examination into the year that the fourteen respondents, that related use of lethal force 
incidents, had completed their Basic Training was then looked at. This revealed the following 
interesting situation.  
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Table 18: Year of Basic Training: Respondents involved in shooting incidents 
 
 
As illustrated, 37%, i.e. five (5) of the respondents, attended Basic Training in the year 1993. 
Two respondents attended in 1994 and the rest of the respondents seem to be spread out from the 
years 1988 to 2002.  
 
The Basic Training Learning Programme that was reviewed fell into the period from July 2004 
to June 2006.  
 
Incidentally when compared to the overall sample population in terms of the year Basic Training 
was attended, there is a similarity. In both the pie charts, the one immediately above (year of 
Basic Training Learning Programme of respondents involved in shooting incidents) and the one 
immediately below (year of Basic Training Learning Programme of all respondents), the year 
1993 had the most number of respondents who had attended Basic Training. The largest number 
of respondents (five (5)) who were involved in shooting incidents came from the year 1993, 
whilst the largest number of respondents in this sample population (six (6)) attended Basic 
Training in 1993. When this particular group of respondents was further compared, it was 
discovered that in three of the five cases, the respondent himself fired his weapon. 
 
YEAR OF BASIC TRAINING: RESPONDENTS INVOLVED IN 
SHOOTING INCIDENTS
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162 
 
Table 19: Year of Basic Training: All respondents in sample  
 
Interestingly, none of the 14 respondents who related use of lethal force incidents attended the 
Basic Training Learning Programme that was discussed at length in Chapter 3 of this research. 
This means that the majority of operational police officials fighting crime on the streets attended 
Basic Training prior to the changes that occurred in the Criminal Procedure Act and specifically 
s49 (2).  
 
It also means that Human Rights training and the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 
1996) did not play a major role in their basic training and yet they are policing communities that 
demand such rights. This disparity is a further concern regarding the use of force in the SAPS. 
 
This concern is reinforced by results in Question 15 where it was indicated that 25 of the 29 
respondents claimed they did not receive any in-service training on the amended s49(2). There 
appears to be very little or no alignment between the Bill of Rights, afforded to South African 
citizens in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) and the actual provision of a 
policing service in line with these rights of citizens.  
 
Although Chapter 3 (overview of the Basic Training Learning Programme 2004 to 2006) 
encompasses human rights and the changes to the use of lethal force legislation, the disparity is 
YEAR OF BASIC TRAINING:  
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that the majority of operational police officials who are serving communities have as yet not 
attended and received the same Basic Training. 
 
As early as September 2001, the Mistry et al. report had recommended inter alia: 
 
• Basic and Refresher training for police officials in Human and Constitutional rights; 
• The roll out of s49 workshops; 
• Training on restraining techniques; 
• Simulation training; and 
• Refresher courses. 
 
The interviews in this study were undertaken in 2006 – five years after the Mistry et al. report. 
And yet it appears that the same situation has prevailed. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the 
SAPS paid out R3,7 billion in civil claims for the period 2005 to 2008 (Carter, 2008). The delays 
in retraining are proving to be costly, in money and possibly and potentially, in lives too. 
 
The dramatic change that the country has gone through since 1994 points to the need for urgent 
intervention with reference to the training and equipping of police officials in order to police 
more effectively in a new democracy and s49 specialised training being one of the important 
components of the overall thrust of improving the levels of professionalism and conduct of 
operational police members. 
 
Question 29: Were you ever trained regarding the correlation and/or differences between the 
use of lethal force during arrest and acting in private defence? 
 
This question was analysed as follows: 
 
• 69% answered in the affirmative – having received training in correlation and differences 
(20 respondents); 
• 24% claimed not to have received training (seven respondents); and 
• 7% did not provide an answer (two respondents). 
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The following question sought to unpack the understanding on private defence and the use of 
lethal force during arrest.  
 
Question 30: If yes, briefly explain the extent of this training. 
 
Table 20: Analysis and Explanation: Differences between Private Defence and UOLF 
during Arrest 
 
The study indicated that many of the respondents understood the use of private defence to be 
associated with the use of lethal force whilst off duty. The distinct impression on the researcher 
was that private defence implied the use of lethal force to protect the police official’s family, 
after work hours.  
 
On the question of explaining the correlation and/or differences between the use of lethal force 
during arrest and private defence, the following responses were collected from the interviewed 
respondents: 
“…private defence as in? …soos by die huis is dit private defence?” (seeks approval of 
the interviewer). “Ja hulle het vir ons gese daar er …hoe kan ek se …dis moeilik nou om 
te beskryf” (Interview 11, 2006). 
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 “I can use pepper spray …use the tonfa …only if the culprit resisting an arrest …not a 
firearm” (Interview 12, 2006). 
 
 “….er …say for instance I am at home ….I’m on rest days and somebody breaks into my 
house …then it puts my life or my wife’s life or any of the persons inside the house in 
danger …I can use my firearm …to stop him” (Interview 13, 2006). 
 
“I don’t understand acting in Private defence ….when …when er…er …I’m in a very 
serious situation. I have to use my firearm, I cannot say it is private defence, actually, I’m 
defending my life, it’s not about the privacy, it’s about protecting life” (Interview 16, 
2006). 
 
Interviewee 18 initially asked the researcher to explain private defence then went on to say: 
“er …with private defence, I would like when I’m, I don’t use my firearm and make an 
arrest …is it um …more like when I use my pepper spray to arrest the guy?” (Interview 
18, 2006). 
 
These responses reflect that there is apparently a poor understanding in respect of the following: 
• Firstly of private defence; 
• Secondly, role of lethal force when acting in private defence; and  
• Thirdly, the relationship between private defence and use of lethal force when effecting 
arrests. 
 
The reason for asking this question in the interview was to establish whether police officials 
identified the correlation and/or difference between using lethal force when acting in private 
defence and the authority the new s49 afforded them in preventing a suspect from causing future 
death and grievous bodily harm.  
 
It is tentatively submitted that the distinction between private defense and the use of lethal force 
in terms of the new s49 is as follows: 
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• Private defence authorises the use of lethal force when the life of the police official or 
other person is threatened; whereas 
 
• S49 authorises the use of lethal force both when the life of the police official or any other 
is threatened (private defence) and also to prevent a suspect from causing future death or 
grievous bodily harm. 
 
The submission made by the researcher stems from a contentious issue, admittedly that of the use 
of lethal force to prevent a suspect from causing future death or grievous bodily harm. This 
research discovered this provision (the second point) in the explanation above is not well 
understood by operational police officials.  
 
When deciding to use lethal force to effect an arrest, how can a police official predict that a 
suspect can cause future death? Does the action of the police official then depend on a reasonable 
set of facts put before court to justify why he believed the suspect had the potential to cause 
future death? As mentioned earlier, nobody within the criminal justice policy community has 
been able to determine the “future dangerousness” of a person by even a fifty percent accuracy 
(Geller & Scott, 1992:255).  
 
This situation points to the very real practical problem of police officials in such situations 
having to make split-second decisions.  
 
See further discussion in Chapter 5 for differing opinions on the matter. What is evident is that 
clarity and training on this distinction between the use of lethal force when acting in private 
defence and when effecting arrests, need to take place. It will also provide some respite in an 
already untenable situation. 
 
The following three scenarios were posed to all twenty-nine respondents. These scenarios dealt 
with the crime of domestic violence. The reason for the focus on domestic violence was that 
crimes against women and children were identified as a priority in the SAPS Strategic Plan for 
2005-2010.  
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However, the ICD reported to Parliament in 200672 that “the extent of SAPS’s non-compliance 
with the Domestic Violence Act is still atrocious” (ICD, 2006:50). The research hoped to 
highlight the need to focus on this social ill. 
 
The first scenario entailed attending to a domestic violence complaint where the wife of a 
suspect has been badly beaten up. The victim identifies the suspect and when the police official 
tries to place the suspect under arrest, he flees. The interviewed police official was asked to 
explain how he would respond in this instance where a suspect for Domestic Violence resists 
arrest and attempts to flee.  
 
Scenario One 
You attend a domestic violence complaint and find that the wife of the suspect has been badly 
beaten up. The husband/suspect is outside the property. The victim identifies/points him out to 
you. You approach him, place your hand on his shoulder and inform him that you are placing 
him under arrest. He pushes you away and flees down the road. How would you respond in a 
situation such as this where a suspect for Domestic Violence resists arrest and attempts to flee. 
Would you attempt to arrest him and how would you carry out the arrest? 
 
It is encouraging to note that 20 of the respondents (69%) intimated that they would give chase 
after the suspect and arrest him. Fourteen respondents (48%) indicated that they would call for 
backup/assistance in order to arrest the suspect. It seems unreasonable to call for back up and/or 
assistance to place one suspect under arrest who is clearly attempting to escape (i.e. not 
physically directly resisting arrest). These fourteen respondents could be either unsure and/or 
overtly cautious. 
 
More encouragingly 21 respondents (72%) indicated that they would not use their firearms to 
carry out the arrest of the fleeing suspect (as described in Scenario 1). The remaining 8 
respondents (28%) stated that they would use minimum force and not their firearms.  
                                                
72
 Full article may be accessed at http://www.icd.gov.za/reports/domestic_violence/dvr0606.pdf 
 Titled: Domestic Violence Report to Parliament for the period January to June 2006 
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However, one respondent (3%) indicated that he would fire a warning shot to stop the suspect 
from fleeing. Interviewee 14 stated that: 
“He continue er …running away, you have to make a warning to him… then by shooting 
to a person, you have to give a first warning to a person, if he does continue …then you 
have to, you have to shoot to a person but to injure him so that …can overcome the …the 
…running ….with his continue, continuing of running away….” (Interview 14, 2006). 
 
Four respondents (14%) indicated that they would return later if the suspect runs away. Six 
respondents (20%) indicated that they would advise the complainant of relevant action that she 
could take. 
 
Scenario Two 
In the same scenario, you are attending the complaint of domestic violence and find that the wife 
of the suspect has been badly beaten up. The husband/suspect has a firearm on the premises but 
it is not on his person. According to his wife, prior to your arrival, he threatened to shoot her. 
He is standing outside the property. The victim identifies/points him out to you. You approach 
him, place your hand on his shoulder and inform him that you are placing him under arrest. He 
refuses to consent to the arrest and does not co-operate. Explain what you would do next. 
(Section 49 (2) (b). 
 
In the same scenario, the wife of the suspect has been badly beaten up. The husband/suspect has 
a firearm on the premises but it is not on his person. According to the wife the suspect did 
threaten to shoot her. The suspect refuses to consent to the arrest and does not co-operate. The 
police official had to explain what he would do next.  
 
An overall majority of 25 respondents (86%) indicated that they would not use their firearm but 
use minimum force to arrest the suspect. Further, 24 respondents (83%) indicated that they will 
definitely arrest and charge the suspect. Twenty (20) respondents (69%) indicated that they 
would seize the firearm. These results are encouraging and in line with the Domestic Violence 
Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) requirements which inter alia provide for the following:  
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• Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998) authorises a peace 
officer to arrest a suspect for domestic violence at the scene of the incident without a 
warrant; and 
 
• Section 9 of the Act provides for the seizure of arms in domestic violence incidents. 
 
In terms of s49, the police official is authorised to arrest the suspect, using the reasonably 
necessary and proportionate force to overcome any resistance because there is substantial risk 
that the suspect may cause future death or grievous bodily harm to the victim. Moreover, the 
crime of domestic violence did involve life threatening violence. 
 
Five respondents (17%) indicated that they would try to get an enquiry be held (instituted) to 
determine whether the suspect is fit to possess a firearm. The Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 
116 of 1998) (section 9) outlines that affidavits may be put before court regarding the suspects 
state of mind or mental condition and his/her inclination to be violent to show that the suspect is 
not a suitable candidate to be in possession of an arm. As indicated in the Mistry, Minnaar 
Redpath and Dhlamini report (which looked at the role of the criminal justice system in 
excluding unfit persons from firearm ownership) (2002:13),73 in terms of the Arms and 
Ammunition Act (Act 75 of 1969), section 11, the SAPS may declare a person unfit to possess 
an arm if the person “threatened or expressed the intention to kill or injure him or herself or any 
other person”.  
 
Scenario Three 
You attend a domestic violence complaint and find that the wife of the suspect has been badly 
beaten up. The husband/suspect is outside the property. The victim identifies/points him out to 
you. She also informs you that he has a firearm and, prior to your arrival, has threatened to use 
it. You place a hand on his shoulder and inform him that you are placing him under arrest. He 
pushes you away and attempts to flee. How would you respond in an instance like this where an 
armed suspect for Domestic Violence resists arrest and attempts to flee. Would you arrest him 
and how would you carry out the arrest. Explain briefly. 
                                                
73
 Full report can be viewed at http://www.smallarmsnet.org/issues/regions/gunfreerep.pdf  
170 
 
In the same scenario, the wife/victim informs the police official that her husband has a firearm 
and, prior to police arrival, had threatened to use it. The suspect pushes the police official aside 
and attempts to flee. The police official was accordingly asked to explain how he/she would 
respond in such an instance where an armed suspect in an incident of Domestic Violence resists 
arrest and attempts to flee.  
 
The analysis of this question was challenging as the responses were varied. Each category is 
calculated from the total number of respondents of the sample population (i.e.10/29 = 34% and 
so on). In other words, some respondents gave two different responses and each response was 
counted separately. 
 
• Ten (10) respondents (34%) will shoot if the suspect draws with 2 respondents willing 
specifically to shoot to kill if the suspect draws his/her firearm (interviews 11 and 13) 
• Ten (10) respondents (34%) indicated that they will approach suspect with their weapon 
drawn; 
• Nine (9) respondents (31%) will not use their firearm and opted to use minimum force to 
arrest the armed suspect; 
• Eight (8) respondents will arrest and charge the armed suspect 
• Eight (8) respondents (28%) will wait to be shot at before they shoot; 
• Seven (7) respondents (24%) will call for backup; 
• Seven (7) respondents (24%) will fire a warning shot; 
• Six (6) respondents (21%) will not shoot the armed suspect for Domestic Violence 
• Four (4) respondents (14%) will shoot at the armed fleeing suspect 
• Three (3) respondents (10%) will shoot suspect in the leg. 
 
The significance and interpretation of these responses are discussed as follows. The expected 
‘correct’ response to Scenario 3 being that the police officials would pursue the suspect with 
their own weapon drawn.  
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However, in this scenario it would be advisable for the police officials not to shoot at the fleeing 
suspect unless their lives or anyone else’s life was in immediate, life threatening danger. 
Moreover, the suspect is known and can be traced and arrested at a later stage. The arrest of this 
suspect is necessary but minimum force should be considered first in order to effect the arrest. 
The wife should be removed (from the home to a place of safety) and a formal case registered. It 
is not advisable to fire a warning shot at the suspect. The suspect should not be shot under these 
circumstances at all yet in the responses four respondents indicated they would have decided to 
do just that.  
 
Scenario 3 is the scenario that outlines a case where aggravated Domestic Violence – wife beaten 
– assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm has been committed and she was threatened with 
a firearm. There is no imminent (immediate life threatening) danger. Whilst it may be argued 
that substantial risk exists or that perhaps the suspect may cause future death, the researcher is 
still of the opinion that minimum force should first be applied before the decision to use a 
firearm is taken. Judge Kriegler in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S 
v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) tabled nine points for clarity to police officials 
when use of lethal force is to be considered (see Chapter 4 (SALR, 2002) for more detail on 
these nine points). 
 
In Scenario 3 the following specific points of the Walters judgement apply: 
• where it is necessary to arrest, only necessary force may be used to effect the arrest; 
 
• where force is necessary, only minimum force to effect the arrest may be used (in this 
scenario therefore minimum force should first be considered);  
 
• the degree of force to be used must be proportional to the threat of violence to the arrestor 
or others and the nature of the crime the suspect is suspected of having committed; 
 
• the shooting of a suspect merely to arrest is permitted in very limited circumstances only; 
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• under ordinary circumstances such a shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a 
threat of violence to the arrestor or others or is suspected of having committed or 
threatened to commit an offence of serious bodily harm (the suspect is not a threat to 
police officials but has committed a crime of serious bodily harm). 
 
The judgement in the Walters case meant that a police official may not shoot at a fleeing suspect 
merely because they (the suspect) will escape and get away and not be arrested. Furthermore, 
that a firearm may be used to effect an arrest only under certain very limited circumstances. 
 
Question 31: Is there any other information about the use of lethal force and Section 49 you 
would like to add? 
 
The feedback and analysis of this question was an eye-opener because it revealed the 
respondents true feelings and thoughts in respect of the changes on the use of lethal force during 
arrest. The thematic coding for this question was a challenging task since, being an open-ended 
question, the responses were very varied. A summary of the responses to this specific question is 
provided below: 
 
• 24% (seven respondents) believe that people (ordinary citizens) and (criminal) suspects 
have more rights than the police; and  
• Four (4) respondents related incidents where their colleagues had used lethal force in the 
execution of their duties and as a consequence, they themselves had been negatively 
affected. 
 
To establish why the use of force is viewed so negatively, a review of each response is given as 
follows: 
 
• The respondent related an incident where two of his colleagues (police officials) shot at 
suspects in an ATM robbery – the incident left three suspects dead. Both police officials have 
been charged, convicted and imprisoned as a result of the shooting. The respondent indicated 
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that he “feel bad about s49” (sic) (Interview 4, 2006). It appears that the respondent fears 
that if he became involved in such a situation, he too, may be arrested and incarcerated. 
 
• The respondent related that a colleague attending a complaint was shot, and in another 
incident, a colleague was robbed of his service pistol with a toy gun. In the latter incident, the 
police official was also shot (with his own firearm after it had been taken from him). The 
respondent also related an incident where a colleague was robbed of his state vehicle and his 
service pistol in Zamdela, Sasolburg in 2001. According to the respondent the police official 
in the latter incident was too afraid to use his firearm (Interview 6, 2006). It appears that the 
respondent believes that police officials are victims and/or helpless to tackle crime. They feel 
that they cannot defend themselves. 
 
• The respondent and his colleagues came under attack. Police returned fire. This incident left 
one police official and one suspect dead. The respondent is aggrieved that senior officers 
attended the scene and treated the respondent and his colleagues poorly (dismissively and 
with suspicion) at the scene (Interview 17, 2006). It appears that the respondent believes that 
the use of lethal force is frowned upon by senior ranks in the SAPS. He possibly also feels 
like operational police officials are not backed by senior officers when lethal force is used.  
 
• Respondent related a story where reservists attended a scene prior to his arrival. When the 
respondent arrived at the scene, the complainant fired upon the respondent and his colleague. 
When interviewed, the complainant stated that the reservists had told him that “if there’s 
anything moving in your yard, you can shoot it….” (2006, Interview 20). Respondent 
believes that police officials are not properly trained. 
 
Further to this point the responses also revealed that 7% (two (2) respondents) indicated that the 
police are “not covered” or are not protected by the amended S49 when they use lethal force in 
the execution of their duties. Some comments regarding this aspect are given below:  
 
• A respondent indicated that “…people think that now they got more power than us… 
sometimes …I feel that they have more rights than me myself because now people are 
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more protected than us.” When commenting on the Bill of Rights, the respondent stated 
that “….you have to think humanly ….but what about me, I deserve to be treated like 
human (sic)” (Interview 2, 2006). 
 
• Another respondent on the same point reflected that “die wet net ‘n bietjie word ….meer 
verander….as jou as ‘n polisieman er….hoe kan ek se, te cover” (Interview 11, 2006). 
 
It appears that police officials feel that the new s49 (legal aspect) does not afford them the 
necessary “protection” or “cover” to effectively perform their tasks. 
 
• 34% (ten (10) respondents) believe that the rights of the police have been limited by the 
amended S49;  
 
The following discussion complements the above discussion where police officials indicated that 
they do not feel that s49 protects them when they need to police effectively. Some of the 
responses to this question are quoted and discussed as follows: 
 
• One of the responses was that suspects have more power and more rights than police 
officials (Interview 2, 2006). 
 
• “Most of police members in the service, they will say they are unhappy, their hands have 
been cut by the ….the new laws, they will tell you also, their hands have been cut because 
we cannot act, even though if you have to interrogate the suspect ...you can not 
even...what do they call it...choke him or what...ja, the suspect...if he is nice, he will deny 
it, you can never force him to speak the truth…most police officials…our hand has been 
cut…detainees have more rights than the police officials….ICD will take steps against 
the police officials…” (Interview 8, 2006). 
 
It appears as if the police official feels that because he can no longer choke a suspect to speak the 
“truth”, his rights as a police official has been limited. It is a gross violation of the suspect’s 
constitutional rights if he needs to be “choked” to speak the truth. See Chapter 3 overview. 
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• One respondent stated that “parliament must try to be secret things (sic) when its come to 
cases like this…government must see the danger of that” (Interview 9, 2006). The 
respondent further stated that it is useless to carry a firearm because you can never use it. 
It seems that by going public with the amendment to s49 and the introduction of the 
Constitution to the nation, the respondent believes that the rights of police officials have 
been restricted. 
 
• Another respondent intimated that “dis moelik, hierdie human rights maak dit baie 
moelik….” (Interview 11, 2006). Human rights is the cornerstone of the Constitution, 
considering the chequered political past of South Africa and its gross violation of human 
rights, it is of concern that the respondent sees the protection of human rights as 
restrictive. (See detailed discussion on Human Rights at 4.2 in Chapter 4 of this study.) 
 
•  “I would say this s49 is more of a burden ...it protects the criminal not the 
policeman....”. This respondent further stated it was like s49 was “Putting me in 
handcuffs...like er....I dont the use why we carry guns with us...might just help to give us 
tonfa and say hey go out and do your work…” (Interview 15, 2006). Clearly the feeling 
here is that the police official feels helpless and frustrated with the new s49. Again, the 
issue of the suspect being protected by the new law and not the police official, comes up. 
 
• When asked why he felt “bad” about the amended s49, one respondent stated that the 
new s49 has “handcuffed” him. He related that when called to attend a complaint at a 
tavern where a woman was assaulted, he had been provoked by the patrons. They told 
him to “Shoot! Or are you afraid to shoot….but you’ve got the firearm?...that is why I 
say I hate that amendment total…er..section 49” (Interview 19, 2006). The police and 
policing operations have come under scrutiny in the new democracy and the Constitution. 
These are one of the experiences police officials have to be equipped to deal with, namely 
changes regarding the use of lethal force and focus on Human Rights.  
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• Another respondent also felt quite strongly about the rights of police being limited by 
s49. He said: 
“I think it’s a bunch of crap because the police member’s hands are tied behind their 
backs and the suspects know that. All the people outside know that we’re not allowed to 
shoot…that’s why the crime is so high because they haven’t got any respect for the police 
because the police hands are tied behind their back…sometimes I’m scared to use my 
firearm….I’m not familiar with…the…the…fine print of s49…thats why I’m telling 
you…I’m not using my firearm anymore…” (Interview 20, 2006). 
 
This discussion above reflected on some of the concerns the respondents shared as to why or 
how they feel limited by the new s49. The following are other findings in the study.  
 
• Seven percent (two (2) respondents) display an “us versus them” (own emphasis) 
understanding of the situation; 
• Six (6) respondents are in fear of losing their jobs if they use lethal force;  
 
A consistent theme that emerged was of both fear and anger. Some examples are:  
– “I’m gonna be charged with murder…I may lose my job…whose gonna feed by kids 
at home….” (Interview 15, 2006).  
 
– “I’m afraid to use my firearm because there’s so much…problems after that, all the 
investigations and maybe discharge….” (Interview 18, 2006). This respondent was 
very uneasy during his interview. He said that “I had reason to use but I didn’t use it 
because of this bloody s49 – so my life was in danger but I didn’t want to lose my 
job”. He went on to say the “Problems lie with judges…we need to educate the 
judges to find in favour of police officials because you can’t argue with a man who 
wants to kill you. I am not his doctor, I’m there to stop him from committing a crime. 
Judges are condemning police officers acting in line of duty”. (The respondent 
appeared to be visibly angry and upset) (Interview 28, 2006).  
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– The following respondent indicated that: “….on the end of the day, you gonna lose 
your job for them, for another person’s stuff….it’s not about….doing the right thing 
anymore, its about getting the policeman out of a job or getting a loop hole in what 
he did wrong…policeman is also just a normal person, you can only 
take…(expletive)…up to a point” (Interview 29, 2006). 
 
These comments are emotionally charged and expressed a sense of frustration, helplessness but 
also fear and anger. It appears from these responses that the use of lethal force has had a wide 
spectrum of influence on their lives, both professionally and personally.  
 
Seven (7) respondents stated they were too scared to use their firearm;  
• “police officers are too scared to use firearms, .me too” (Interview 5, 2006); 
 
• “..I know people who have died because they….they were afraid to use their firearms” 
(Interview 6, 2006); 
 
• “…my life is worth more to me than the arrest…I’ll try to catch him later…it’s interesting to 
see how it works so….performance…..”(long pause) (Interview 15, 2006). The researcher got 
the distinct impression that the respondent wanted to convey that perhaps his life was of 
more importance than making the arrest and that he is not prepared to sacrifice his life to 
fight crime. Also that perhaps the lethal force situation has had a detrimental effect on his 
desire to fight crime.  
 
The inextricable link from these responses is that although crime might be escalating or staying 
at unacceptably high levels, the commitment by police officials to effectively police, has waned. 
Could these beliefs and perceptions be reflected in poor service delivery and delayed response to 
complaints? The following findings also reflect dissatisfaction and a fear to use lethal force. 
 
Eleven (11) respondents stated they have become negative and appear demoralised, while two 
(2) respondents fear that they will go to jail if they used their firearms. It is noteworthy that the 
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ICD reported the following statistics for SAPS members who were charged criminally over the 
last three years as follows: 
• In 2005/2006, a total of 1 643 police officials were charged criminally (ICD, 2006:69); 
• In 2006/2007 a total of 1 787 police officials faced criminal charges (ICD, 2006:69); and  
• The 2007/2008 ICD Annual Report showed that 2 101 police officials faced criminal 
charges (ICD, 2008:58). 
 
These reported statistics of the ICD reflect that there has been an annual increase in the number 
of police officials facing criminal charges. It is reasonable then to assume that the respondents 
are fearful that their actions, if contrary to the law, may result in their prosecution. 
 
Four (4) respondents stated that the service will suffer because they will delay their response to 
serious complaints;  
 
Twenty-one percent (six (6) respondents) gave no response to Question 31 (Is there any other 
information about the use of force and Section 49 you would like to add?) 
So the question is: what do these responses illustrate? The majority of operational police officials 
in the sample population indicated that the new s49 is “limiting”; does not protect or “cover” 
them; is a “burden”; and that it (mainly/only) protects criminals. They feel vulnerable and fear 
reprisals such as criminal charges and dismissal and/or suspension or even have any promotions 
blocked – all of which may result if they use lethal force. It is evident also that commitment to 
policing in this type of culture has been seriously affected.  
 
It appears that the majority completed their basic training well before 2000. The breakdown of 
the year the sample population attended Basic Training, as illustrated below: 
• 24% (7 respondents) were enlisted between 1975 and 1990 
• 45% (13 respondents) were enlisted between 1990 and 1995 
• 10% (3 respondents) were enlisted between 1995 and 2000 
• 21% (6 respondents) were enlisted between 2000 and 2005 
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Therefore the majority of the sample of respondents underwent Basic Training well before the 
amendment to s49.  
 
This knowledge coupled with results from Question 15, which indicated that 86% did not receive 
in-service training on the use of lethal force, means that the majority of operational police 
officials who completed their basic training after 1995, are largely untrained on aspects of the 
amended s49 and the use of lethal force. The country was dramatically reformed in 1996 with the 
arrival of a democracy and a new Constitution. The impact of having the majority of operational 
police officials who have not been re-trained after the amendment to the use of lethal force, 
policing in a new democracy which intensely focuses on human rights and which has amended 
the use of lethal force, is indeed disconcerting.  
 
The Basic Training Learning Programme for SAPS has had to be reconstructed in line with 
policing in a democracy with its new laws. However, police officials who policed in the old era 
have not had re-training and any requisite skills development of any significance, as is clearly 
illustrated in this research. This assertion is supported by the responses to questions 15 and 18. 
As follow up research it would be interesting to explore how this sample population group 
results would fare when compared to other policing areas in the country.  
 
This line of thinking generated some interesting questions. Are the majority of police officials on 
ground level facing the same predicament? What can be done to address this situation? Could 
this situation be linked to the reason for the unacceptably high crime levels in our country? Is it 
easier for criminals to commit serious and violent crimes and get away with perpetrating them 
because they know their right to life is protected and the police cannot shoot at them when they 
are escaping? Are criminals using (exploiting) this situation to their advantage? 
 
In terms of the use of lethal force, the new s49 also speaks of “substantial risk” (s49 (2)(b)) that 
the suspect will cause immediate or future death if the arrest is delayed. So the question here is: 
How does a police official determine ‘substantial risk’ as mentioned in the new section? And 
doing or making that judgment call ‘on-the-spur-of-the-moment’.  
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Each situation is unique and different people respond differently to certain situations. Precedent 
as set by the courts is often followed, where each case is judged on its own merit. The response 
from the respondent in Interview 4 challenges exactly that. He stated that: 
“While I’m still running, I can shoot them to [in] the back. So I know that thing is there. 
So I feel bad. If I’m going for armed robbery, I think about what if I shoot that guy, or 
that guy shoot me while he was running towards that direction then I’m came at the back 
(sic). Then….er…I’ll be a loser then he will be a winner…because they will send you to 
jail. You lose the job. You were doing the job but you lose the job, you go to jail” (2006, 
Interview 4). 
 
He cannot be exactly sure that his course of action in the heat of the situation is the correct one, 
which is compounded by the fact that there is no room for human error. The absence of 
guidelines for operational police officials on “substantial risk” is a great concern to many police 
officials and other observers.  
 
Another interviewee related an incident where he believed he could have used lethal force stating 
that: “I had reason to use but I didn’t use it because of this bloody s49 – so my life was in danger 
but I didn’t want to lose my job” (Interview 28, 2006). 
 
The same respondent indicated that: 
“Problems lie with judges…..we need to educate the judges to find in favour of police 
officials because if criminal (sic) is armed and has been shot because you cant argue 
with a man who wants to kill you. I am not his doctor I’m there to stop him from 
committing a crime. Judges are condemning police officers acting in line of duty” (2006, 
Interview 28). 
 
A complete overview of the analysis of the research results led to the identification of three main 
areas of concern. They are introduced below. 
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6.3 Major research findings 
The research focus was on evaluating the training of operational police officials in SAPS after 
the amendment to s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). Apart from the 
actual training requirements as provided by and compared to the Basic Training Learning 
Programme (June 2004 to July 2006), other areas for concern were also identified. These 
findings were grouped together and are discussed as follows.  
 
6.3.1 Majority of the operational police officials have not received training on the use of 
lethal force and its legal implications 
The majority of the respondents did not meet the requirements for the use of lethal force as 
outlined in the Basic Training Learning Programme. More specifically, as referred to firstly in 
Chapter 3 (3.3.3 v), Criminal Procedure: Learner’s Guide (2004) where the police official is 
expected to identify and apply sections of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) 
(own emphasis).  
 
Secondly, in Chapter 3 (3.3.4.i), the Use of Force Presenter’s Guide (2004), where the police 
official is expected to use appropriate force to uphold and enforce the law and protect people and 
property.  
 
Although this may be logical because the curriculum could not have remained the same over the 
years, it is obvious that the changes in respect of the Constitution and lethal force have not been 
filtered down to the grassroots of the SAPS. Research results indicate that the majority have not 
received re-training on the use of lethal force after the amendment to s49 in 2003. Eighty-six 
percent of the population did not receive any in-service training whilst 79% did not attend a 
workshop or other training intervention (see question 15 and 17). One of the specific outcomes is 
to make use of force decisions that meet legal organisational and public requirements.  
 
So too, not one of the respondents quoted a single relevant applicable case law that dealt with the 
use of lethal force (see questions 7 and 8 of analysis above). Moreover, 86% have not attended 
any in-service training and 82% have not attended any workshop on the use of lethal force after 
the amendment to s49. 
182 
 
 
Interestingly, 100% (all respondents) stated that training on the use of lethal force is necessary 
and 100% indicated they will be willing to attend this training.  
 
Practical firearm training (66%) and training on theory (31%) on the use of lethal force was 
suggested by respondents. Chapter 1 of this research study provides that the concept of training 
“….can be regarded as a systematic and planned process to change the knowledge, skills and 
behaviour of employees in such a way that organizational objectives are achieved” (Erasmus & 
Van Dyk, 1999:2).  
 
The terms “substantial risk” (s49(2)(b)) needs urgent clarification. Police officials are not trained 
or inadequately trained on this requirement. The research results indicate that operational police 
officials in the sample do not possess the relevant knowledge on the amended s49 nor the skills 
and attributes necessary to use lethal force to combat crime. Many of the police officials 
interviewed were unable to make a split-second decision based on the aspect of ‘substantial risk’ 
and to further consider its implications in their response to violent crime.  
 
The majority of police officials interviewed are therefore untrained and cannot make appropriate 
use of lethal force decisions to effectively police by responding to violent crime. This is a 
marginal gap in the information on the use of lethal force between the content in the Basic 
Training Learning Programme and the knowledge of the operational police officials interviewed. 
 
It must, however, be noted that the majority of operational police officials in the sample 
attended/received basic training before 2004. In addition, 69% of the research population have 
served in the SAPS for over ten years (see Chapter 6 – Question 3). Now with the Constitution 
being 12 years old, the amended version of s49 being five years old and the Basic Training 
Learning Programme that was reviewed for this study being two years old, one can assume that 
the up-skilling of this majority of operational police officials has been seriously neglected. The 
situation is unacceptable and in conflict with the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 
1996) and the rights afforded to citizens of the country.  
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This means that there is great disparity in the constitutional needs of the country and the actual 
skills and expertise of operational police officials. They are clearly not in a position to deliver a 
quality, professional service under these circumstances.  
 
6.3.2 Majority of the operational police officials did not receive Human Rights training 
The research results revealed that training on Human Rights and Policing has been neglected. 
The analysis of the results from questions 11 and 12 confirm this finding. In totality, 89% of the 
respondents interviewed did not contribute meaningfully (51%) to the question on Human rights 
and Policing, of which (38%) claimed to have received no training on the subject at all. Four 
respondents (14%) indicated in their responses to Scenario 3 that they would shoot the armed 
suspect although the suspect posed no direct threat or did not cause imminent life threatening 
danger as he attempted to flee. The suspect was known and could be arrested later.  
 
Operational police officials need training on how to make use of lethal force decisions by 
striking a balance between the interests of society and extent to which he or she limits certain 
rights when s49 is put into operation. This research revealed this factor to be a major deficit 
between the Basic Training Learning Programme and the responses of the operational police 
officials. 
 
Human rights are the cornerstone of the Constitution – it is a concept that cannot be separated 
from policing. Urgent intervention is required in this area (see recommendations in Chapter 7). 
 
6.3.3 Overall negative perceptions and disposition on the amendment to s49 and the use 
of lethal force 
The general perceptions of the respondents interviewed regarding the use of lethal force are very 
negative. There appears to be apathy, discontent and fear if not anger in some cases.  
184 
 
The analysis of the findings from the responses to Question 31 substantiates this position. An 
extract of some of the perceptions and beliefs are as follows: 
• “suspects have more rights”; 
• its “us versus them”; 
• “rights of the police are limited”; 
• “police are not covered” (not “covered”, i.e. legally or organisationally protected by s49 
if they use lethal force); 
• fear of job loss; 
• “unhappy” or “angry” with the amendment to s49; 
• too “scared to use firearm”; 
• have become “negative” and “demoralised”; 
• fear of being jailed if they use their weapons; 
• say Service will “suffer” because they will “delay” their response to serious crime. 
 
It is evident that this situation needs urgent intervention. The overwhelming impression gained 
from the interviews is one of a feeling of helplessness and being unable (prevented from) to act 
decisively a feeling of having their ‘hands tied’). It appeared as if the interviews provided a 
much-needed opportunity for interviewees to vent their frustrations with the system as well as 
with those who interact with the legal system. 
 
In support of these findings, the Mistry et al. report of 2001, also on the use of force by members 
of the SAPS that was conducted in seven policing areas in Gauteng, also revealed that: 
• “criminals have more rights than the police” 
• “our hands are tied by the law” 
• The Constitution “is like a rope around the police’s neck” 
• Some of the respondents fear “getting into trouble” (Mistry et al. 2001, 47-51). 
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The key question then would be: Is there any correlation between these negative perceptions, 
poor morale and fears and the crime statistics and police response times to serious and violent 
crime? Clearly the absence of support and guidance (maybe even resources) may have led to the 
feeling of helplessness amongst those who are expected to enforce the very law they could be 
prosecuted by. The unfortunate result of these fears and perceptions means that many of the 
operational police officials interviewed have invested very little commitment and passion in their 
duties and policing responsibilities to combat violent crime. This circle of uncertainty carries 
with it the tendency to blame others such as police management, the public, the system and so on 
– one wonders who takes responsibility eventually? The reality appears to be that operational 
police officials are not coping with fulfilling the duties they are empowered to carry out, as 
expected of them by society. 
 
6.3.4 Some operational police officials delay their response to serious and/or violent crime 
for fear of using their firearms  
The research findings in this study indicate that 34% (ten respondents) believe that the rights of 
the police have been limited by the amended s49. Six respondents are in fear of job loss if they 
use lethal force. Seven respondents stated they were too scared to use their firearms. Eleven 
respondents stated they have become negative and demoralised. Two respondents fear that they 
will go to jail if they used their firearms. Four respondents stated that the service will suffer 
because they will delay their response to serious complaints. One respondent stated the 
following: 
“Those people that writing this new law…..they must go out into the field and see how its 
working outside…..its easy to sit behind the desk and write down a new law something 
like that…if I know for instance that the suspect is armed or suspiciously armed….and at 
the end of the day….you might say no let him go…my life is worth more to me than the 
arrest….I’ll try to catch him later….its interesting to see how it works 
so….performance…”(long pause). When asked by the researcher if this was a general 
feeling or did the respondent himself hold these views, the respondent stated that it was a 
general feeling and that his colleagues “…talk about it all the time” (Interview 15, 2006). 
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Another respondent on the same note stated: 
“…policemen say if I respond to serious cases of armed robbery, I will take my time if I 
can’t use my firearm…s49 in some cases made service delivery bad especially because 
guys don’t know what to do on s49…if they shoot someone they get into serious trouble. 
They avoid a situation than get into trouble for it” (Interview 5, 2006). 
 
Police officials need to make split second decisions – so he/she needs to be well versed in s49 
and its provisions to make decisions in line with the law – yet 86% have never received training 
on new s49, while 79% did not even attend a workshop on the new law (see above Question 15 
for detail).  
 
This situation is unacceptable and criminal. In all the modules of the Basic Training Learning 
Programme reviewed, the back page has a copy of the SAPS Code of Conduct. The first bullet of 
the Code of Conduct provides that the police official shall serve: 
 
• with integrity, render a responsible and effective service of high quality which is 
accessible to every person and continuously strive towards improving this service.74 
 
From the research conducted it does not appear to be so – police officials are in fear of arriving 
at a serious, violent complaint where it may be inevitable to use their firearms – they believe that 
wrongful action on their part may lead to a severe impact on their careers, salary, rank, status, 
livelihood, families, etcetera. The impression gained from the responses indicates the majority 
feeling of: ‘why risk using your firearm when you have so much to lose’. Rather arrive late at the 
incident when there is no serious risk – perhaps the suspect will already have escaped – the 
detective can follow up and investigate the case later. Just where does that leave the victim in the 
scope of things? What about the fundamental rights of the victim?  
 
This type of callousness/fear/insecurity of the police official may result in the loss of life or 
serious injury of the victim. Can the SAPS afford to go on this way? The Code of Conduct also 
                                                
74
 From the research this does not appear to be so (see later discussion of research findings and  
 recommendations). 
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mentions the police’s undertaking to uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person. 
Research reveals that this is far from the case. 
 
In the Walters case the Constitutional Court held that the right to life, human dignity and bodily 
integrity are both individually and collectively the foundation of the value system upon which 
the Constitution is based. If this very foundation is compromised, then “the society to which we 
aspire becomes illusionary” (SALR, 2002:631 at G).  
 
6.4 Summary 
In the responses there are overall perceptions of fear, hence the delay in response to serious 
crime, the expression of uncertainty (about s49 provisions) and general apathy. Clearly this 
research indicates that police officials do not know when and how to use their firearms when 
faced with dangerous, life threatening situations.  
 
The majority of police officials interviewed are afraid to use their firearms. There is fear of 
reprisals such as fear of being charged, jailed, job loss and/or being killed.  
 
This negative disposition of the majority of the police officials interviewed is of concern. The 
research conducted has indicated that many operational police officials clearly delay their 
response to serious crime for fear of reprisals if they use the firearms. As discussed in Chapter 3 
(3.3.3.i), the failure to act where there is a legal duty to act positively may also be deemed to be 
acting unlawfully.  
 
Police officials who therefore fail to immediately respond to serious, life threatening crime are 
acting unlawfully and may be prosecuted. So too, their conduct would be contradictory to the 
provisions of Section 205 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). 
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A further general perception arising from the research results is one of discontent. There was not 
one respondent who was positive about the changes (to s49) and the future of the police. There 
was generally a poor response to the changes in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 
1977) and the amendment to s49.  
 
What is troubling is the delayed response that some are engaged in when they have to respond to 
serious and/or violent crime. There seems to be a perception with most of the respondents that if 
police management is not concerned with their safety/training, why should they place their own 
lives in danger or be concerned with protecting others. The existing data and research conducted 
supports this view.  
 
Operational police officials are not adequately trained to use lethal force. The fact that the 
majority of operational police officials in the sample were “older” or served for over ten years 
was a surprise. In Chapter 7 a number of recommendations, generated by the findings in this 
chapter, will be put forward for consideration. 
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Chapter 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON 
IMPROVING THE TRAINING OF OPERATIONAL POLICE OFFICIALS 
ON THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE SAPS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research was firstly, to evaluate the training of operational police officials on 
the use of lethal force in the SAPS. In order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion to answer this 
question with some fairness, the researcher set about examining the legislation (s49) and the 
Basic Training Learning Programme content and juxtapose that with what the “new” law 
prescribes.  
 
An in-depth study directed at answering the research question involved inter alia: 
 
• a review of the Basic Training Learning Programme (June 2004 to 2006) on the use of 
lethal force; 
 
• a review of the legal framework on the amended s49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
(Act 51 of 1977) and 
 
• the interviewing of 29 operational police officials extrapolated from two provinces by 
one-on-one interviews. 
 
The focus was to determine whether they were adequately trained to make use of lethal force 
decisions in line with legal and organisational requirements. The study revealed some shortfalls 
such as the complete absence on the use of lethal force of operational police officials. By 
implementing these recommendations it is hoped that the training needs of operational police 
officials will be addressed and the service delivery in the SAPS will be improved.  
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The research is valuable because it provides recommendations on future training needs on the 
use of lethal force for operational police officials. Furthermore, it served to identify a gap in the 
knowledge and skills of operational police officials. Suggestions on the way forward are 
recommended accordingly. This study will benefit the government, citizens of the country and 
operational police officials in general.  
 
This chapter provides a summary of the chapters together with recommendations based on the 
interpretation of the data. It encompasses the opinions of the researcher based on the information 
obtained in the study, as well as the views of operational police officials (the respondents). These 
recommendations therefore serve as a guideline only. 
 
7.2 Summary of chapters 
Chapter 1 introduced the rationale for the research. The new democratic order heralded 
significant changes in the South African legal order. One such change was the birth of the 
Constitution. The arrival of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) caused a 
ripple effect of change throughout the South African legal system. An example would be that 
whilst the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) protected the right to life, the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) s49 (2) allowed for a fleeing suspect to be shot at 
(with the attendant possibility of killing such fleeing suspect) in order to secure his/her arrest for 
future appearance in a court of law.  
 
In Chapter 2, the research methodology employed in the study was described. The qualitative 
study involved the use of semi-structured, one-on-one interviews with operational police officials 
in the Gauteng and Vaal Rand areas. Twenty-nine respondents took part in the in-depth 
interviews which took between 1 to 1 ½ hours for each interview. In the probability sampling 
(random), any member of the population (target group) had an equal chance of being included in 
the sample. An interview guide was compiled which focused on various aspects of training on 
the use of lethal force. The data was analysed both statistically and thematically. Various 
research problems arose and were effectively dealt with.  
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Chapter 3 dealt with the review undertaken of the Basic Training Learning Programme that was 
implemented at the SAPS Training Institution, Pretoria, for new police recruits for the period 
July 2004 to June 2006. The review focussed specifically on use of lethal force training provided 
to recruits. Some of the learning material was discussed in detail namely the Regulatory 
Framework (Law and Policing) and Fitness and Street Survival (use of force). Included in this 
chapter are the unit standards provided for by SASSETA.  
 
Chapter 4 looked into the South African legal framework on the use of lethal force. It provides a 
backdrop on the history of Human Rights and comments on international perspectives. Chapter 2 
of the South African Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) (Bill of Rights) is 
discussed and this leads to the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995) which 
also guides use of lethal force in policing. A few groundbreaking case laws on the use of the 
lethal force are discussed. These influenced and impacted on the changes to s49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). The chapter ends with a discussion on how the courts 
view the use of force. 
 
Chapter 5 compares the old s49 to the new section. It explores different opinions on the use of 
lethal force and these are linked to the Basic Training Learning Programme. In particular the 
deadly force decision making model is discussed as well as the “grey areas” in the legal arena on 
s49. 
 
Chapter 6 summarised the data collected in the one-on-one interviews. Various themes were 
identified in the process, namely: 
• changes in behaviour of operational police officials when responding to serious crime 
after the amendment to s49; 
• recommendations to improve/introduce use of lethal force training for operational police 
officials; 
• results of real life use of lethal force situations experienced by police officials; 
• training on human rights and use of lethal force; and 
• general perceptions on the amendment to s49 and the use of lethal force. 
192 
 
The analyses and interpretation of the responses were done simultaneously. The results of the 
interviews were compared to the Basic Training Learning Programme use of lethal force 
requirements and the legal framework to establish whether the theory was supported or rejected 
by the data. Chapter 7 introduces recommendations. 
 
7.3 Recommendations: What is needed in the SAPS?  
This research had a problem-centred approach to the use of lethal force in the SAPS, i.e the use 
of lethal force was the dominant concern of operational problems by a specific group 
(operational police officials). If properly diagnosed and high level skills are identified – the 
concerns around the use of lethal force after the amendment to s49 may be successfully 
addressed. 
 
7.3.1 Dire need for clarity on the “grey areas” of the new s49  
The grey areas referred to here are the following: 
 
• The principle of “proportionality”; 
• “future death”; and 
• “substantial risk”. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, how does a police official determine whether a suspect will cause 
“future death”. Future “dangerousness” (threat of causing a death) of a suspect cannot be 
accurately predicted (Gellar & Scott, 1992:255). Both the Police and the Department of Justice 
need to seek, obtain, agree and communicate clarity on the areas of concern.  
 
Whilst the delay from 1998 to 2003 (five years) may have been unavoidable for various reasons, 
the last four years after the amendment to s49 should have warranted an intensive drive to 
address these issues. Ready or not, delays like these are not beneficial to both the ministries of 
Justice and Safety and Security. Neither is it fair or beneficial to police officials. The importance 
of the role of inter-departmental agencies is crucial in order to serve and protect the country. 
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It appears that the amendment has been finalised – appropriate or not. Immediate inter-
departmental support is needed to drive alignment and serve the needs of government and its 
people. Urgent training intervention on the part of the SAPS is required to do what is necessary 
to provide training and up-skilling of its members to conform to the new law.  
 
Legal experts need to clarify the legislation and propose an interpretation so that operational 
police officials can be up-skilled as soon as possible. In this way, valuable and appropriate 
training on the legal stance can take place with immediate effect. 
 
This recommendation must first be implemented. When finalized and/or addressed, it will 
support the following suggestions on improving the Basic Training Learning Programme and the 
Use of Lethal Force Training Program which follows below.  
 
7.3.2 Introduce a specific use of lethal force training programme for operational police 
officials  
A gap was identified between the Basic Training Learning Programme requirements in respect of 
use of lethal force and the actual training of operational police officials on use of lethal force. 
This research reflects that the use of lethal force training in the SAPS is disjointed. The 
misconception that practical skills coupled with the Act and a copy of its amendment (s49) are 
adequate to train operational police officials how to make decisions using the appropriate levels 
of force in a given situation. This fallacy may be costly, not only to the police services but to 
ordinary citizens. 
 
The content of the Basic Training Learning Programme on the use of lethal force was juxtaposed 
with the legal framework on lethal force. It is evident that the Basic Training Learning 
Programme is too vague and the “grey areas” are not unpacked, clarified or fully discussed. This 
could be as a result of the absence of an appropriate interpretation of the new s49. An operational 
police official cannot arrive at a sound decision on whether or not to use his/her weapon in the 
absence of such clarity. Hence, the general negative disposition in the sample population. (See 
Chapter 6 for detail).  
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Further, the majority of operational police officials interviewed attended Basic Training before 
the amendment but they were not re-trained by way of In-service training or attending a 
Workshop on the amendment to s49. Based on information received from the respondents, no 
practical or theoretical training material was disseminated to police officials other than a 
(legalistic) National Instruction on the matter. It is evident that drastic measures need to be 
implemented to address this situation in order to effectively provide those police officials who 
attended training before 2003, with the relevant knowledge and skills on how and when to use 
lethal force in line with organisational and legal requirements. 
 
The research conducted has revealed that most of the police officials interviewed attended basic 
training before the arrival of the 1996 Constitution and subsequent amendment to s49 in 2003. 
And yet they have not received training and development to bring them up to speed with the 
changed political and legal landscape. Coupled to this situation was the “…..profound changes in 
the training and development field in South Africa….” (Erasmus & Van Dyk, 1999:xv). These 
changes being the promulgation of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act 2 
of 1995), outcomes based education and unit standards, etc.  
 
Secondly, an investigation conducted by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) 
undertaken in 2002 indicated that police readily use their weapons to stop fleeing suspects whilst 
not under imminent life threatening danger (Annual Report, 2002-2003). According to Adv. K. 
MacKenzie, the then Head of the ICD, it was the belief of the ICD “that the lack of training on 
how to implement this Act” (s49), has contributed to the high number of deaths. The ICD went 
on to add that refresher firearm and “simulation” training was necessary. The research for this 
study revealed that the majority of the respondents (all operational police officials) are not 
appropriately or inadequately (lack of) trained on the amendment to s49. (The results indicated 
that 86% did not receive in-service training whilst 79% did not attend a workshop on the 
amendment either). 
 
Thirdly, the results of the research conducted in this study, has confirmed that there is a general 
lack of training on the use of lethal force.  
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The aforementioned discussion is supported by Leggett (2003:1) who appropriately states that 
“to expect a civil service to undergo transformation without substantial retraining is very 
unrealistic”. Inevitably, it is predicted that improved training would boost confidence, alleviate 
fear and the uncertainty presently so prevalent in policing.  
 
The benefits of training, as described by Erasmus & Van Dyk (1999:33), ensures that the 
enterprise (organisation) and the employee benefit as a whole. The police service would benefit 
and probably save on legal and civil expenses if their approach to this situation changed.  
 
It is suggested that in order to close the gap identified between operational police officials who 
were trained before and after the amendment to s49, a Use of Lethal Force Training Programme 
should be introduced. This training must include the entire scope of the use of lethal force. This 
means that in addition to the current training of the legal requirements, scenarios and limited 
practical skills, operational police officials need training on how to write statements and present 
evidence in court to justify the level of force they applied and under what circumstances.75 
 
It would be advisable to target those police officials who passed Basic Training Learning 
Programme before 1996. The research revealed that development in the following important 
subjects is necessary: 
• Human rights and policing; 
• Theoretical study on the use of lethal force; 
• Practical training on the use of lethal force;  
• Simulation Training; and 
• Statement writing and testifying on the decision to use lethal force. 
 
                                                
75
 Refer to article Integrated use-of-force training program – Focus on Training in: The FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin for more detail. See reference list. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3197/is_n8_v36/ai_11199334, 
November 1996. 
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It is suggested that the SAPS employ several methods to conduct a training needs analysis to 
identify the organisation’s training needs. This will ensure that the needs of crime fighting police 
officials are valid. In addition, unnecessary expenditure on training and other resources could 
then be avoided. It is suggested that the Nadler’s model for training, also called the “critical 
events model”, be considered for this process (Erasmus & Van Dyk, 1999:41). 
 
Whilst it may be advisable to provide this type of training to the entire service, those units that 
respond to crime as first responders, such as the Flying Squad, Community Services Centre 
personnel and the Crime Prevention Unit should be considered to receive this new training (and 
re-training) first. 
 
Theory based approach to training 
In terms of a more theoretical based study, the relevant unit standards from the SAQA approved 
learning programme related to Human Rights and the use of lethal force should be extracted. 
Minor alterations and additions need to be made to customise the program according to specific 
policing needs. A program is then designed to achieve competency in the identified unit 
standards for human rights and the use of lethal force. The inputs from the legal experts on a 
proposed interpretation on s49 to be included in the theory part of the program. The introduction 
of such a program with a focus on police safety and clarity on legal framework as per Chapter 4, 
will serve the interests of the service well. Bruce, (2002d:5) informs that in the United States the 
killings of police declined with the improvements in police safety.  
 
Scenario-based role-playing 
The training programme also needs to be based on the previous decided case laws (Chapter 4). 
Actual scenarios based on these cases, as well as actual shooting incidents of operational police 
officials, need to be discussed and reviewed (a case study approach to training with trainees role-
playing in simulation exercises of incidents and events drawn from the South African context).  
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The challenge here could be that there is no case law on the present interpretation on the new s49 
since its amendment. The “grey areas” referred to earlier, have not been tested in court. It is 
difficult to train police officials on the use of force without a definite, clear interpretation. But, 
this could be resolved by the proposed interpretation of role-players suggested above. However, 
case decisions on the amended version may well also provide added support in implementing a 
training program.  
 
Practical and/or simulation training 
The physical fitness standards of the operational police official, is of utmost importance. 
Standards for acceptable levels of fitness need to be set. These fitness standards may be linked to 
the SAPS Performance Enhancement Process and accompanied by regular competency tests. 
Further, it is suggested that this process is measured and performance be rewarded or incentive 
based. In terms of the Use of Lethal Force Training Programme, training in unarmed combat and 
restraining techniques is also necessary. Police officials need to be equipped to use minimum 
force before considering the option of making use of their weapons if the situation warrants (last 
resort option). 
 
There is a dire need to develop simulation training. For the purposes of this research, simulation 
training essentially means setting up mock scenarios and training police officials to make split 
second decisions by responding in line with legal and Human Rights provisions is a necessity. 
The SAPS cannot afford to ignore the need for this type of intervention on use of lethal force. 
Simulation training on the use of lethal force will allow the police official to perform his/her task 
on a high standard in an actual situation. This will positively contribute to his/her competency 
levels. In an article, Sanow (2001:64-68) discusses different training courses in controlled and 
survival force that are offered by the United States National Standardized Training Association 
(USNSTA).76 The USNSTA developed a national training standard for the use of force that starts 
at physical force and escalates to lethal force. The training is varied from hand-to-hand combat to 
the use of lethal force.  
 
                                                
76
 View complete article at www.controlledforce.com/articles/article16.pdf  
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One of the training methods used in the program that involves the use of force from physical to 
lethal force, is the Firearms Training Simulator training. This training program is a computerised 
simulation programme that allows police officials to “respond” to a range of life threatening 
situations. The Mistry et al. report (2001:69) on the use of force also strongly recommended 
Simulation Training to help police officials to “inculcate split-second decision making and 
critical assessment of life-threatening situations”.  
 
Simulation training will combine the theory (knowledge) and practical training (skills) of the 
operational police official when he decides (attributes) whether or not to use his/her weapon in a 
simulated scenario. This process is termed “applied competence” (Erasmus & Van Dyk, 
1999:149). It is suggested that the top ten crimes (gleaned from the crime statistics) per province 
are extrapolated and training scenarios on each are developed accordingly. All operational police 
officials in the respective province then to be trained in line with the greatest risk he/she may 
face when on duty.  
 
Police officials who do not meet with the standards in respect of the theory, practical and 
simulation training should perform duties indoors for a limited period. He/she may then be 
allowed to re-train and retest to meet with the competency requirements.  
 
It is suggested the Use of Lethal Force Training Programme be linked to relevant unit standards 
and the National Qualification Framework. Police officials should be awarded credits upon 
successful completion of the program (which can be taken into account for promotion purposes, 
and towards further higher education study). 
 
In support of the above recommendation, the ICD (2003:56) recommended that s49 workshops 
are needed for “clear and concise explanation and definitions of the whole Section 49”. It was 
further suggested that these workshops deal with practical aspects such as case studies, role-
playing, simulation training and weapons handling training.77 
 
 
                                                
77
 View full report at http://www.icd.gov.za/documents/2003/annualreport03.pdf (accessed 1/3/2009). 
199 
 
7.3.3 Upgrade the Basic Training Learning Programme to include specifically the 
correlation and/or difference between Private Defence and the use of lethal force 
when effecting an arrest 
When asked if there is any correlation and/or difference between the use of lethal force during 
arrest and acting in private defence, many understood the use of private defence to be associated 
with the use of force whilst off duty. It appears that the use of the term “private” refers to the use 
of lethal force whilst police officials are off duty. It may also imply that operational police 
officials understand private defence to be applicable to those circumstances where they (police 
officials) use lethal force to protect their families, i.e. there must be a relationship (private and 
personal/family link) between the person who acted and the person whose interest was 
threatened. But, as provided for in the module under discussion this is clearly not what acting in 
private defence is about. A detailed discussion appears at Question 30 in Chapter 6. In S v 
Mokoena (1976:162), was also quoted to indicate that a person may act in private defence to 
protect another person, although there is no relation between the person who acted and the 
person whose interest was threatened (General Principles of South African Criminal Law, 
2004:27). An intervention that clarifies the use of lethal force and its relationship to private 
defence and effecting arrests will provide some relief to any misunderstandings. 
 
7.3.4 Upgrade the Basic Training Learning Programme  
The following recommendations are made towards improving the Basic Training Learning 
Programme of June 2004 to 2006. This section complements the recommendation made above in 
7.3.2. 
 
Of the total of 11 themes referred to in Chapter 3, only four themes relating to the use of lethal 
force were reviewed in detail. They are the overview of the SAPS (background), the Principles 
of Policing, Regulatory Framework of Policing and Fitness and Street Survival.  
 
In the Principles of Policing (Chapter 3), the fact that the police have no legislative or judicial 
powers needs to be driven home in order to clarify how they see their role in the crime fighting 
process.  
However, the research revealed that operational police officials feel powerless in that they 
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perceive that they cannot protect themselves appropriately – their idea of appropriately seems to 
be that they are not allowed to use their weapons like they previously (pre-1994) did. However, 
they need to understand and adapt by changing their way of policing to fall in line with a more 
human rights orientated and respect for the law approach. 
 
The Regulatory Framework addresses the General Principles of South African Criminal Law. In 
it the failure to act where there is a legal duty to act positively may also be deemed to be acting 
unlawfully, is mentioned.  
 
From the research conducted in this study it is clearly evident that police officials are afraid of 
using their weapons, use of which becomes a highly likely occurrence when they need to respond 
to serious crime. They deliberately do not respond promptly to emergencies where firearms are 
used, e.g. armed robbery, violence, etcetera. Surely such a failure to act promptly is contrary to 
what is expected of a police officer on duty. Police officials are duty bound to act/respond to 
emergencies yet the research findings of this study conveyed attitudes of apathy and an 
intentional delayed reaction due to the police officials’ fear of reprisals or sanctions (legal and 
disciplinary by the organisation itself).  
 
When compared to the Basic Training Learning Programme (for the training period 2004 to 
2006), the module on the Use of Force (2003) strongly emphasises inter alia that police officials 
must “master the principle of appropriate use of force” apart from having extensive knowledge 
of police powers conferred upon the police official by law. The module introduces the deadly 
force decision-making model, namely: Ability, Opportunity and Jeopardy. This is introduced via 
the ‘S’ in AITEST which represents ‘Scale for use of force and shooting decisions’. The 
presence of all three – Ability, Opportunity and Jeopardy – may justify the use of lethal force. I 
am of the opinion that the deadly force decision making model may be appropriately used to 
explain subsection 2(c) of the new s49(2) and must be considered in future training and 
development of operational police officials.  
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This issue needs to be addressed in future training and intervention. The onus to respond is upon 
the police official, failure to respond must result in prompt disciplinary action. So too, the onus 
to clarify the issue around the amended s49, is upon senior management of the SAPS.  
 
The “grey areas” discussed in Chapter 5 of this research, also need to be unpacked and clarified 
in more detail. The Basic Training Learning Programme reviewed did not effectively illustrate 
the principle of proportionality, substantial risk, future death, etcetera. Six case laws were cited 
in the program that dealt with lethal force and this is encouraging. These case laws should be 
presented as scenarios and enacted by simulations for inclusion in the Basic Training Learning 
Programme. The AITEST and its principles were very relevant. It addresses officer safety and 
assists police officials in making appropriate lethal force decisions as it includes scenarios such 
as armed robbery. However, a clear understanding that the use of lethal force must be strictly 
necessary and unavoidable does not come through with enough emphasis. 
 
The reason for this could be that the amendment was only signed into law in 2003, one year 
before the Basic Training Learning Programme had come into effect. Nevertheless, this does 
little to justify the absence of any form of training on the subject of the majority of operational 
police officials interviewed in the research. I am not sufficiently convinced that the Basic 
Training Learning Programme addresses the needs of police officials engaged in operational 
work.78  
 
7.3.5 Improve the morale and poor perceptions on the use of lethal force in the SAPS 
 
It is recommended that senior management in the SAPS address the general negative 
perception/attitude of operational police officials on the use of lethal force (see Chapter 6).  
 
In addition, the researcher is of the opinion that there is an urgent need to boost the confidence of 
police officials presently and alleviate fear and uncertainty in respect of the use of lethal force, a 
phenomenon that is evidently prevalent in current policing in South Africa. 
 
                                                
78
 The review of the Basic Training Programme in Chapter 3 refers. 
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It is the opinion of the researcher that the poor handling of the amendment to s49 in the upper 
echelons of the government, may have contributed to this situation. The controversy on the use 
of lethal force coupled with a national instruction which states that a signed copy is to be placed 
on the member’s personal file (Annexure I) stating his/her acknowledgement of receipt and 
reading of the instruction (but without receiving any formal practical training), may be perceived 
as intimidating to police officials with reference to their understanding of its (s49) implications 
and implementation at ground level.  
 
It appears that many are not applying for the position of the “sacrificial lamb” or wanting to have 
their name on the next decided case law. The morale of the police officials interviewed was low 
and their general disposition indicated that the majority of them have a negative view to the 
changes to s49. It is suggested that a forum is created to allow the free exchange of ideas. An 
internal process such as an information hotline may be set up to receive such queries. The centre 
may then advise and/or counsel police officials on how to deal with their concerns around the 
implementation of the amended s49 and other practical problems that they may be experiencing.  
 
7.4 Summary 
If the recommendations are implemented, it will prevent operational police officials from 
contravening the very laws they are responsible for upholding, which resulted in the Govender 
case in the first place. Furthermore, the SAPS may save on expensive legal battles and use this 
money to invest in one of their most important human capital, i.e. operational police officials.  
 
The research objective was to explore whether operational police officials are adequately trained 
to make use of lethal force decisions in line with legal and organisational requirements. As 
illustrated, this research question was tested by evaluating the Basic Training Learning 
Programme (June 2004 to 2006), exploring the legal framework and engaging in one-on-one 
interviews with operational police officials. The comparison analysis clearly identified a gap and 
further illustrated that the majority of operational police officials in the sample group are 
presently not adequately trained to make use of lethal force decisions that are in line with legal 
requirements. 
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In order to tackle this concern, it is recommended that SAPS management urgently take note and 
implement corrective action to retrain and up-skill operational police officials, especially those 
who entered the service before 1996. Future areas for research into this situation could include an 
investigation into cases where police officials used lethal force after the amendment to s49. 
Court decisions may also be used to periodically re-evaluate the training on the matter.  
 
In addition, the poor morale of police officials could be researched to determine its root cause 
and take corrective action to address it. 
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ANNEXURE C: LIST OF SCHEDULE 1 OFFENCES, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 
51 OF 1977 
 
Source: Joubert, C. 1999. Applied Law for Police Officials. Technikon SA: Florida. 
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ANNEXURE D: COVER LETTER FOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Respondent 
Thank you for your time. I am a student with UNISA, completing a masters degree in Police Practice. 
TOPIC: AN EVALUATION ON THE TRAINING OF SAPS POLICE OFFICIALS ON 
THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 49 OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, ACT 51 OF 1977. 
 
This research has been approved at Head Office Strategic Management, the Divisional Commissioner and 
UNISA. You have been selected by a random sample for the purpose of having a semi-structured 
interview on the chosen topic. Your view on the matter is important. 
 
Your participation is voluntary, your service number and name are not recorded anywhere on the 
questionnaire. You and your responses are COMPLETELY anonymous. The information obtained during 
this interview is strictly confidential. The data received will be processed and categorized in manner that 
would make it impossible to identify a particular person's response. You are therefore urged to be totally 
honest. 
 
Please keep the following in mind: 
• Lethal force shall refer to force that necessitates the use of a firearm. 
• Training shall include practical, theorectical and simulation training. 
It is envisaged that this research will be used to make a positive contribution to policing and your input 
will be valued. If you have any questions about the interviews, please contact Rita Moodley on 082 8040 
253. 
 
Thank you for your time and effort. 
 
Rita Moodley.  
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ANNEXURE E: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE: MTECH RESEARCH PROJECT ON USE OF FORCE & S49 TRAINING 
 
Please indicate your answer with an (X) in the appropriate box provided. Where a written answer is 
required please write in the space provided. If you need to write more than what can fit in the space please 
attach a separate sheet of paper with the question number above your written response. 
 
PLEASE NOTE! ALL RESPONSES WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS SINCE YOU ARE NOT 
REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ANY IDENTIFICATION OR YOUR NAME 
 
SECTION 1: 
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
 
QUESTION 1:  What is your gender?  
 
Male Female 
  
 
QUESTION 2: How old are you? (years) 
 
 
 
QUESTION 3: How long have you been in the SAPS (number of years)? 
 
 
 
QUESTION 4: In which unit do you currently serve? 
 
 
 
QUESTION 5: When did you receive your Basic Training at the SAPS Training College? (passing out 
month & year date). 
Month Year 
  
 
QUESTION 6:  
In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the use of force and the 
provisions/requirements of Section 49 (use of force to effect an arrest) of the Criminal Procedure Act (No 
51 of 1977)? 
YES NO IF NO, PROCEED TO QUESTION 8 
  
 
QUESTION 7:  
Did the training include reference to the applicable decisions by the Appellate Division and/or the 
Constitutional Court? 
YES NO 
  
QUESTION 8: If yes, briefly describe the extent of the training 
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QUESTION 9:  
In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the Amendment to Section 49 (Judicial 
Matters Second Amendment Act (No. 122 of 1998)? 
YES NO 
  
 
QUESTION 10: 
In your Basic Training did you receive any formal training on the topic of Human Rights & Policing? 
YES NO 
  
 
QUESTION 11:  If yes, what was the extent of the training? 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 12: 
Since receiving your Basic Training, have you attended any WORKSHOP OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING 
on the topic of Human Rights & Policing - specifically related to the Bill of Rights and the importance of 
the limitation clause (Section 36 of the Constitution Act 108, 1996). 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 13: 
If yes, when did you receive this in-service training or attend the workshop (month and year date)? 
MONTH YEAR 
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QUESTION 14: If yes, what was the extent of this training? 
 
 
QUESTION 15: 
Since receiving your Basic Training have you received any IN-SERVICE TRAINING on the Amendment 
to Section 49 (Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act (No. 122 of 1998)? If NO, proceed to Question 
15. 
YES NO 
  
 
QUESTION 16: If yes, briefly describe the extent of the in-service training you received. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 17: 
Since receiving your Basic Training, have you attended any WORKSHOP in which you were informed of 
the Amendment to Section 49? (If NO, proceed to Question 19. 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 18: If yes, when did you attend this workshop? (Month and year date)? 
DATE MONTH YEAR 
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QUESTION 19: 
If you have received training on both the former and current Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51/77, did it lead to any changes in the way you behave(d) regarding the use of lethal force during arrest? 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 20: 
If yes, explain how you modified or will modify your behavior in a situation as described in Section 49 – 
if you need to use lethal force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 21: 
If no to Question 15, would you be interested in attending a course or workshop on the use of lethal force, 
specifically on the new Section 49? 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 22: 
Do you think a learning program or in-service training on the use of lethal force is necessary to prepare 
police members for policing on the streets? 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 23: 
From your experience what kind of use of lethal force training would you recommend be provided to 
police members? 
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QUESTION 24: 
From your experience are there any changes or additions you would recommend be implemented or 
added for improving the training on the use of lethal force and Section 49 in the SAPS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 25: 
When responding to any serious crime situation do you make a conscious effort to keep: 
1. Use of lethal force training in the back of your mind? 
YES  NO 
  
 
2. Training regarding fundamental human rights, in the back of your mind? 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 26: 
Within the last five years have you had occasion to make use of your FIREARM while performing your 
police duties? (If NO, proceed to Scenario 1). 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 27: 
What were the outcome/s and result/s of the above event? (insert tick here) in the applicable boxes – there 
can be multiple ticks or none. 
Arrest and detention of suspect  Injury to suspect/s  
Injury to bystander/s  Death of suspect/s  
Death of bystander/s  Criminal charges  
Suspension from duty  Conviction on charges  
Internal disciplinary hearing  Discharge from SAPS  
No injuries sustained after 
shooting incident 
 
 
Any other (describe/list e.g death of a fellow police official) 
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QUESTION 28: If yes, briefly describe the use of lethal force event/situation where this occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 29: 
Were you ever trained regarding the correlation and/or differences between the use of lethal force during 
arrest and acting in private defense? 
YES  NO 
  
 
QUESTION 30: If yes, briefly explain the extent of this training. 
 
 
 
SCENARIO ONE 
You attend a domestic violence complaint and find that the wife of the suspect has been badly beaten up. 
The husband/suspect is outside the property. The victim identifies/points him out to you. You approach 
him, place your hand on his shoulder and inform him that you are placing him under arrest. He pushes 
you away and flees down the road. How would you respond in a situation such as this where a suspect for 
Domestic Violence resists arrest and attempts to flee. Would you attempt to arrest him and how would 
you carry out the arrest. 
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SCENARIO TWO 
In the same scenario, you are attending the complaint of domestic violence and find that the wife of the 
suspect has been badly beaten up. The husband/suspect has a firearm on the premises but it is not on his 
person. According to his wife, prior to your arrival, he threatened to shoot her. He is standing outside the 
property. The victim identifies/points him out to you. You approach him, place your hand on his shoulder 
and inform him that you are placing him under arrest. He refuses to consent to the arrest and does not co-
operate. Explain what you would do next. (Section 49 (2) (b). 
 
 
SCENARIO THREE 
You attend a domestic violence complaint and find that the wife of the suspect has been badly beaten up. 
The husband/suspect is outside the property. The victim identifies/points him out to you. She also informs 
you that he has a firearm and, prior to your arrival, has threatened to use it. You place a hand on his 
shoulder and inform him that you are placing him under arrest. He pushes you away and attempts to flee. 
How would you respond in an instance like this where an armed suspect for Domestic Violence resists 
arrest and attempts to flee. Would you arrest him and how would you carry out the arrest. Explain briefly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 31: Is there any other information about the use of lethal force and Section 49 you would 
like to add? 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE! 
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Source Theoretical and foundational knowledge on the use of lethal force. 
http://www.sasseta.org.za/docs/Whats-new/THEORETICAL-AND-
FOUNDATIONAL-KNOWLEDGE.pdf.  
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